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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this dissertation is firstly to define .and 
analyse the concept of ~inority rights and to place it in 
perspective in relation to surrounding concepts such as 
communalism, ethnicity, groups and individualism. This is 
done through a critical discussion of various theoretical 
perspectives relating to the subject matter. Comparisons 
are drawn between the policies of various plural societies 
aimed at accommodating their ethnic diversity, either 
constitutionally or 
This is followed by 
through methods that lack legitimacy. 
a discussion and evaluation of 
consociational democracy and federalism 
solutions to the problems created by 
minorities in a plural society. Having made 
as possible 
ethnicity and 
the hypothesis 
that democracy is best served in a multi-ethnic society by 
a system that emphasizes group rights in addition to 
individual rights and which accepts the notion of 
government through consensus, the emphasis then moves to 
the particular nature of the South African minority 
question. The policies of the various actors on the South 
African political scene towards minority righta are 
analysed critically. Attention is given to factors which 
may influence group formation in a system emphasizing 
voluntary association, such as race, ethnicity, class and 
ideology. There is also a discussion of the nature of the 
rights which minorities may claim and emphasis is placed on 
the requirement that minorities should be able to levy 
strategic influence without disrupting the society as a 
whole. Finally, this dissertation deals with the 
question of which constitutional alternatives offer the 
most promising solution to the problems caused by South 
Africa's cultural diversity. Although a political system 
emphasizing individual rights might come closest to the 
liberal ideal and may be suitable to a ethnically 
homogeneous country, the violent history of plural 
societies where group rights have been neglected, indicate 
the need for a pluralist solution in South Africa. While 
there is a strong tendency among Blacks to view the concept 
of minority rights as yet another Apartheid ploy to 
maintain White domination and privileges, the purpose of 
this paper has been to prove that minority rights is an 
universal conc~pt and is not a creation of Apartheid, 
although the National Party has managed to almost 
irreversibly taint it. Yet, in a system of group formation 
through voluntary association, the concept of minority 
rights can serve as a powerful tool to help facilitate a 
negotiated settlement towards a predominantly Slack 
government based on consensus. A true power-sharing 
consensus-orientated constitution has been found in 
Lijphart's notion of a consociational democracy and the 
view is taken that the Natal-KwaZulu 
constitutional proposals is an 
con•titution. 
example of 
Indaba's 
such a 
-----------~-----------
PREFACE 
Although this dissertation is primarily an academic work 
required for the completion of a Masters Degree, it also 
represents a longstand~ng interest of mine in ethnically 
diverse societies and the plight of minority groups in 
various parts of the world. The focus of my field of study 
has shifted during recent years from an international to a 
more South African perspective, firstly because of the 
rising level of conflict in South Africa, 
because of the acceptance that I, as a 
and secondly 
member of an 
Afrikaner minority with a sad record of racial repression, 
am under an obligation to direct my attention to a 
fundamental question of a post- Apartheid society what 
role should minority rights and a group-based ideology play 
and which constitutional model will secure a peaceful 
future for us and our children? 
The precarious position in which the White South African 
finds himself in 1988 is the direct result of decades of 
enforced group classification based on race, and the 
question inevitably arises whether our society might not 
have been more normal and integrated like that of Brazil, 
for example, had South Africans been treated as individuals 
irrespective of their race and ethnicity? The question is 
hypothetical and the reality remains a society deeply 
divided on racial grounds, with the White minority holding 
a vice-like grip on political and economic power as a 
perceived safeguard for the future existence. 
The idea behind this paper is then to research the pomsible 
ways by which to persuade the ruling group to loosen its 
grip on power by ottering its members certain safeguards 
r~garding their continued survival in, but not dominance 
of, a democratic non-racial South Africa. 
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1.INTROOUCTION 
" ••. in those states in whic:h ethnic:, rel igioLts and 
linquistic: minorities exist, persons belonging to suc:h 
minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with 
other members of their group, to enjoy their own c:ulture, 
to profess and prac:tic:e their own religion, and to use 
their own language." 
-Article 27 of the United Nations Covenant on c:ivil and 
Politic:al Rights. 
The above-mentioned right of persons belonging to 
minorities has bec:ome a foc:us of continuous politic:al 
conflict throughout the twentieth century. Minorities are 
a fact of political life, especially so in plural societies 
when one segment of the population tends to bec:ome 
politically dominant, c:ausing c:onflic:t between it and other 
weaker or less numerous segments of the society. This 
results normally in the loss of legitimacy of the ruling 
government. 
Responses to the question of acc:ommodating minorities in a 
plural society can take the form of either individualism dr 
communalism; individualism referring to the primacy of the 
individual as the basic and central political unit, as 
oppose to the group approach of c:ommunalism which 
emphasizes the right of a group to exist and survive. In 
1 
this dissertation· 
individual rights 
it will be argued 
can coe>:ist and 
that 
that 
group and 
the ideal 
constitution in a plural society like South Africa, will 
strive to keep a fine balance between the$e. 
Although this paper will deal mostly with the minority 
question in South Africa in the post-Apartheid era, a 
review will also be given 
d•bate and developments in this 
of the current 
regard. 
group rights 
is not unique to South African, comparisons 
Since the problem 
will therefore 
be made with other countries such as Canada, Switzerland, 
Cyprus, Northern Ireland,Zimbabwe and Nigeria. All these 
states have significant minority groups and have tried to 
accommodate the aspirations of these groups in several ways 
such as regional autonomy in Belgium, minority 
over-representation in Switzerland, or, as in Spain and 
Zimbabwe by ignoring group aspirations and insisting on 
individual rights. Among some 
devices traditionally adopted 
accommodate minorities have 
of the other constitutional 
in plural societies to 
been bicameralism, the 
separation of powers, the federal division of competence, 
proportionality, checks and balances, a bill of rights and 
judicial review. Some of these efforts have failed 
dismally, but by carefully analyzing the reasons behind 
these failures, conclusions can be drawn with regard to 
what should be avoided in South Africa's future 
constitution. 
2 
Although South Africa is similar in certain respects to 
many other plural states in the world, it is unique in two 
ways : firstly, the dominant group at present actually 
consist of a numerically small minority group which numbers 
about one sixth of the total population, and secondly, in 
South Africa group membership is imposed from without 
i.e., it is not voluntary. The emphasis of this paper will 
fall not so much on the present South African group 
dispensation which has been forced onto the country by the 
National Party's obsession with racial and ethn~c groups, 
but will instead focus more on prospects for voluntary 
group formation in a post-Apartheid era. 
When negotiations commence over a democratic constitution, 
a choice will have to be made between a purely 
individualistic approach, a communal approach or a 
combination of the two. If communalism is incorporated into 
the constitution, the question arises as to whether the 
rig~ts of groups should be purely negative - i.e. the right 
against interference from outside the group - or positive, 
in which case it refers to the more active claims such as 
representation in the parliament and in the civil service 
as a group, which implies state support for that particular 
group and power-sharing. If one accepts the legitimacy of 
minority rights it should further be decided what kind of 
groups would be eligible to make legitimate claims and also 
which rights would be regarded as legitimate. Although it 
3 
is difficult to make any prior predictions on which groups 
will emerge and how long 
one thing is certain 
such a configuration will endure, 
the principle of voluntary 
association will have to form th- co~nerstone of any such a 
system. 
Although much is said in the minority rights debate about 
how a group's rights against outside interference should b~ 
protected, refering mostly to cultural autonomy, language 
and religious rights, the essence of the debate centers 
more on political and economic power how it will be 
distributed among various groups and whether this 
distribution will allow minorities to safeguard their 
interests and survival. 
4 
2.PERSPECTIVES AND THEORIES RELATING TO 
MINORITY RIGHTS. 
ETHNICITY AND 
It may be proper to begin discussion of minority rights by 
c:larifying two surroundir1g c:onc:epts, namely 11 ethnic:ity 11 
and 11 plural. soc:iety 11 • A plural society is understood to 
c:ontain two or more communities based on distinct factors 
of race, culture, cast~, language or religion. The lines 
of differentiation or c:leavages tend to be deep and 
mLttual 1 y 
multiple 
divisions 
leading 
re-enforcing and few cross-cutting cleavages and 
group applications 
fol.low closely the 
to sharp conflicts 
are present. 
lines of social 
between groups or 
Political 
cleavage, 
segments 
(Boulle 1985 :29 ). To avoid confusion, Boulle also 
distinguishes between the term "plural society" which means 
a highly segmented and conflict prone society and a 
11 pluralistic:: society" which re·fer to a society wi·th many 
politically 
memberships. 
significant gr .. oups with cross-cutting 
The political form of the former is 
sectional domination and for the lattef, liberal democracy 
(Boulle 1985 : 33). 
Whereas the terms plural/pluralistic society refers to the 
heterogeneity of a soc:iety in which the segments may or may 
not be in conflict, ethnicity refers to the factots that 
are used to justify and give substance to differences 
between these segments. Rothschild (1981 : 9) refers to 
5 
ethnic:ity as "the political activities of complex 
collective groups whose membership is largely determined by 
real or putative ancestral ties and who perceive these ties 
as systematically affecting their place and fate in the 
political and socio-economic structures of their state and 
society''. As criteria of ethnic identification, he lists 
the following race, kinship, religion, language, 
customary mode of livelihood and regionalism. Out of the 
above explanations of the concepts of a plural society and 
ethnicity, it follows that both concepts are closely 
intertwined with the definition of minorities. 
Sigler (1983 5) defines a minority as" ••. any group 
c:ategory of people who can be identified by a sizeable 
segment of the population as objects for prejudice or 
discrimination or who, for reasons of deprivation, require 
the positive assistance of the state." This def ir1i tion 
includes groups whose status derives from race, religion, 
Other language, ethnicity, caste and culture. 
characteristics ascribed to minorities are subordinate 
statLts, low self-esteem, an implicit sense of solidarity 
imply settlement in a certain and identity and often 
geographical area. The definition mentioned in the 
Covenant on civil and Political Rights of the U.N. is quite 
similar and defines minorities as '' •.. non-dominant groups 
in population which possess and wish to preserve stable 
ethnic, religious or linquistic traditions or 
6 
charac:ter.ist.ics different to the n~st of the population". 
A fine semantic distinction can be drawn between the 
concept of minorities and .that of groups. While~ a 
minority ref~rs almost inevitably to a non-dominant segment 
of a heterogeneous population, the concept of group is less 
specific and may refer to either a majority or a 
minority. Sigler ( 198~!. 6) tries tc, avoid the 
ambiguities of the term 'group' by focusing on minority 
rights as an aspec:t of group rights." In the South 
Afric:an context a stigma has been attached to the term 
'minorities' bec:ause of the abuse of it by the National 
Party whic:h has equated minorities in South Africa with 
"nations" based on forced ethnic affiliations in acc:ordcmc:e 
with the Population Registration Ac:t. This policy of 
"divide and rule " implies the deliberate fragmemtation of 
the black population. In spite of the fact that the term 
has beeM slightly discredited in the South Afric:an 
context, it is used and recognized internationally. I 
will therefore use the terms 'groups' and 'minorities' 
interchangeably, with the provision that when I refer to 
groups, it will be used in reference to minority or 
non-dominant groups 
Identifying Minorities 
In order to evaluate minority claims to certain rights and 
7 
to a separate identity, one has to first find a way to 
identify these minority groups. Certain criteria can 
assist one in evaluating which groups may legitimately make 
claims. 
Ethnicity has always been a prime distinguishing feature of 
groups. Shibutani and Kwan (1976: 98-98) define an 
ethnic: group as, " ••• consisting out of people who conceive 
of themselves as being of a kind, who are united by 
emotional bonds, mostly speak the same language, and share 
a common cultural heritage." Very important is their 
belief that they are of common descent, but at the same 
time, such an ethnic group does not necessarily constitute 
a nation. 
Adam and Moodley (1986 27) claim that the way by which 
ethnicity asserts itself depends primarily on the policies 
of the dominant group in other words, unchecked 
domination by the dominant group may cause grievances among 
the minority group and result in ethnic mobilization. The 
authors further distinguish between cultural, economic and 
political ethnicity. Cultural ethnicity refers to 
language, religion or regional particularities such as 
customs and shared values. Economic: ethnicity dehotes 
economic in•qualities that coincide with ethnic group 
boundaries, while ethnicity in the political sense, refers 
to legal and regal inequalities between groups 
8 
Skin colour is one of the most common differentiating 
factors used in identifying groups. Such groups will 
often experience discrimination and prejudice such as being 
denied access to jobs, education, housing and other social 
goods. Sigler (1983 7) mentions some further 
identifying 
firstly, 
characteristics 
that membership 
voluntary in the sense that 
a.scribed to minorities: 
of such groups are rarely 
it is usually determined by 
descent or inheritance; secondly, minority status does not 
require a numerical minority, as the black population in 
South· Africa. c:an presently testify to. Thirdly, 
minorities are c:onflic:t groups in a continuous state of 
unrest and social dissatisfaction and fourthly, ac:c:ess to 
the majority group may be difficult for members of the 
minority. 
Schlemmer, in an article entitled "Need and Criteria for a 
new Constitutional Dispensation", uses ethnicity as a 
synonym for group identity. He regards a. group's shared 
self-c:onc:ept and the way it is defined, in terms of 
identity-contra.st with other groups, as very important. He 
adds that ethnic: group identity (ethnicity) c:an be nominal, 
passive and formal and can stem from sentiment actively 
shared within a group. 
Bla.~uw (1986 :5) mentions that a. group is 'sui generis' 
i.e. it has its own reality/uniqueness and he gives three 
9 
reasons for the relatively independent reality of groups: 
Firstly, although individuals come and go, the group goes 
on. Secondly, the group has a determining effect on the 
attitudes of its members, and finally, there will be 
differences af opinion within any one group. 
When identifying a gro~p, one has to deal with the concept 
of voluntary association, which refers to the freedom of 
choice of anyone to join any group, and not to. be forced to 
become a member of that group. Macdonald (1986 :9), in his 
critique of group rights, mentions that defenders of group 
rights often insist that group rights are illegitimate if 
the groups are not formed by voluntary association. He 
questions this approach by arguing that, if it is groups 
that define persons, it follows that persons cannot become 
members of any group; and asks these pertinent questions: 
"So how c:an group!:!i in this c:or,text be c:onst.it.uted by c:\ 
principle of voluntary associatio1,? 11 , .and, "is tt,e r,otior, 
of group rigt,ts compatible with this (limited) principle of 
voluntary association?" 
In his view, very few group rights would be legitimate .if 
the principle of voluntary association is to be a condition 
for the recognition of such rights. He recommends that a 
more plausible test would be that the recognition of group 
10 
rights "should not ac:cord unequal power to sc:>me groups". 
Macdonald gives further substance to his argument by citing 
ar, imaginary e:·:ample of 
entrenched representation in 
an Afrikaner 
parliament 
group having 
what woL1ld the 
purpose of this be if the principle of voluntary 
association allows anybody from any group to join an 
Afrikaner group? 
A plausible answer to Macdonald's argument would be that 
even under a system of free association, certain criteria 
would determine individual entry into a group, eg. 
language, religion, or in the 
sharing the same ideological 
members. Macdonald finally 
case of a political party, 
beliefs as other party 
admits that even though he 
argued that group rights are not legitimate, the reality of 
a linguistically heterogeneous South African plural society 
sL1ggests that his previous analysis is "fatally flawed". 
According to Adam and Moodley (1986 :13), South Africa is 
the only society in the world where ethnic group membership 
is imposed from without, in other words, as opposed to 
voluntary association. This is true with regard to 
Blacks,Indians and Coloureds. In actordance with National 
Party ideology~ the population is not only divided into 
racial groups, but also into a further eleven black ethnic 
11 
nations. These racial and ethnic boundaries have been 
drawn up by Apartheid architects in an effort to fragment 
Black opposition, with complete disregard for the basic 
c::ornerstone of group formation, namely voluntary 
association. '-Adam and Moodley sum up their debate behind 
voluntary assoc:iatiori as follows: "If a group identity is 
not self-chosen, why should its members want to preserve 
it?" 
When determining the legitimacy of a groups existen~e, all 
of the above factors are useful, but two of them are 
especially important. Firstly, the strength of group 
identity and group self-image as a distinguishing factor, 
and secondly, that such a group should be formed by 
voluntary enrollment by its members. 
Which minority rights are relevant? 
Several theorists have tried to for~ulate a criterion with 
which to measure the rights which may need to be secured 
and protected. According to Blaauw (1986 :11), the Draft 
Convention on the Protection of National or Ethnic: Groups 
or Minorities lists the following rights of minorities on 
national level: 
the right to self-determination; 
cultural and regional autonomy; 
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the right to participate in legislative, administrative 
and judicial processes; 
the right to share in the distribution of public funds; 
the right to utilize natural resources in the territory 
of the minority group, and finally; 
the right to economic, social and cultural development. 
Dinstein (1976 :102-121) sees the following minority rights 
as being fundamental: 
the right to physic:al e>:istenc:e; 
the right to self-determination; 
the right to preserva t.ion o·f a separate identity; 
the right to utilize national resources. 
Vernon van Dyke (1984) identifies the following group 
rights: 
the right to self-determination; 
the right to separate constitutional representation; 
the right to special and separate legal status; 
the right to have a separate language and culture; 
the right to have a sepa~ate homogeneous residential 
area and property rights; 
the right to equal economic opportunity. 
Conor Cruise O'Brien (1984 :14) emphasizes the rights which 
minorities have historically sought: Social integration 
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into the wider society, economic, technical and functional 
integration and equality, and i~ all else fail~, th~ right 
to political secession the latter being a doubtful and 
controversial right. 
Most of the above-mentioned rights can be divided into 
positive and negative rights according to Macdonald (1986 
:8). He defines negative rights as rights against 
interference of others, the right to 'do one's own thing' -
such as the freedom of a group to practice its own 
religion. Positive rights are rights which require public 
recognition and positive support, such as a claim for state 
funding of schools which will allow groups to educate their 
children in their own language, or to have that language 
officially recognized. Macdonald sees group rights as 
positive rights which are not claims to non-interference, 
but claims to positive support. Other characteristics 
which Macdonald ascribes to group rights are that the 
holders of such rights have duties rather than liberties, 
and that the holders of group rights have those rights in 
virtue of sharing feature of group membership. 
It seems then, that the right of a group to exist and 
survive is the most basic right of all. Only then can such 
a group hope to assert other rights such as the right to 
live differently from other groups if they so wish, to 
exert their more positive rights such as cultural and 
14 
regional autonomy and to expect not to be treated as 
second-class citizens in any respect. 
The Relationship between Sroup and Individual Rights 
According to Sigler (1983 :182), Western political theory 
has had an essentially individualistic basis since the 
French and American Revolutions, and civil rights have been 
mostly aimed at protecting the individual against the power 
of the state. It was a reflection of liberalism and 
ignored the fact that groups had rights too. This 
sentiment has changed in the second half of the twentieth 
century when people began realizing that the two-tier 
theory which places the individual against the state, is 
inadequate to meet strongly emerging claims for group 
rights. Since minority rights have already been defined, I 
will look briefly at Individual Rights. 
Individual rights, or Individualism, refers to the primacy 
of the indi~idual as the central political unit, apart from 
the state. Each individual has certain fundamental civil 
and political rights such as freedom of speech, worship and 
property rights. These cannot be taken away from him, and 
the principle behind them is accepted in most democratic 
states. The debate between group and individual rights 
turns on one crucial consideration: Are individual 
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rights sufficient to protect groups against the state, or 
do groups require special rights?. 
One school of thought claims that individual rights are 
sufficient, and some theorists even regard it as incorrect 
to speak of group or minority rights, since each individual 
has his own unique set of interests and values, and is 
therefore a minority (Louw & Kendall, 1986 :167). Coner 
view: "Rights Cruise O'Brien (1984 :19) takes a similar 
are best thought of as inherent in each human being, 
irrespective of what kind of cultural grouping he or she 
may belcmg tel." In agreement, Macdonald (1986 :2) states 
that rights which protect individuals also protect groups 
at the same time, although he admits that this is only the 
case in linguistically homogeneous countries. NUSAS hold a 
similar view - the organization recently claimed: "If the 
rights of individuals are protected by the law, surely 
there is no need for minorities to be protected? 11 -(One 
per-on, One vote in a Unitary South Africa brochure, 1987). 
A purely individualistic approach in the political 
structures of a plural or multi-cultural society has been 
proven 
precedents 
idealistic and 
and curfent 
unworkable with many historic: 
examples all over the world. 
According to Va~ Dyke (1983 :20), an insistence on 
individualism •• .•. may leave the individual relatively 
helpless before those who look upor1 him with disdain." Van 
Dyke claims that while life can be good on an 
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individualistic basis for the dominant majority, minorities 
at the same time have not done well under individualism, 
and he gives as an example the plight of the Blacks 
throughout most of the United States history. Because of 
the "frequent perversion" of individuc:,lism, it tends to 
work against minorities in a plural society, and ostensible 
individualism becom~s an enemy of the individual who 
belongs to a group other than the ruling majority (Van 
Dyke, 1983 21). Therefore, Van Dyke argues, certain 
measures, of a communal nature, need to be taken to 
guarantee individual and minority rights. He mentions the 
following measures which have been implemented in various 
individualistic countries to modify and supplement 
individualism: 
-The granting of regional autonomy to a minority which 
is concentrated in a certain geographical area, for 
example, Belgium, Nigeria and the USSR. 
-The electoral system may provide for proportional 
representation f6r all ethnit groups. 
-The electoral system can provide for electoral 
boundaries to coincide with ethnic boundaries, giving 
minorities a better chance of voting for their own 
repn~sen ta ti ves. 
-The handing out of government positions to 
representatives of minority group• on a proportional 
basis, for example in Belgium, where cabinet posts are 
divided equally between Flemish- and French-speaking 
ministers. 
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-A second chamber in parliament in which minorities are 
represented as groups to allow them a minority veto 
over matters which may be disadvantageous to them. 
-Separate but equal schooling may be provided for. 
-Outsiders may be prevented from buying property in 
minority areas, a measure aimed at mafeguarding the 
minority culture (comparable with the Group Areas Act 
in South Africa). 
-Outsiders may take up residence in minority areas only 
with spetial permission, with the same result as in 
the case of the previous measure. 
Van Dyke (1983 :22) concludes by saying that as long as all 
groups enjoy equal status. and rights, human rights in 
general will be better served by communalism than by 
\ 
individualism. This will especially be the case if the 
segmental boundaries are clear and unchanging. 
Sigler (1983 :196) criticizes the notion that individual 
and group rights must collide. He agrees that this is true 
in so far as where individual rights have been replaced 
totally by group rights, but otherwise they can coexist. 
This idea enjoy some degree of acceptance but the 
important question remaining is how to construct 
delicate balance between group and indiviual rights in 
order to prevent them from clashing in a system which will 
guarantee democracy. 
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A conclusion can be drawn that group rights and the 
recognition thereof does not endanger or challenge 
individual rights, but is a supplement to the d~fic:ienc:ies 
of a purely individualistic: approach in plural or 
multi-cultural societies. Blaauw (1986 :18) concurs: "If 
the principles of freedom of c:hoic:e and democratic: 
decision-making procedures are consequently followed, no 
unsolvable confl~cts between individual and group rights 
should develop". 
The Ac:c:ommodation of Minority Rights 
Because I will later be looking extensively at specific: 
examples of plural societies and the way they are dealing 
with their minority problems, I shall therefore just 
briefly discuss some general ways in which minority rights 
can be dealt with, according to Rothschild (1981 :155-159). 
The first policy that Rothschild mentions is genocide. 
This refers to the mass-extermination of minoriti-s. 
Recent examples include 
million Armenians by 
the deliberate 
the Turks early 
century, and the extermination of the Jews 
in the second World War. 
killing of several 
in the twentieth 
by the Germans 
The second policy is that of expulsion. Examples here are 
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the expulsion of about ten million ethnic Germans out of 
Eastern Europe after World War Two, the Asians out of 
Uganda in 1972 and the Gieek and Turkish minorities o~t of 
Turkey and Greece respectively in the 1920's. This option 
today is just as unacceptable to world opinion than the 
first. Rothschild mentions as a variant on this option the 
forced relocation of a ~inority from its own territory to 
another area within the same state. The South African 
policy of forced removals is reminiscent thereof. 
The third illegitimate optior1 is the 
assimilation of a minority into the majority. 
compulsory 
A recent 
example is when Rumania forced ethnic Bulgarians to change 
their names so that it would be more Rumanian. Spain has 
also for many centuries tried to assimilate the 
Catalonians, Basques and Galicians into a uniform Castilian 
culture. Rothschild argues that such a policy might be 
more successful if minorities could be enticed to identify 
with a 11 supraettmic 11 culture instead of the culture of the 
majority. For example, a Welshman may be enticed with 
being identified as British, but never with being English. 
The fOL\r.th way of dealing with minorities is what 
Rothschild cal ls "uncoerced acculturation through 
crossed-patterned reticulation'', which simply refers to the 
overcoming of ethnic cleavages by competition on an 
individual basis on economic, social, and other levels. 
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------------------------.-----------------------
This is what Adam and Moodley (1986 :197) refer to as 
devising a "Common Soc:iety" and it is a way of making a 
.. plural soc:iet.y 
South Afric:a 
less plLtral. Th•se authors believe that 
can overcome its plurality by allowing its 
groups to compete on an individual basis for scarce 
resources and they make the claim that the country is 
already relatively "common" t.hr·ough a common religion, 
economic interdependence and a common social culture 
between Black and White. This policy is reminiscent of the 
concept of cross-cutting cleavages which will be discussed 
later and in greater detail. Rothschild uses the United 
States as an example of the fourth strategy. 
A fifth strategy in dealing with minorities is that of a 
deliberate neglect and this is done by completely ignoring 
minority claims, or through the subtle belittlement of 
ethnic c:ultures. France's way of ignoring its regionally 
based c:ultural groups in Corsica, Brittany, the Alsace and 
the Basque region, serves as an example of this strategy. 
The sixth method concerns the II 
federalisation by turning it 
institutionally fragmenting ethnic groups 
perversion" of 
into a method of 
into smaller more 
easily dominated segments. For example, Stalin subdivided 
the Turkish/Moslem nation into smaller linguistic ethnic: 
groups •uch as the Kazakhs, Turkmens and Uzbeks. In South 
Africa too, the National party has subdivided the Blacks 
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into several ethnic-based homelands, which have the option 
of becoming 'independent' .from Pretoria. 
Because all of the above-mentioned methods entail some form 
of repression, they do not help to make the dominant group 
more legitimate in the eyes of minority groups, and 
therefore make no contribution t6 reduce inter-group 
tension and conflict. The exception to the rule is what 
Rothschild referred to as "uncoerced acculturation thr-ough 
cross-patterned retic::ulation", which also can be equated 
with individualism. 
Adam and Moodley (1986 :36) distinguish between five types 
of ethnic dominance which the ruling majority has over the 
minorities: 
-Firstly, they mention state violence against scapegoat 
minorities, for example the Jews in Naii Germany, and the 
Asians in Uganda. 
-Secondly, state competition with self-reliant ethnic: 
groups, for example the French Canadians, the Biafrans in 
Nigeria and the Basques in Spa~n - the dominant group will 
resist secession at all costs and may try to co~opt the 
minority through a political structure like federalism, 
consociationalism or emphasizing economic interdependency 
beteen the two groups. 
-Thirdly, the authors mention state tutelage of 
stigmatized subordinates - i.e. minorities regarded as 
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inferior by the majority group, for example the Indian 
caste system. 
-Adam and Moodley fourthly refer to state provision of 
foreign labour supplies and use the guest-worker situation 
in West Germany as 
Federal Republic of 
an example. The Turkish workers in the 
West Germany are there only 
temporarily, and have no right to participate in politics, 
and generally form a stigmatized group. In my view the 
official policy of West Germany, namely that it is not a 
country of immigration~ is fair should a homogeneous 
country artificially create a permanent minority with the 
potential of inter-group conflict which most plural 
societies suffer from? I do not necessarily agree with 
Lord Scarman (in Whittaker, 1984 :64) that a plural society 
has much to offer to mankind - ''A variety of cultures, 
activities and skills which a homogeneous society cannot 
offer''. The conflict and problems created by most plural 
societies far outweigh the advantages of cultural 
diversity. The U.S.A used to be one of the exceptions when 
it was still a 'melting pot, although looking at the 
turmoil in certain states with large Hispanic populations 
like Florida, California and New York over the refusal of 
these communities to assimilate, one has doubts as to even 
the United States being an exception anymore. 
-Finally, Adam and Moodley mention the state 
incorporation of ascendent immigrant minorities which 
results in the least troublesome way of accommodating such 
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grc:>Llps. As can be seen, there are many similarities 
between Adam and Moodley's list of types of ethnic 
dominance and Rothschild's list of ways of dealing with 
minorities. These similarities represent minority 
domination in plural societies, and are the ma.in reasons 
behind what Van Dyke calls "illegitimacy" ir1 plural 
societies. 
A more feasible alternative is 'communalism' which refers 
to the acceptance that minority group identity can be made 
less sali~nt if acknowledged and constitutionally supported 
and protected by the ruling majority. According to Van 
Dyke this process can take several forms: 
-A federal system by which area-bound minorities a.re 
given regional autonomy to run their own affairs. 
-Secondly, minority over-representation in parliament 
and in the civil service through the allocation of 
fixed quota seats (proportionality). 
-A minority veto by which minorities can block 
legislation at exe~utive or legislative level if it is 
regarded as disadvantageous to their vital interests. 
-Fourthly, segmental autonomy, by which a minority 
receives certain powers and state resources to deal 
with at will, regardless of whether that minority is 
concentrated in a specific area. 
-A G~and Coalition referring to a system of government 
where several political parties ~epresenting various 
groups form coalition government. 
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The latter four mechanisms are the basic requirements for 
consociational democracy. 
Other communal devices are: voters can register on 
separate electoral roles, for example the Maoris in New 
Zealand; minorities may be allowed to maintain their own 
law and courts, their own educational facilities, and to 
live according to their own values and traditions with the 
help, for example, Cultural Councils which look after a 
group's cultural interests. 
The measures mentioned above are representative of the 
growing trend of acceptance and recognition of group 
rights in addition to individual rights in the second half 
of the twentieth century. This does not mean that the 
ac:ceptancE-~ of group rights is a II panacea II according to 
Van Dyke (1983 :22). Some societies are so deeply divided 
that not even communal measures can reduce conflict. For 
example, Lebanon, Cyprus and Northern Ireland, all for whom 
partition seems the only viable option. But it does mean 
that the acceptance of communal.ism must be given serious 
consideration in a plural society where individualism has 
failed to provide the answer. 
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AN EVALUATION OF CONSOC%AT%0NAL DEMOCRACY AS AN %NSTAUMENT 
FOA THE PAOT!CTION AND PAOMOT%0N CF M%NOA%TY RIGHTS, 
Introduction 
The idea of consociationalism is a relatively new to 
the Western ~onstitutional debate. Traditionally, majority 
rule was seen as the embodiment of democracy and the 
British Parliamentary and American Presidential systems 
were held as e~amples of such majoritarian democracy. The 
concept of "constitutionalism" was founded on the fear of 
the abuse of majority power, according to Boulle (1985 
1). Lijphart's notion of c:onsociational democracy was 
founded on this principle of curtailing majority power in 
favour of power-sharing between both majority and minority 
groups. 
Boulle (1985: 4-14) lists the main characteristics of the 
British and American constitutional systems and highlights 
the differences between them and a consensus, power-sharing 
constitution : The British parliamentary system is based 
on institutions like constitutional monarchy, a bicameral 
legislature, a parliamentary 
judiciary and a politically 
executive, · an 
neutral civil 
independent 
service. The 
term "Westminster system'' refers to certain distinctive 
features of the British system and the close institutional 
relationship between the legislature and the executive is 
regarded as the essence of the system. The distinctive 
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majoritarian features of the British system which includes 
the following: 
An electoral system that operates according to the 
plurality principle in single-member constituencies; 
The British parliament functions in such a way that 
enables the government, i.e. the dominant pa~ty to make 
legislation even against large majority; The cabinet 
usually consist only out of members of the majority 
party; The dominant party captures its seats on a 
winner-takes-all or first-past-the-post basis, meaning 
that the runners-up in each constituency cannot utilize 
any of those votes even if they each lost by just a few 
votes to the winning candidate; Because of the 
legislative supremacy of the · parliament, no 
geographical or functional spheres are immune from its 
authority; Finally, the centralization of authority is 
a typical feature of the parliamentary system, derived 
from the supremacy of the parliament, a unitary 
constitution 
responsibility 
and the doctrine of ministerial 
Certain restraints have been placed on the majoritarian 
features of the Westminster system: these include the 
obligatory general election every five years; a rule of law 
curtailing the legislative supremacy and almost unlim~ted 
powers of parliament; A second chamber in parliament, 
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which, although weak, does provide some restraint on the 
more powerful lower house; a further devolution of power 
does occur with delegation of power to local authorities 
and to regions like Scotland ~nd Wales. 
The American presidential system is based on a fixed term 
non-parliamentary executive that derives from the 
separation-of-powers principle. The origins of the 
system, according to Boulle (1985 1 13) can be found in a 
distrust in government and faith in the division,diffusion, 
limitation and sharing of authority. The three basic 
elements of the system are qualifications of the 
fundamental premise of majority rule these are the 
territorial distribution of competence to th~ 50 states; 
the supremacy of the constitution; the authority of the 
federal judiciary. These basic qualifications represent a 
system of checks and balances and a deviation from simple 
majoritarianism. Yet, apart from these qualifications, 
the system did not give sufficient protection to the Black 
minority in the USA with regard to fundamental human or 
group rights until the breakthrough by the Black civil 
rights movement in the 1960's. 
Consociational 
alternative 
democracy has been presented as 
to majoritarian-based parliamentary 
an 
and 
consociationalism is aimed at providing democracy in plural 
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societies and is therefore closely related to theories of 
pluralism. Boulle defines consociational pluralism as a 
model "which rec:ognist~s cultural diversity as a decisive 
factor, but maintains stability and avoids conflict through 
negotiation and cooperation at the elite level, in spite of 
the lack of cross-cutting affiliatio1,s 11 • He makes a 
distinction between it and the so-called open/consensus 
pluralist model. The latter refer to a system where 
cross-cutting group affiliations tends to reduc~ conflict 
by building up cooperation and mutual trust in an 
integrated society. 
The concept of consociational democracy originated from 
the Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart, and is used 
as a formula to achieve stability in deeply divided plural 
societies. This is done by the sharing of political power 
between various minority groups in plural states according 
to a certain formula. Lij phar1: ( 1980) defines it as 11 ••• a 
form of decision making in which the leaders of all the 
significant segments of a plural society cooperate to 
transcend the segmental divisions in such a society". 
Consociationalism c: ha 11 enges the tendency to equate 
democracy with majority rule in plural societies. It 
deals with negotiation- and compromise politics and relies 
on four basic principles, all of which are being used in 
some or other form by most 'democratic' plural societies. 
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These principles are: a grand coalition, a mutual veto, 
segmental autonomy and proportionality, and will be dealt 
with in greater detail later on. 
Of the nine plural societies discussed in the previous 
chapter, most 
consociationalism 
of 
or 
these have been experimenting with 
at least with some of its underlying 
principles. One thinks immediately of Belgium attachment 
to consociational democracy after 1970 which has put the 
theory into practice by implementing all four principles, 
for example, the mutual veto which both the Flemish and the 
French have when it comes to laws that may be harmful to 
their cultural interests, t~e proportionality rule which 
determines the composition of the cabinet at a 50-50 basis 
between the language groups, the autonomy that both 
language groups enjoy in their regions, and the fact that 
Belgium has been ruled for most of the second half of this 
century by a grand coalition of several parties. 
Switzerland is another highly consociationalized country 
A Grand Coalition of parties and ethnic groups, as well as 
proportionality comes into consideration when the Executive 
and the National Council are elected; a mutual veto exists 
and a high degree of segmental autonomy can be found in 
the French and Italian cantons which protects them from 
potential domination by the German-speaking majority. 
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The idea of a Grand Coalition is also found in the 
Executive of Canada, together with some segmental autonomy 
in French-speaking 
to Catalonia and, 
Quebec; Spain granted segmental autonomy 
to a lesser extent, to the Basque 
Provinces. North Ireland and Cyprus too, experimented 
briefly with consociationalism, and even in the Soviet 
Union and Nigeria, a degree of autonomy is allowed in the 
federal units. Zimb~bwe also made use of proportionality 
(to a very generous extent) to accommodate the 20 white 
seats in its Parliament, although this was forced on them 
in accordance with the rulings of the Lancaster House 
Agreement. 
By now it should be clear that consociational democracy is 
supposed to meet a few basic requirements. namely: it must 
create 
groups, 
stability, 
it must 
it must 
facilitate 
arrange power sharing between 
cooperation and compromise 
between the elites of such groups and finally, it must 
promote and protect minority group rights. This paper is 
especially concerned with the latter and I shall now look 
at to what degree the four underlying principles of 
consociationalism contribute ·toward the attainment thereof. 
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.The Four Principles 
!.Grand Coalition (the principle of power sharing) 
This means that the political leaders of all significant 
segments (political part~es, ethnic, religious or interest 
groups) govern the country jointly. As said before, this 
principle is in direct contrast to the 
winner-takes-all/government-versus opposition system of 
British politics (Lijphart 1980 : 60). Lijphart argues 
that it is necessary that as many of the segments as 
possible in deeply divided societies should be involved in 
government (Venter, 1983 275). This would prevent 
minorities from being excluded from political 
decisi6n-making and should help to avoid the conflict which 
such an exclusion would cause. Since these minorities are 
being made part of the government, they have to accept 
responsibility fro decisions made by the government. This 
responsibility, together with the fact that they have 
ir1side influence in the government with respect to 
sensitive minority issues, should help to regulate conflitt 
in a consociational democracy. 
According to Boulle (1985: 46) a grand coalition usually 
refers to a proportional participation of all minorities 
in a coalition and it therefore reduces the need for an 
alternation of office. The Swiss national executive with 
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it seven members are chosen by the main parties in 
proportion to their electoral strength, with the condition 
that at least two of the seven shbuld come from a French-
or Italian-speaking canton. In Belgium, the cabinet 
posts are divided on a 50-50 basis between French and 
Dutch speaking ministers. 
2.Mutual Veto (minority veto) 
The purpose of a mutual veto is to ensure that no minority 
segment can be outvoted on the central political level when 
its vital interests are at stak• (Du Pisanie and 
Kritzinger, l.985 :447). Lijphart also calls it 11 negative 
minority rule'' (1980: 61). Even though minorities can be 
made part of government in acc:ordar1c:e with the Grand 
Coalition principle, they can still be outvoted by the 
majority in the government. The minority veto gives them 
the ability to prevent legislation which would disadvantage 
their minority position with regards to theii vit~l 
interests. For example, a 20% minority vote can overrule 
an 80% ~ajority vote. This is the ultimate minority 
protective mechanism and it can lead to minority tyranny, 
if used in an indifferent manner. The minority veto can be 
either an informal common law or a formal constitutional 
measure (Du Pisanie and Kritzinger, 1985 : 447). 
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According to Boulle (1985 
viewed from two sides 
48) the minority veto can be 
firstly as a device to ensure a 
complete unanimity on all decisions and secondly to enable 
minorities to prevent the taking of decisions by a cabinet 
which may harm their minority interests. It is 
especially the second perspective which makes the veto 
contentious as it gives minorities a disproportionate 
amount of power. The minority veto can operate at all 
levels of government., inc:luc.Hng the e:·:ecut.ive, legislature, 
and judiciary. It can be entrenched in a constitution or 
just used informally, i.e. without constitutional backing. 
Examples of where minority vetoes are in operation are 
Switzerland and the Netherlands (both informally), Belgium, 
formally with regard to all cultural and linguistic 
matters, and Cyprus, where a formal veto given to the 
Turkish-Cypriot minority caused a lasting deadlock in the 
ccmsti tut ion, resulting in its eventual failure. 
3.Proportionality 
Proportionality refers to the requirement that all 
political groupings of a defined minimum size should be 
represented according to electoral strenght in the 
legislative and executive. Political groupings could als6 
include ethnic minority representation acc6rding to 
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fixed population proportions. Like grand coalition, it 
differs sharply from the winner-takes-all system and the 
principles of majority rule (Du Pisanie and Kritzinger, 
1985 277). According to Venter (1985 : 277), it removes 
many divisive issues from plural politics, because 
proportions are pre-determined and there is no further need 
for rivalry and competition for positions, resources 
etc. Groups share power according to their numerical 
strength or sometimes are overrepresented. It is a very 
useful concept when segments are of highly unequal size, 
and is anoth~r method to protect the rights of even the 
smaller minority groups. 
According to Boulle (1985 :50), the proportionality 
principle is never encountered in a pure form in practice, 
but through its accommodationist role it has 
countries like Switzerland, Austria, Belgium 
Netherlands. 
been u~ed in 
and the 
Practical difficulties include the fact that policy 
decisions are difficult to take along proportional lines; 
difficulties also exist when a single prominent position 
has to be filled, for example the position of the 
President. Finally, difficulties develop when public 
appointments are made, because these have to be made 
proportionally, regardless of the ~erits or ability of 
appointees. This can lead to inefficiency because the best 
person may not necessarily be chosen for the job, 
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according to Boulle (1985 50) 
4.Segmental autonomy 
This pri~ciple means 
delegated to separate 
that "decision-making authority is 
segme11ts 
according to Lijphart (1980 
as 
61) • 
much as possible 
The idea is that 
different segments rule themselves when it comes to matters 
that are not of common concern. Venter (1985 :278) claims 
that it refers to in reality to minority government - i.e. 
government by a minority over minority issues. It provides 
a powerful stimulus for minorities in a plural society to 
be able to rule their own affairs. According to Venter, 
segmental autonomy does not necessarily have to be linked 
to geographical autonomy,. unlike in the ca\se of 
federalism. Examples of segmental autonomy in practice 
today are the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, 
Spain, among other•. In most cases, segmental autonomy is 
institutionalized through a geographic federation. The 
relationship between segmental and territorial autonomy 
will be discussed later when a comparison will be drawn 
between consociational democracy and federalism. 
.Conditions favouring consociational democracy 
Venter (1985 274-281) lists some of the favourable 
conditions which are needed for 
to succeed: 
consociational democracy 
Coalescent leadership, referring to the role of ruling 
elites to promote unity and compromise among each other, 
while at the same time retaining support of their 
followers. 
A multiple balance of power is necessary between 
sub-cultural segments in so far as at least three 
numerically balanced segments must exist, and that the 
total number must not exceed fiv• or six, since this can 
disrupt cooperation. 
Multi-party systems should exist and partie• should 
coincide with segmental divisions in the plural society. 
These then ''express the principle of segmental autonomy in 
political form''. The parties also serve as political power 
bases for segmental leaders. 
- Population size - most examples of consociational 
democracies have small populations and small territories. 
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democracies have small populations and ~mall territories. 
This helps the elites to become more acquainted with each 
_other, and ensure that the total demands of the system are 
smaller. 
- Whether cleavages are cross-cutting or coinciding - if 
they coincide, for example, when race, class and language 
differences reinforce each other, fragmentation is high and 
vice versa. The higher the fr•gmentation, the more 
difficult it is to apply consociationalism. 
- The presence of over-arching loyalties such as a national 
flag, monarchy or fear of external threat, can serve as a 
unifying force in divided plural societies. 
Unfortunately, such loyalties are often absent, and group 
loyalties become more important, which is not conducive to 
consociationalism. 
Boulle (1985 56-58) agrees with Venter's list of 
favourable conditions for consociationalism but he 
emphasizes especially the importance of prominent .elite 
leadership - leaders should accept basic national symbols, 
should be committed to the maintenance of the system, be 
wi 11 ing to transcend divisive-,? cleavages through 
II 0Ver-·arching II c:r.:>mpromise n Furthermore, the leadership 
should be stable and sufficiently strong to take their 
followers with them. 
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The condition of elite leadership has given rise to a 
debate between Lijphart and Daalder ~ver the existence of a 
prior tradition of elite accommodation. Oaalder argues 
that a historical traditioM of compromise is critical for 
successful consociationalism, while Lijphart argues that 
the cooperation can be created by efforts of the elite 
leadership. The question of who is right is still 
unresolved, according to Boulle (1985: 57), but Lijphart's 
view seems to be the correct one the chances of elite 
coc:>pr~rat.ion succeeding would not depend on historical 
examples of such occurences, but on whether the current 
elite leadership can compromise and cooperate under current 
conditions. 
Conditions unfavourable to consociational democracy 
The first of these is if a country's population and 
territorial size are too large, since this would complicate 
cc:>operation. Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium are 
all relatively small. 
socio-econmic inequality 
difficult, and thirdly, 
Secondly, 
COLI 1 d make 
if e?:·:ternal 
a high degree of 
cooperation more 
threats are not 
perceived in the same way by different segments. Ethnic 
cleavages are also perceived as unfavourable, as opposed to 
religious and cla~s differences. Boulle also ventures 
into the contentious issue of cross-cutting cleavages and 
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suggests that the absence of cross-cutting cleavages 
between segments of a society ·might be unfavourable for 
consociationalism. He uses Switzerland as an example of 
cross-cutting cleavages in a successful 
The Swiss example will be discussed later on. 
consociation. 
The relationship between consociational democracy and 
federalism 
Consociationalism and Federalism are the two constitutional 
arrangements that are most often identified with the 
regulation of conflict and the protection of minority 
rights in plural societies. While both have as a basis a 
system of. institutional checks and balances through a 
division of sovereignty, federalism refers to a horizontal 
division of power to the different levels of government, 
while consociationalism refers to a vertical sharing of 
power among different groups. Before going in greater 
de~th into the 'differences' between the two concepts, a 
brief overview of federalism is necessary. 
The concept of federalism is based on the rule that the 
government may be polycentric i.e. with several concurrent 
and competing ~ources of power. The relevant fields of 
power may be geographically, functionally or ethnically 
defined. Legislative, executive and judicial powers are 
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separated at all levels of governmentr In other words, 
the basic characteristics of a federal state are the 
absence of a single supreme body and secondly, divided 
sovereignty. In practice it means that no single g~oup 
can dominate society as a whole, unless that group can 
capture all levels of government in every unit. 
Federalism is diametrically opposed to a unitary system of 
government, the latter being based on a single, ultimate 
centre of authority, the central government, which holds 
all legislative -nd executive pow~r. 
The first basic precondition for a state to be federal is 
that the communities involved must have a strong need to 
manage their common affairs collectively, just as they 
would manage their own affairs separately (Du Pisanie and 
Kritzinger 1985 445). If the former does not exis~, it 
will be difficult to establish an association, and 
different units will drift around independently in the same. 
region An example would be the German states before 
Bismark unified them in 1871. Although these states used 
the same language, had the same culture and occupied the 
same greater area, they could only be moulded into a very 
loosely knit community innitially, , and governed their own 
affairs and external relations independently. The German 
Confederation which they belonged to was not a sovereign 
state but merely an organization of 34 monarchical states. 
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In order to accommodate different sources of power in a 
federation, common affairs will be left to the central 
government and own affairs to the individual autonomous 
member states or units. This is termed the division of the 
sovereignty of the state. 
The areas in which the different units of a federal state 
enjoy autonomy, are agreed upon in a written constitution 
to .which all parties are irrevocably bound. A Supreme 
Court is usually the final arbiter when disputes arise 
between federal units or between the federal units and the 
central government. 
A further principle, according to DU Pisanie and Kritzinger 
(1985 : 446) is that changes in constitutional matters are 
subject to the right of concurrence of the majority of 
federal units. No central government can change the 
constitution arbitrarily. 
Lijphart (1980 51) draws a distinction between a 
federation, which is a single sovereign state, and a 
confederion which constitutes a co-operative arrangement of 
two or more states which retain their separate 
sovereignties. He also mentions that federalism is 
usually seen as a geographical division of power in which 
the federal units are territorially defined, giving each 
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unit authority over all persons in it's area. A different 
form is Friederich's corporate federalism, which gives a 
unit jurisdiction over a particular 
irrespective of where segments of this 
group 
group 
of people, 
may find 
itself geographically. Corporate fede~alism is often 
defered to as consociations, although Lijphart does not 
necessarily agree with ths view. Du Pisanie and 
Kritzinger (1985 447) agree that corporate federations 
need not cdnform to consociational principles of mutual or 
minority veto, proportionality in respect of civil service 
appointments and the allocations of funds, i.e. none of the 
requirements for a consociational democracy. 
In addition to the above, Li)phart includes the following 
characteristics of federalism A written constitution 
which specifies the division of power between central and 
regional governments; Two chambers, representing the people 
at large and the units of the federation separately; 
Equality of representation i.e. the smaller units are 
over-represented in one chamber; Non-centralization, 
meaning that powers shared by the levels of government, 
cannot be taken away without mutual consent; and finally, 
the various federal units can amend their own constitutions 
unilaterally. 
As stated previously federal units are usually based on 
geographical boundaries dividing different segments of a 
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plural society. This is the asymmetrical or coinciding 
boundary model which Lijphart (1980 :56) supports on the 
following grounds : 
The basic aim of federalism is the accommodation Of 
diversity within a framework of political unity. 
Clear dividing lines between antagonistic groups can 
reduce conflict. 
The Swiss example shows how successful the asymmetrical 
model can be in an ethnically-diverse society. 
Lipset, in contrast, proposes the symmetrical or 
cross-cutting model because he argues that antagonism and 
conflict will be intensified if federal boundaries coincide 
with segmental boundaries "Democracy needs cleavage 
within linquistic or religious groups, not between them". 
I shall refrain from going deeper into this debate at this 
point because references, highlighted with concrete 
examples, will be given throughout the remainder of this 
thesis, putting the opposing viewpoints in perspective. 
A summary of the above characteristics indicate that 
federal units are highly autonomous and run their own 
internal affairs, while simultaneously participating in the 
central government. 
units caused by 
The inherent inequalities ~etween 
unequal distributicm of weal th 
the 
and 
population can be balanced by overrepresentation of the 
weaker units. 
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Ac:c:ording to ( 1980 : 60) the c:onc:epts of 
federalism and consociationalism superficially appear to 
be completely different, but he is of the view that they 
are actually very closely related "Federalism can be 
viewed as a consociational device, and consoc:iationalism 
can be interpreted as a special form of federalism". 
Lijphart argues further that a federal state is not really 
relevant to the problem of plural societies, but that a 
consociational democracy is. He adds that when the 
geographical units reflects the cleavage of society, then 
federalism and consociationalism is one and the same thing. 
Du Pisanie and Kritzinger (1985 447) see the difference 
as follows It is clear that a consociation need not 
necessarily conform tot.he conventional concept of the 
community and the underlying principle of individualism and 
a shared conception of right which forms the basis of 
federalism, nor to the resulting 
authority of the constitution 
courts". 
principle of the ultimate 
is interpreted by the 
Boulle (1985 54) sees the relationship between the t.wo 
concepts as follows : "a c:onsociation will also be a 
federation when the segments are geographically 
concentrated and the boundaries between the federal units 
follow segmental boundaries as far as possible, and where 
the other federal principles, such as bicameralism, are 
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applied. Conversely, a federation will also be 
consoci.r~tion when the ·1 irst three consociational 
principles are applied, the federation is 
consists of the appropriate number of 
asymmetrical and 
small component 
units, and it provides a decentralized system of 
government". 
According to Venter (1985 : 278-279) there are similarities 
between federalism and consociationalism in so far as 
federalism reflects the principles 
proportionality in the federal 
veto as part of the federal 
of grand coalition and 
upper houses, the mutual 
Ltni t' s veto right over 
constitutional changes, and finally, it embraces the 
principle of segmental autonomy in the autonomous statu~ of 
federating units. Yet for a consociation to be a 
fully-fledged federation, several requirements need to be 
fulfilled according to Venter (1985: 279): 
the segments of a plural society must be geographically 
delimited; 
the geographical and segmental boundaries must coincide 
and the federating units must be mostly homogeneous; 
a writ.ten, inflexible constitution, a bicameral 
legislative authority, division of power, 
over-representation and judicial powers of revision. 
In my view, Venter's thesis on the difference between the 
two concepts deserva some criticism. If one looks at a 
classic example of a consociational democracy, Belgium, 
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then it is clear that the Belgian system fulfills many of 
Venter's requirements, and could therefore be either. For 
example, its segments are geographically delimited into 
Flanders and Wallonia, the geographical and segmental 
boundaries coincide and, except for Brussels, the units are 
homogeneous. Furthermore, it has a written, in flexible 
constitution, a bicameral legislative authority etc. My 
argument is basically that, as the case cf Belgium proves, 
.. there is little difference betwec~r'l the under 1 y ir1g 
principles of fede~alism and those cf consociationalism, 
and that they are indeed very closely related. 
Critique relating to consociational democracy 
Forsyth (1984 11) directs his. criticism of 
con soc ia tiona 1 democ: racy at the "ambigLli ties" it causes, 
and recommends that one should rather stick to the ''high 
road of ·fc~deralism". 
follows 
His basic points of critique are as 
Firstly Forsyth argues that Lijphart's definition of a 
grand coalition is very broad indeed, which leads to all 
kinds of ambiguities, as discussed under the heading 
11 cc>nditior1s unfavourable". Setondly, he criticizes the 
principle of minority veto, which, because of its potential 
of creating minority tyranny, makes the grand coalition 
look like a "standing diplomatic corl'ference" .;md not like 
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like a singl~, united government, e.g. as happened in 
Cyprus. His third point of criticism is aimed at 
proportionality he asks t.he questic.m ~ "how deep shou 1 d, 
for example, ideological differences in a plural society 
be before 
differences 
proportionc~ 1 i t.y 
between Tory 
becomes desirable? would 
and Labour in Britain or between 
Democrat and Republican in the USA qualify these countries 
as plural societies? Forsyth criticizes the ambiguous use 
of the word 'segment' in the principle of segmental 
autonomy he asks whether 'segment' can include both 
political parties and ethnic groups. 
Forsyth's critique, although having some relevancy, seems 
to be centred more on syntax problems and the degree of 
vagueness in Lijphart's definitions. Forsyth seems bent 
on proving that. there is no need for "adapting either the 
fram€~work <::>r the languag<~ o·f consociat.icmal.ism", but h.is 
critique does nbt really succeed in going any further than 
at tacking tl,e "ambiguities" o·f L.ij phart' s def ini tior1s. 
The critique delivered by Venter (1985 
substance: 
281) shr..>w more 
His first objection is a methodological one which views 
consociationalism as insufficient for explaining the 
relationship between coalescent elite behaviour and 
political behaviour "Politi<:al. stability in a plural 
society is not caused by elitist compromise, but is 
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something which makes consociational elite compromise 
possible 11 • Venter continues that one cannot expect that 
elite action will save a plural society from conflict, 
because leaders often put their own interests first,- at the 
expense of inter-cultural conflict (Lijphart assumes that 
elites will firstly attempt to solve conflict). In my 
view, Venter and others may have a point with regard to the 
le~ders putting per•onal interest first, but then that is 
a problem of leadership quality, not of consociationalism, 
and could happen under any constitutional system. A 
recent ex•mple of leadership quality can be cited in the 
refusal in 1987 of a French-speaking mayor of a town in 
Belgium to learn to speak Flemish and resulted in the 
collapse of the coalition government and forced 
into a general election. Even though it started 
Belgium 
off at 
third-tier government level, the obstinate actions and the 
poor leadership quality of a public official eventually had 
national repercussions. 
Lijphart 's view that segmental divi~ion favours 
consociationalism also receives much criticism according to 
Venter (1985 283). He mentions Barry's claim that 
increased internal segmental autonomy only leads to more 
conflict and greater polarization. Venter also lists other 
criticism of Lijphart's postulation that Switzerland is 
such a successful consociation because it is so neatly 
segmented into various ethnic groups, as opposed to the 
cross- cutting model. These authors, Steiner and Bohn, 
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claim that Switzerland has far more cross-cutting 
affiliations among segments than Lijphart thinks. Their 
claim is erroneous in my view, as this would be denying the 
fact that Switzerland's linguistic/cultural segments 
(cantons) and regions are indeed highly homogeneous, i.e. 
the ethnic divisions are strongly asymmetrical, not 
cross-cutting (even though class and religious cleavages 
may overlap). This will be confirmed by anybody who has 
travelled between Italian-speaking Ticino, French-speaking 
Geneve and G~rman-speaking Zurich. It is like travelling 
in between three different countries - so distinct are the 
segmental ethnic divisions. 
Venter also mentions Gottmann's critique of Lijphart's 
assumption that segmental isolation can be either 
geographically or personally based. 
very difficult for a group to 
Gettman believes it is 
maintain its cultural 
identity without having a defined geographical area. This 
is a valid criticism, if one accepts that corporate 
federalism (non-territorial federalism) in Cyprus failed 
because of the lack of territorially defined areas for its 
two groups (they were totally interspersed). 
value of geographical 
The 
borders 
not be 
conclusion is 
coinciding with 
under-estimated. 
Venter also 
that the 
ethnic divisions should 
mentions critique of the principle of 
proportionality, which supposedly causes weak coalition 
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government , manipulation through paity politics and a 
constant change of government. Venter answers this 
criticism himself: '' ••• proportionality is a general 
reflection of divisions already existing in a society'' 
(1985: 284) (and does not cause the~e divisions). 
The most valid critique, in my view, is aimed at the 
principle of a mutual veto. Venter mentions that it is 
time-consuming~ unduly favours a status quo and that a 
proposal benefitting all segments of society can be vetoed 
by minorities seeking a greater share of the action. The 
biggest danger is that minority veto can lead to minority 
tyranny, where a minority can hold a majority hostage 
through its blocking veto. This can lead to frustration 
and anarchy. The Cypriot constitution failed because of 
overuse of the Turkish minority veto. In my view, the 
only solution to overcome this problem is to increase the 
minimum% of minority votes needed in parliament for a veto 
to succeed,to a level just higher. than that which any one 
minority/political party can manage. In other words, such 
a group will need some support from outside its own group 
to enable it to veto legislation. This measure will only 
work if there is more than one minority segment. 
In Boulle's opinion (1985 :63) the most prominent 
shortcoming of consociationalism is the heavy reliance it 
places on leadership elites and cooperation and compromise. 
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Furtl1ermore, because of the cooperative nature of 
consociationalism, there is virtually no opposition in the 
traditional sense, which can k~ep the government on its 
toes. Boulle views this as resulting in the lowering in the 
quality of democracy. He also mentions that slow and 
ineffective government may be a result of the 
counter-majoritaria.n nature of consocia.tionalism and as 
said before, the veto and coalition principles can bring a 
government to standstill, while proportionality cah result 
in the quality of the civil service being aversely 
affected. As in the case of federalism, the duplication 
of institutions can be costly and ineffective. Boulle 
does admit that, although consociationalism may be slow, 
costly and ineffective over the short term, it does produce 
results over the long term. 
Finally, I will mention some of the critical remarks made 
by Samuel Huntington (1981 4) • According to him,, the 
concept of consociational democracy is incorrectly termed, 
and should rather l::>e "consociational oligarchy" because of 
a distinct lack of democracy. Huntington claims that it 
is democratic only in so. far as each group is represented 
and the consent of all must be present for decisions to be 
taken. Furthermore consociationalism a.chiewes 
inclusiveness by •acrificing competition "In essence-, it 
is an elite conspiracy to restrain political competition 
within and among communal groups''~ Huntington's arguments. 
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an be countered by arguing that demo~racy is a relative 
concept, which may have many interpretations, e.g. the 
interpretation thereof by the .German Democratic Republic 
which totally contradicts democracy 
Western democracies. 
as understood by 
South Africa, according to Lijphart's definition, is not 
·very adaptable to consociational democracy, and taking into 
account the critique listed above, it is clear that the 
concept is not the perfect solution to all plural 
conflict. But at the same time, compared to some of the 
alternatives some of the underlying principles of 
consociationalism may well serve to reduce conflict in a 
multi-cultural society like South Africa, by protecting 
minority rights. When deciding which of the consociational 
principles to apply, much depends on the Mature of the 
South African society and its particular· needs. 
In my view, consociational democracy, when applied 
selectively, preferably inside a federal system, can serve 
as a model for overcoming South Africa's 
question. This will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter 5. 
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plurality 
4. A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF MINORITY RIGHTS IN SELECTED 
PLURAL SOCIETIES. 
Western political theory has been essentially 
individualist since the American and French Revolutions and 
between 1778 and 1850 the foundations were laid for modern 
thinking about human rights (Blaauw 1986 2). The 
transformation of ethno-nationalism began even earlier 
however and Blaauw mentions several factors contributing to 
this process, of which the Westphalian Peace Treaties of 
1648 was the most important. Other factors included the 
after-effects of the industrial revolution and the growing 
ideologies of liberalism in the 18th and 19th centuries 
which both favoured the importance cf the individual rather 
than ethnic groups. 
This liberalistic way of looking at human rights held in 
practice little r-lation to the rights of ethnic minorities 
and were essentially aimed at the restraint of the power of 
the state on behalf of individuals. It represented the 
birth of the Western Liberal political theory, and together 
with the 
centuries, 
growth of socialism 
it strongly favoured 
in the 19th and 20th 
the individual above the 
ethnic group. In it seemed to signal the demise of 
ethnicity and group sentiment in Europe. 
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Yet, contrary to predictions, ethnicity did not disappear 
completely and in 1914, the unequal treatment of the 
Serbian minority in Austria-Hungary sparked off the First 
World War. Before the Second World War, Hitler us~d the 
German min6rities in Poland and Czechoslovakia to stir up 
German nationalism, which, for a short while, discredited 
the entire concept. Shortly after the World War 2, which 
Bla-uw sees as the turning point, a tremendous growth in 
the spirit of ethnic consciousness and nationalism took 
place. Sri?veral de?veloping so<::it:;ities in. Asia, Afric:a and 
South America took the lead towards independence. Even in 
Europe, ethnicity began to replace class-based politics and 
the liberalistic notion of individualism in plural 
societies (Glazier 1982: 47). 
Developments in technology and communic~tion in the second 
half of the 20th century also helped to revive established 
but dormant minority movements, and new minorities formed 
because of mass-emigration and the creation of artificial 
borders after the two World Wars. 
Only 9 per cent of the world's states are totally 
ethnically homogeneous (Blaauw, 1986 3). Conflict between 
majorities and minorities occur on political, economical 
and social levels and is a global phenomenon. The notion of 
equating democ: r.:-u:y with majority-rule has become an 
outdated concept in progressive heterogenous societies. 
Plural societies and the conflict they inevitably produce, 
seem to be the product of the irreversible movements cf 
mankind. The of minorities and their 
aspirations are accepted as a fact of political l.i fe in 
most democratic states with legitimate governments. In 
most cases such states have tried to solve political, 
soci ... ,1 ~ E .. conomica l and legal problems created by 
heterogeneity by the recognition and 
legitimate minority rights in other words, 
acceptance of communalism. 
acceptance of 
through the 
Since there are so many states in the world with one or 
several minority groups, a variety of policies have been 
formulated and experimented with in an effort to reduce 
conflict levels~ and yet no single formula has so far been 
completely successful. Switzerland can probably be regarded 
as the plural society with the lowest level of conflict, 
but unfortunately not all plural states have the same 
historical traditions, centuries of peace and stability and 
the particular ethnic composition that Switzerland has 
(although even Switzerland experiericed ethnic conflict as 
recently as 1983, when the French-speaking region of Jura 
seceded from a canton dominated by German-speakers). 
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The search for a solution to the problems facing plural 
societies is continuing, and is bound to become more urgent 
as more long-dormant minorities become more prominent, e.g. 
the Corsicans and Basques in France, the Muslims and 
Armenians in the USSR and others. According to Alvin 
Toffler, a general breakup bf nations and a transfer of 
power to regions and groups is occurring at present, caused 
by the disintegration of the modern society of the 
industrial era. Toffler claims that minority rights will 
become a crucial aspect of future politics as nations try 
to accommodate the aspirations of more and more groups 
inside their boundaries. Toffler wrote his book, The Third 
Wave, in 1983, and by 1987 this process has accelerated. 
One only has to consult the international media to note 
what a disproportionally large section of the news is being 
taken up by ethnic and minority strife. Not a day went by 
in 1987 without ethnic-inspired violence in CO\ ' .::>r .1. Lanka, 
Northern Ireland, Lebanon, Israel and South Africa, to name 
but a few. 
Toffler (1987 :151) predicts that this trend will continue 
as more subcultures break away from the dominant values of 
the majority, and that even inside these minority groups 
themselves, a further division into smaller, self-defining 
mini-groups will take place "Dii'f~~renceis thc:\t onc::e seG?med 
trivial are i:ak ing on cul tur-.::\l and pcllitic:al 
signi1'ic:anc::e." Toffler (198~!, 322) mentions several 
examples of minority groups which are becoming 
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more pr-c)minent, for example separatist movements .in 
Corsica and Brittany (France), the Scots, Welsh and even 
Cornwall and Wessex in Britain, the South Tyrolese in 
Italy, the Basques and Catalans in Spain, the Croatians in 
Yugoslavia, and even the Texans and Californians in the 
USA (who claim that they have to subsidize poorer states in 
the US).Of course not all these examples are equal in 
intensity, but if the trend continues as ~t present, ethnic 
or group-consciousness will increase drastically in the 
near future. 
Regardless of whether this trend towards heterogeneity, 
diversity and the fragmentation of national states will 
continue over the long run, several societies, such as 
South Africa, are at present forced to find a way to deal 
with minority issues. There is no magic formula, but some 
deductions can be made frdm the experiences of other plural 
societies. Drawing comparisons might prove a worthwhile 
exercise in an effort to find a solution for our own 
'enigma', and to help us answer th• following question: 
Do the experiences of plural societies confirm John Stuart 
Mill's assertion that representative democracy is virtually 
impossible in such societies? 
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CANADA 
Canada is the world's second largest country in land size, 
with a population of mi 11 ion (::>f whic:h 6 millicm an:~ 
French-speaking. Unlike the United States, Canada has 
never been a melting pot, and today several sizable 
minorities exist, apart from the French Canadians. These 
include half-a-million German-speaking Canadians, a similar 
number of Italian Canadians, 300 000 Ukrainians, 170 000 
Indians/Iniuts plus another 1,6 million people from other 
ethnic: origins. For the purpose of this paper, I have 
chosen the French Canadian minority as the subject for 
research. This particul~r group has been relatively 
dormant for many decades, and only during recent years (the 
beginning of the 1960'&) did they appear on the ''political 
chessboard of religious and national minorities'', according 
to Legendre (1980 : 4). Before looking in depth at the 
factors which lead to the French Canadian nationalist 
revival and how Canada is coping with it, some historical 
background needs to be highlighted. 
Leger·idre ( 1980 5-15) divid~s the history of French Canada 
into two periods, namely the period of survival between 
1760 and 1960, and the Quiet Revolution between 1960 and 
The first period commenced in 1760, an era in which French 
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colonial rule was replaced by British rule. The French 
Canadians were immediately placed in a minority position in 
greater Canada, and a natural fear of domination caused 
friction, violence and uncertainty between French and 
English Canadians. After having to repress a rebellion by 
radical nationalists fighting for the secession of French 
Canada, Britain decided that a solution to the problem 
would be to unify the four provinces. This was done 
through the British North American Act in 1867, which at. 
the same time guaranteed certain ~ights to the 
French-speaking minority, such as recognition of the French 
language in Parliament and in the courts of Justice, and 
the recognition of French civil law. The Constitution of 
1867 was based on the 'double state theory' implying a 
bicultural and bilingual Canada. 
francophones living outside Quebec, 
In reality though, 
the major French 
province, were serioualy disadvantaged because the 
linguistic resolutions of the Con~titution made nci mention 
of French Canadians outside Quebec, of which there were 
quite a number~ According to 1971 population figures, 
there were approximately one million French-speaking 
Canadians living outside of Quebec, of which the following 
provinces have the highest concentrations ~ Nova Scotia, 
27 220 (3,5%), Ontario, 352 460 (4,5%), Manitoba, 39 000 
(3,9%), Alberta, 22 695 (1,3%), New Brunswick, 199 085 
(31%),- (Legendre 1980 18). Only New Brunswick and 
Ontario have lar~e and concentrated enough French 
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populations to resist total assimilation, according to 
Legendre. The extent of a•similation can be seen in the 
half-a-million Canadians of French origin which no longer 
had French as a mother-tongue in 1971. Several factors 
caused this anglicization process, among others the growing 
urbanization of former rural French Canadian communities 
and the growing inter-provincial movement of the 
population that brought the French culture in conta~t with 
the dominant English culture. 
Throughout this period the French Canadians followed a 
policy of defensive nationalism which was primarily 
concerned with the .survival and preservation of their 
existing rights and relatively comfortable position in 
Quebec. In this respect, the predominant role of the 
Catholic Church should not be underestimated. After the 
disturbances of 1837 38, the Church took control of 
masses in conjunction with the professional and 
conservative elite and with the elimination of the radicals 
(whose aim was total political separation of Quebec), 
fbrmulated the predominant ideology of French Canada until 
deep into the 20th century. The essentials of this 
ideology according to Legendre (1980 7) were the Catholic 
faith, and the French language, culture and traditions. 
This may explain why the French influence remained 
concentrated so strongly in the province of Quebec and did 
not spread across Canada to any great extent - unlike the 
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English who used Ontario as a base from which to 
colonialise and spread their culture to the rest of 
Canada. 
By the beginning of the 20th century, Canada was divided 
into two distinct communities with separate languages, 
cultures, religions, economies and territories. The French 
Canadians were found predominantly in rural Quebec while 
the English Canadians settled in the rest of Canada, as 
well as in the Urban c€mtres t-:if C:1u£\°?bec: •. By 1901, 80% of 
Quebec's population were of French origin, a percentage 
which remained constant up to today. Their share of the 
total Canadian population declined from 30% to 28% in 1971, 
(Legendre 1980 :18). When Quebec became industrialized at 
the turn of the century, the French speakers moved in 
greater numbers to the cities, and in the process underwent 
a major socio-economic transform-tion and a change in their 
basic values and traditions. Various groups worked hard 
e:\gainst ideological oppression which went hand-in-hand 
with industrialization and the growth of federal power. 
These groups formed a new elite which started the 'Quiet 
Revolution in the 1960s'. 
The sec:ond peric)d, called the Quiet Re_volution (1960-1979), 
was marked by the emergence of nee-nationalism amongst the 
French Canadians. The nee-nationalist movement was led by 
an elite consisting of former Catholic action movement 
militants, young engineers, social science and business 
6 '') .... 
graduates, and their strategy envisaged a change from the 
rural vision of French Canada to an industrial vision which 
welcomed socio-economic development (Legendre 1980 : 9). 
According to this new vision, the provincial government 
became a partner in areas of the reconstruction precess, 
such as education and welfare, which used to be controlled 
by the Catholic Church before. New terminology developed -
the French C.:.'\nadian society b(,?C:ame a "Quebecois" so(::iety. 
The Quebec state government started playing a more visible 
and stronger role in the federal system, challenging the 
Federal government occasionally. It also made a bid for 
international status by establishing independent cultural 
ancl commercial links with European states, especially 
France. In this f if.~ld Quebec received much support from 
the French President, De Gaulle, who made his famous remark 
"Long live 1-a ·fre€~ Qlt(,~bec 11 ir, thr~ si>d:ies while visiting 
Canada, giving a boost to the Quiet Revolution. De 
Gaulle's speech caused havoc in relations between the 
Canadian Government and France which viewed it as French 
interference into Canada's domestic affairs. 
The Quiet Revolution also drew support from the working 
class which benefitted by new labour laws and unionization 
in public sectors. , Thera was also an explosion in the 
French Canadian artistic and literary life, with the 
development of the mass media during this period. 
Everywhere in Quebec people became mere aware of their 
national identity, and the French language strengthened its 
position in a country and a continent dominated by the 
English language. Before the series of constitutional 
reforms initiated by the Quiet Revolution in 1960, federal 
measures did not support the French-speakers to a great 
extent. The Federal government often refused to disavow· 
le~Jislaticm which were harmful to French-Canada's 
interests, while the constitution never mentioned language, 
only religion, as a political determent. 
several actions were taken against the expressed will of 
the French Canadians, e.g. imposition of milita~y 
~onscription in 1917 and 1942 (Legendre 1980: 8). 
In 1976 the Parti Quebecois, whose aim was to make Quebec a 
sovereign state, came to power in Quebec. {.'% few months 
1 a ter the . r1ew ruling party made French the official 
language of Quebec, thereby making French the language of 
industry, 
educ a tic:m .. 
business, labour relations, bureaucracy and 
There was a strong reaction to this measure 
from the English minority in Quebec, which constituted 
about 10% of the population of 6,4 million, and was now 
being made to feel the pressures of being membe~s of a 
minority grC)Llp n Much antagonism developed, and at this 
point conflict between gro1.ip and individual rights 
developr,~d. The English Canadians placed on 
individual rights in a liberal and democratic state, while 
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the French Canadians emphasized the priority of collective 
communal rights over individual rights. The Francophones, 
being a minority themselves in Canada, utilized the 
p~inciples of communalism in greater Canada but followed an 
individualistic policy in their own province which 
seriously disadvantaged the individual rights of the 
English-speaking minority in that pro~ince. 
Up to 1969 the Quebec government played a passive role in 
the language question and with regard to education for 
example, parents still had the freedom of choice over which 
language to have their children educated in. By 1974 a new 
law, titled Bill changed all this; French was made the 
official language in Quebec and the freedom of choice 
regarding language of education was limited for the first 
time, according to Legendre (1980 13). A new law, Bill 
101 was introduc•d in 1977 which restricted the use of 
English-medium schools even further by laying down strict 
conditions Which have to be met before children could 
attend English schools. Smiley (1981 24) mentions the 
most important of these: Parents of such childr•n had to 
have received their elementary education in English in 
Quebec; children who already were receiving education in 
English at the time the Act went into effect. What it 
basically meant was that from 1977 onwards the freedom of 
choic~ of language of education that English-speaking 
residents of Quebec had, became very limited. 
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It is difficult to judge the mor.::'tl i ty of this ( n::~vs.•r.m? 
dis~c:rim.ination) polic:y, but one cannot but wonder if the 
sa~e objectives could not have been reached at a lesser 
socio-economic cost, because it resulted in the flight of 
English-Canadian and Ameir:i.c:an capital, manpower and 
business out of Quebec. The nations largest insurence 
firm, Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, was the first 
major company to leave Quebec, citing language as the 
reason for its departure in 1978. Many more followed. 
Although the official policy of Parti Quebecois was the 
creation of a sovereign Quebec, only a small section of the 
people in Quebec wanted total independence from Canada; 
most merely wanted greater autonomy with respect to 
language, education, culture and economic matters. In 1979 
public opinion polls in Quebec indicated that the majority 
of people still rejected independence, (Pinard 1980). In 
1981 the Parti Quebecois was re-elected by a wide margin 
when it chose not to make separation a major issue. 
It 1. c:· 
-· 
a fact that Canada's pluralistic nature has been 
taken into consideration when most. (:) ·f Canada's 
constitutional weire for·mulated. The French 
Canadians, despite being a minority, have resisted the 
forces of assimilation into the dominant anglophone society 
which controlled most of the important social, economic and 
political institutions. Quebec received much support from 
the federal nature of Canada's constitution which gave 
Quebec virtually complete autonomy over its language, 
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rel.i~Jicm, civil law, and edtH:c.,t:i.c:m ·policy. The bi(::ameral 
parliament in which the Upper House is supposed to balance 
the power of the First Chamber I Commons, has in tha case 
of Ca~ada, not fulfilled its intended role. Th€-? re;,ison 
being that the Canadian Parliamentary cabinet system makes 
the cabinet only responsible to the Commons, and therefore 
undermines 
provincial 
This is 
t.h€':l Upper House's role of pr·ot.ecting 
governments such as Quebec (Watts 1975 64). 
one of the reasons why the Federal government 
interfered to greater extent into the local affairs of 
Quebec such as housing and education and why Quebec viewed 
the 1982 Constitution, especially the Charter of Rights, ~s 
a direct challenge to its iegislative autonomy. The 
Federal government in Ottawa has also mad<~ <::cm tinued 
to incl"'ec'i,\se its authorJ.ty in Ck1ebec:: and a 
.immigrati<:m P<::> l. i<::y was f <J 1 l c.1wed which gav€-? 
preference to immigrants from countries with the greatest 
linguistic and cultural ties with Canada's English-speaking 
community. 
Hegardless aJ. l the above-mentioned h~":\rassmen t 
experienced by the French Canadians, the federal system did 
manage to protect them from ultimate domination with regard 
to matters closely linked to their survival and even 
prevented total assimilation into English-speaking Canada. 
The question often flSkr,.;)d is what prevented the 
Francophones from losing their separate identity? Was it 
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just. bec:aL.tse of rel.ativc;?.ly. and 
highly-concentrated popu la ti<:m or was there more to it? 
Legendre (1980: 4) seams t.o think so. He reasons that it 
was not only the French language and culture which helped 
French Canada to kaep its separate identity, but that it 
was also helped by a '' ••• conception of the whole world, a 
system of values, of institutions, a social organization 
and the techniques themselves which are characteristic of 
these people c.··md in which th€~Y want. to be distinct.. 11 He 
argues that rather than just linguistic pluralism, Canada 
has to put up with a pluralism of collective objectives 
which the state finds more difficult to reconcile. He 
concludes by saying that the French Canadian minority 
question is one of 11 ••• a nation state in which a subculture 
Ltnder<;Joini;,i c:lisc::r.im.ination, C:>Y" livin<;J in a minor.:i.ty 
si tuatic:,n, bec:ome1s ~stron~J encJugh to as1,sert i t~;el f 
po~si.tively as another entity and demands that the rest oi' 
the society recclgnizes it as such" 
The French Canadians, in my view, have c:~chieved a 
relatively powerful position in Canada: Firstly, by 
escaping assimilation into the dominant English-speaking 
community for centuries and prevented Canada from becoming 
a melting pot like its southern neighbour. In other words, 
they managed to survive as an ethnic group. Secondly, 
they achieved a high degree of autonomy in their own 
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geographic area. The French Canadians have furthermore 
managed to protect their cultur~ by the attainment of dual 
language rights, by control over education and today they 
have the power to influence th- political balance in 
Canada. Pierre Trudeau, .the formei Canadian Prime Minist-r, 
made the following claim in this regard: II In terms of 
realpolitik, French and English are equal in Canada because 
each of these linguistic groups has the p6wer to break the 
c:ountr-y. 11 (Slabber·t and Welsh , 1979 : 40). 
Th~? role of the Parti Quebecois should 
uMderestimated either. According to Rene Levesque (1979: 
11) his party stood for the attainment of power to be able 
to makf: laws, levy taxes, to have a sovereign National 
Assembly and to have independent foreign relations, but at 
the same time to have close economic ties with the rest of 
Canada. to of 
sovereignty-association inste.;~d. of independence and 
separatism, 
negative. 
regarding the latter two concepts a!s to<.':l 
Yet he wanted, apart from complete internal 
autonomy for Quebec, also separate defence arrangements, 
seperate foreign relations and a seat in the United Nations 
and Commonwealth. It seems that Levesque wanted the best 
of beth worlds, namely political independence on the one 
hand, but on the other hand, the advantages of economic 
inter-dependence with Canada. Or perhaps he was just 
trying to soothe the Quebecois who were wrried about the 
negative and unknown i~plications of almost total 
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'independence', and ~ho might just have voted against him 
in the.coming referendum. 
Public opinion research h~s shown that in 1977, 45% of 
French speakers considered themselves French-Canadians, and 
41% consider•d themselves Quebecers (Davison and Gordenker, 
1980). This result proved that a majority of French 
Canadians, like many minorities worldwide, which are 
struggling for greater self-determination, still feel some 
loyalty to greater Canada and to other groups sharing that 
country. It therefore came as no surprise that (against 
the expectations of the Parti Quebecois) during the 1980 
Referendum on an independent Quebec, 60% of the French 
Canadians voted No and forced the Parti Quebecois to change 
its tactics by lessening their demands for independence and 
opted inst~ad for merely greater autonomy. 
In the early 1960's, the forces beh~nd Quebec's 
independence movement became even more disorganized and it 
seemed to have lost momentum, as the Parti Quebecois' 
popularity reached a new low. At this point it seemed as 
if Adam and Moodley's contention that Quebec nationalism 
tends to decline if it impedes economic progress, would be 
proven accurate. (i.e. that economic factors would make 
Canadian society more common and Quebec nationalism less 
visible). Yet in 1982 Quebec refused to sign the 
constitutional amendment, which included a Charter of 
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Rights 
to the 
which included an amending formula. Before agreeing 
new constitution, Quebec insisted on several 
conditions, which included: the explicit recognition of 
Quebec as a distinct society, a veto over future 
constitutional change and additional provincial powers in 
several areas. When the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that 
the constitution also applied to Quebec, the province 
refused to participate in any further constitutional 
conferences and from then on, virtually two Canadas 
existed, according to the Prime Minister, Mulroney 11 
those Canadians who accepted the constitution and those who 
had been left 6ut 11 (Macleans, June 1987) 
When Mulroney came to power in 1984, he made it a top 
priority to secure Quebec's full participation in a new 
constitution, 
federal power. 
even at the expense of the loss of some 
Finally in June 1987, an agreement was 
reached which recognized most of Quebec's demands, 
especially those insisting that the province constitutes a 
distinct society and that the role of the Quebec government 
should promote 
Quebec. 
and p~eserve the distinct identity of 
There were quite ~erious differences between the Premiers 
of the eleven provinces before the accord was signed, for 
~xample the demand by Quebec to be a distinct society and 
to have certain spending power agreements entrenched, 
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caused much dissatisfaction among some of the Premiers. 
Some provinc:£"!s, like Alberta, did not want to give Quebec 
any special status which would give it different rights to 
the rest of the provinces, and others, like Ontario, was 
always in favour of a strong centralized government. 
In the end, cons~nsus was reached, and the new constitution 
made C.;.~n,::1da in 1987 11 ••• the moist decen tna l i zed government 
on earth", and could make the country more di1'·fic:ult to 
govern'', according to Desmond Morton of the University of 
Toronto (Macleans June 1983). On the positive side!, 
Canada's largest ethnic minority received the permanent 
constitutional recognition of their rights, and, to quote 
Mu l ronc~y; " ••• the amend men ts an,~ very much .in our CarH:\d i.:..\\n 
Ccinstitutional t~adition of balancing collective rights 
with individual rights". 
The specific provisions of the 1987 agreement were the 
fol lc1wing : 
The provinces will have a say in appointing Supreme 
Court Judges and senators. 
Future changes to federal institutions, or granting 
provincial. status to territories, will require 
agreement by Ottawa and all provinces. 
Provinces can opt out of new national programs and 
receive money from Ottawa for their own programs if 
they meet national objectives. 
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Gluebe<:: is 1"'€~cogni zed .;:1.~-; .;a II dir.-5tinc t so<:: iety II within 
C::.;mada. The role of the Quebec legislature and 
government is to preserve and promote the distinct 
identity of Quebec. The agreement also stipulates that 
the clause does not affect the powers of Parliament or 
the legislatures, including any powers, rights or 
privileges relating tt':l 1 .;mguage. Th<~ agreement 
recognizes the existence of French~speaking Canadians 
centred in Quebec and also present elsewhere in Canada, 
but no longer thr,~ e;ndstence c)f "French-speaking 
Canada"·- Merely a sl.i.ght cH·fferenc:e or1 worcHn<J t':lr does 
it contain a deeper message warning Quebec against any 
further autonomy related ideals? (Maclean's Vol 100, 
No 24, June 1987). 
Certain conclusions have been drawn from the French 
Canadian experience: Slabbert and Welsh for example, use 
the rise to power of Parti Quebecois in 1976 as proof for 
their claim that in the case of societies where deep ethnic 
cleavages exist, the prospects of inter-ethnic political 
parties (based on class, function or region) to succeed are 
very poor (1979: 44). Furthermore, they claim that even 
tl,ough Canada is struggling to cope with its ethnic 
minority question, it has not abandoned democracy. The 
Canadian experience is perhaps one of the best examples 
which can be used to contradict Mill's assumption that 
democracy is not possible in plural societies. 
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Quebec is a fine example of where the principles of 
federalism have been applied to ensure that. territorial 
dividing lines largely coincide with ethnic boundaries, 
ensuring that the minority Quebecois femain a majority in 
their own territory. Maj6ritarianism in its purest form 
has. been avoided, and many the principles of 
consociationalism and communalism have been applied to 
ensure sufficient minority protection, if not for all 
Canadian minority groups, then at least for the French 
Ci:'madians .. 
BELGIUM 
"As,; the n<i,,tional.i.s.;m of t;:,ach state tends to dwindle, .,~s each 
I 
country experiences a growing need to become integrated in 
larger entities, so we are witnessing a corresponding 
revival of the regionalist views which nineteenth-century 
uni t:.ary pol ic:iE~s had suc::ceec:led in st:.i. f 1 ing." Pierre 
Harmel, Social Christian Prime Minister of Belgium, 
1965-1966,(in LA REVUE NOUVELLE, 15 January 1964). 
While there was a definite move by most European states 
towards integration into larger entities after 1945, such 
as the EEC, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, at the same time some 
of these states underwent a process of domestic political 
'cHsintegrati<.,n' as the need of certain sections of their 
populations for regional autonomy became mere apparent. The 
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Walloons and Flemings of Belgium were no exeption. 
In 1970, aft-r decades of ethnic conflict and turmoil, 
Belgium implemented constitutional reform which provided 
for decentralization of the administrat~on and the granting 
of cultural autonomy for the Flemings, Walloons and Germans 
- a move which indicated a change towards a high degree of 
c: ommun a 1 i !Eim. Before discussing this change and the 
consequences thereof, some background to the origin and 
nature of ethnic conflict in Belgium is necessary. 
Modern Belgium came into being after Napoleon was defeated 
at Waterloo in Belgium in 1815. After this battle, Belgium 
was handed over to the Dutch by the Congress of Vienna, but 
a few years later the strongly Catholic Belgians rose in 
protest against the Dutch Calvinist King, William of 
Ora~ge, and became independent in 1830. Belgium was 
guaranteed perpetual neutrality in 1839 by the great 
powers of Europe at the time •. The new status of Belgium 
was obtained by a 'coalition' of the Catholic clergy, the 
bourgeoisie of Flanders and the liberal entrepreneurial 
class of the French region, Wallonia. Together they formed 
the 'Unions of Oppositions' .,md approved the new 
Ccmsti tu tion. However, according to Irwing (1980 '7 ) , 
this constitution failed to achieve national unity between 
the Belgians and so, in spite of the larger Flemish 
population, the French language became the sole language 
"'11'" 
',:, 
c1f law, politics, the bureaucracy and the army. The 
practical implications of his development, for example ~n 
the army, (and one must keep in mind that the Belgian army 
had to face up to fierce German onslaughts in both World 
Wars), are perfectly illustrated by the following quote 
from .-a former Fl.c-?mi!sh army ~.ergt~ant : "When I was in the 
army more than forty years ago, the sergeant gave all his 
orders in French - we didn't understand, but that was army 
rule. He would always end with a bellow, 'And that goes 
for you Flemings too' someone could get killed that 
way." (Cern .. 1ki !' 1979. n ::~;24.,) 
In spite of the tradition of coalition and compromise that 
characterized Belgium since 1930, Irving (1980: 7) claims 
that st~ong ethnic, ec:cm1::imi1::a 1, ideological, 
geographical and cultural differences remained. These 
c: 1 <~av ages represented primarily by linguistic: 
seperation between Flemings and Walloons .. 
Throughout the history of Belgium, the Flemings were 
t,··eated c:\S an c1pp1~ess1=~d minor'ity and as second class 
citizens (Van Dyke 21) • The Flemings account for 
approximately 5,7 million out of a Belgian population of 10 
million (1982 est., The World Almanac, 1984). In !Eipi te of 
their numerical superiority throughout Belgian history, for 
most of the time they never managed to use this advantage 
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to gain equal status for the Flemish language. Like their 
Afrikaner counterparts in South Africa, the early Flemish 
movement was essentially literary (Irving, 1980 7), and 
did not have much clout firstly because of backward 
~conomic canditionm in Fl~nd~rm ~nd mecondly bec~ume th~ 
Belgian governing elite, including these from Flanders, 
were mostly French-~peakiA;u 
contributing factor, namely the stigma that Dutch was 
carrying, being the language of the 'recent' enemy - the 
Netherlands - resulting in a reluctance to promote Flemish, 
a dialect of Dutch. The situation was bad for the Flemish, 
being an oppressed 'minority' (although not numerically) in 
their own country - the only official language, education, 
the courts and the bureaucracy were French. Because of the 
fact th-t the Flemish part of Belgium was impoverished for 
the first 40 years cf the country's modern existence, it 
resulted in class cleavages coinciding with linguistic 
cleavages. The Flemings were very poor and according to 
Irving (1980: 7), by 1850 two-thirds of the Flemish 
peasantry were surviving only through charity. The 
governing elites were mostly French-speaking and it was 
quite natural that the grievances of the Flemings were 
mostly ignored by the French-ruling classes. 
Finally, in 1896 the Dutch and Flemish languages were 
merged and only then was the problem facing the Flemish 
77 
tackled. Flemish now became much more used in public and 
in state institutions although 
still mainly French-dominated and 
by 1914, the army was 
all universities were 
still French. The Flemish movement experienced a setback 
after World War One when some cf its members were accused 
of collaborating with the occupying Germans; the same 
happened during and after the Second World War and in the 
decade after 1945, Flemish n~tionalism was 
relatively subdued. 
therefore 
In 1954 a Flemish nationalist party, called the Volksunie, 
was formed, with the objective of an autonomous Flanders in 
a federal Belgium, but is always moved in the shadow of the 
three larger non-ethnic parties of Belgium, even in 
Flanders itself. This all changed in the l960's when the 
Flemish movement started growing rapidly and Flanders 
increased its economic and political power to the detriment 
of Wallonia (Irving, 1980 9). New language laws were 
introduced in 1963 and as the Flemings won complete 
equality for their language, and a linguistic frontier, 
fixed by law and running along the geographical border, 
came into being. By 1958, linguistic cleavages bSgan 
surpassing religions and class differences and the 1968 
the Louvain-crises precipated the whole language problem 
between the Franchophcnes and Flemish. The transfer of the· 
French section of the Catholic University cf Lcuvain, 
brought the language problem to the foreground, and 
resulted in the split between the Flemish 
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and ~ranchophone wings of the Social Christian Party in 
1968. Certain c:onstitutioMal changes were alsc:l made 
between 1967 and 1971 and again between 1977 and 1978, 
which, according to Irving, changed the unitary structure 
of Belgium. Forsyth (1984 13) concurs ; he argues that a 
pr-OC:€?.ss c:>f 11 fed era 1 i1,sin~J II Belgiwn iss taking pl.;~ce thrc:,w:Jh 
the large measure of territorial and communal autonomy that 
is given the two ethnic groups. The question to be 
what did these changes encompass and how do 
their results fit in with previously stated postulations 
with regard to minority rights and communalism? 
and 1973 the Third Revision of the 
Cf.mstitution was implemented with fol ll::>wing 
consequences: Belgium was div~ded into four linquistic 
regions, namely, separate Dutch·- and F'rf=nc h-·spe<'::\k ing 
regions, a bilingual Brussels and a small German language 
rc*!gion; three separate Cultural Councils were formed to 
control the cultural affairs of the two main cultural 
groups, the Flemings and the Walloons, as well as for the 
!:Jerman group. These re?visions of the constitution 
recognized the special rights of the different cultural 
communities ahd at the same time, legislative powers were 
given to the two major language groups in their respective 
regions of Wallonia and Flanders. The cultural councils 
deal with legislation regarding cultural~ educational and 
linguistic matters. Sigler (1983: 116) regards this 
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representational arrangement bf linguistic groups as a 
strong inclination towards consociationalism. In this 
respect he is supported by Lijphart (1980: 60) who also 
sees Belgium as a semi-federal consociational democracy. A 
further change in the 1967-1971 constitution was the new 
requirement that the Cabinet must be comprised of an equal 
number of French- and Flemish-speaking members. In 1971 c:'\ 
further act was passed which defined the powers and 
structure of the linguistic groups in greater detail to 
include the following area: language, arts, n,'i:\ tiona 1 
hc,ff i tage, radio and television, youth policy, educatiori, 
leisu~e facilities and travel. In the clearly defined 
linguistic-geographical border between the Flemish- and 
French-speaking groups, the bilingual Brussels remained an 
anomaly, a stumbling block to a final constitutional 
solution. The French speakers of Brussels wanted full 
regional status for the city in which they were a majority 
even though it was part of greater Flanders. The Flemish 
in contrast, wanted to prevent Brussels from becoming a 
second 'official' French-speaking 
one of the Flemish. 
region, compared to the 
In 1977 to 1978 a four-party coalition government agreed to 
the "Pa<::te cc:,mm1.1naL.1ta.ire", whic:h g&.'\V~'.:! BrL1ssels regional 
-tatus similar to that of Flanders and Wallonia. A 
provision was that the regional executive of Brussels would 
have half the numbers of the executives of Flanders and 
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Wallonia. Another provision cf the Pacte Communautaire was 
the formal division cf government into five levels 
The National Parliament dealing with matters such as 
foreign affairs, defence, fiscal and micro-economic .and 
justice. The powers of the Senate were reduced and 
would concentrate only 
matters, which left the 
on regional and constitutional 
House of Representatives 
(Chamber) as the main legislative body. The Cabinet 
comprises an equal number cf French-speaking and 
Flemish members, which de not have to be members of the 
legislature. 
Regicinal Councils which actually are regional 
parliaments with their own executive dealing with 
regional matters, but not fiscally very autonomous. 
Community Councils dealing with culture, education and 
health (i.e. the former Cultural Councils). 
Provinces. 
Communes~ An Arbitration Court was formed to deal with 
disputes between these five levels of 
(Irving 1980 .: 12). 
government. 
According to Senelle (1978 ~5), the goal of these 
constitutional reforms was to bring harmony to the 
relations between the linguistic communitiem and to 
formulate a system which would prevent eithe~ of the two 
communities from unilaterally forcing its will on the 
other. This entails the acceptance of the fact that 
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tultural federalism has developed in Belgium and that a 
permanent language boundary is dividing the country into 
two •eparate and distinct cultural regions. The motivation 
behind the Flemish-speaking people's push for reform is 
that they wanted to play their rightful· part in public 
affairs and to enable them to promote not only their 
cultural rights, but also to improve their economic and 
social conditions. The Walloons wanted to ensure that 
their numerical inferiority did not lead to their 
subjection to the Flemish majority. To ensure that these 
goals co1 .. 1ld be~ obtained, already-mentioned 
constitutional reforms were implemented with the result 
clearly indicating a determined move towards communalism 
and the recognition cf group rights. 
The Constitutional changes between 1960 and 1980 had a 
effect the Belgian Party system. 
Traditionally, Belgium was divided among three groups, the 
Catholics, Liberals and Socialists. Each were constructed 
as 'worlds' and were ba•ed on ideological conceptions and 
cultural traditions and operated in a wide spectrum of 
activities inc:luding educ at.ion, healthcare, social 
security, mass media, socio-economic interests and most 
impor·tantly, political parties. (Gerard-Libois and 
Mabille, 1980: 130). These parties shared power through a 
series of coalition governments, until the mid-1960s', when 
they began splitting along cultural-linguistic lines, 
resulting in at least nine major parties. 
f~2 
Two factors gave rise to this split, the first being new 
linguistic legislation cf 1962-63 and the second the 
L..ot.tv,ain crisis .. The Liberal Party experienced 
transformation and the Social Christian and Social.ist 
Parties suffered setbacks in 1965 .. Community Parties such 
as the Rassemblement Wallen and the Vclksunie reached new 
highs of 11% and 19% respectivelly, of votes in Wallonia 
and Flanders. (Gerard-L..ibois and Mabille 1980: 134). 
Between . 1971 and 1980 political parties experienced even 
more fragmentation~ increasing linguistic homogeneity and a 
greater interplay of coalitions. By 1978 the number of 
parties have grown tc 13 and by 1980 six combinations of 
governmental coalition have been tried out, which often 
included the community parties. This trend received a 
boc,st from the~ "Pac:te Communaub·:dn,1 11 , ( 19'7'7·-78) which gave 
Brussels regional status similar to that of Flanders and 
Wa 1 l t':ln i a • 
Van Dyke (1983: 13) mentions the following characteristics 
of the Belgian shift towards communalism: Firstly, the 
degree of regional autonomy to the ethnic groups through 
geographical subdivisions along ethnic lines. Secondly, 
the acceptance of proportional representation in Belgium 
after l.945. Thirdly, government (federal) offices and 
po•itions are divided equally between the two groups. 
Fourthy, either parliamentary delegation has the veto right 
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to prevent changes in linguistic boundary lines. 
Forsyth (1984 12) adds to the above communal 
characteristics of Belgium the concept of a grand 
coalition, referring to the fact that the country has been 
mostly governed by party coalition during the twentieth 
century, and he comes to the conclusion that Belgium is a 
classic consociational democracy. (The four 'requirements ' 
being a grand coalition, a mutual veto, proportionality 
and segmental autonomy).Forsyth claims that in the past the 
three main political parties in Belgium served as a 
mechanism for integrating the two ~thnic groups because 
they were bi-ethnic and reflected mainly ideological and 
religio~s conflicts. During the past few years however, 
ethnic differences caused the three major ideological 
parties to broke up into six ethnically-based parties, 
concerned with ethnic, cultural and linguistic conflict 
(Forsyth, 1984 :13). 
Lijphart (1980: 4 - 8) gives a summary of how the Belgian 
constitution is operating along consociational lines: 
The Belgian Executives adhere to the principle of 
power-sharing through grand coalitions. Regardless of 
party representation, the Cabinet must consist of equal 
numbers of French- and Dutch-speakers. c· 01nce 1954 
cabinets have been coalitions of two or more parties. 
all 
Belgian Executives have a balanced relationship with 
the legislative which result in a semi-seperaticn of 
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power and a situation where trade-offs are important. 
Bel~Jian bic:,':':\mE'1'ralism allows twcl Hr.11.1ses in Parlia1M»nt, 
b1 .. 1t the ''Pac:t.e CommL1naut.a.i.re 11 (1977-78) reduced the 
Senate-? and left 
Representatives as the main legislative body. 
The Multiparty system of Belg.i.um is characteriz~d by 
the presence cf at least 9 major parties. These are 
the end-result of a split-up of the three traditional 
part.i.f:.~s. 
Beth the Belgian Houses in Parliament are elected by 
proportional representation, a system whose basic: aim 
is to give parties the number of seats in accordance 
with the number of votes received. Prc::>port.iona l. 
representatit1n was first introduced .i.n 1899 when 
universal. suffrage threatened to destroy the Liberal 
Party's parl .i.ament,ary repreisentatir.m under a 
winner-takes-all system. 
The Belgian society is divided along three traditional 
lines of cleavage, which are reflected in the 
multidimensional character of the party system 
Religious differences divide the Christian People's 
and Christian Social Parties (prac:tic:ing Catholics) 
frc:>m the 
Cathc.>l ic::). 
Sc>c:ia lists; and Liberals (non-practicing 
The latter two parties are divided by 
soc:.i.o-ec:onomic: cleavages, while all three traditional 
parties have divided into community parties based en 
linguistic differences, i.e.Frenc:h and Flemish •• 
Belgium is divided into three autonomous regions along 
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the territorial federal pattern, (Flanders, Wallonia 
and Brussels), each of whom have strong autonomous 
power. 
federalism, which is non-territorial the Cultural 
Council's c~uthor :i.. ty ~eaches all members of that 
cultural group irrespective of territorial boundaries. 
Apart from the 2/3 majority needed in both Houses to 
change the Belgian constitution, the two linguistic 
groups also have a veto over l~gislation affecting 
their cultural autonomy. 
Belgium has definitely transcended a former unitary system 
and inc:Hvidual .i.stic: appl"'C).::'\Ch is m.Jw 1·,eading 
c::omft>rtab l y towards communalism in a system of 
consociational democracy. According to Lijphart (1980: 
72), Belgium is experimenting with a combination of 
territori,al. federalism, dealing with the two cultural 
groups which are not territorially defined, and corporate 
federalism, to deal with the non-territorial ethnicity in 
Br-usse 1. s. " 
SWITZERLAND 
Switzerland is - small country with 
population of six-and-a-half million, consisting of thr-ee 
86 
major ethnic groups and four national languages. Despite 
its scarce natural resources and ethnic diversity, the 
country has prospered into one of the wealthiest in the 
world, with very little social or ethnic conflict. 
The Swiss canton system provides a good example of how a 
federal system can accommodate diverse ethnic minorities by 
following a communal approach. By allowing autonomy at the 
regional level, matters of local concern are left to 
citizens of that region alone. Central government is 
decentralized to a major extent and the rights of 
individuals and states are entrenched in the constitution. 
Further principles of Swiss communalism include a system of 
checks and balances through the Second House in Parliament~ 
proportional representation of all political parties and 
language groups in the executive and finally, form of veto, 
through direct popular initiatives against an unpopular law 
or measure taken by the central government. Switzerland 
is often regarded as the most perfect example of 
consociationalism and cf asymme~rical federalism. 
The reason for Switzerland's success can be found in its 
political system and in the socio-economic consequences of 
that system. 
with each 
It is based on co-operation - of the people 
other within ~he communes, of the commune• 
within the cantons and the cantons with the confederation. 
It recognizes the heterogeneity of its population, which is 
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divided into German (65%)i French (18%), 
a small Rheato-Romanish group (1%). 
Italian (10%) and 
cu 1 tu res, traditions, and religions co-exist 
and the Swiss federal system ensures that there is neither 
majority nor minority domination. It is a system which may 
be summarized as a one man, many votes system, 
citizens cast their votes at several political 
since 
levels. 
This system also prevents one political party from imposing 
its will on the whole country. 
Welsh and Slabbert t:011ct.tr II In the Swis,s case, 
majoritarianism is avoided and instead the principle of 
amicable agreement underlies the decision-making process in 
the political system (1979 146) .. The Swiss federal 
system had its origins in the 13th century after a period 
of violent conflict at domestic level and against foreign 
foes; n It took 700 years to refine the system so that it 
would accommodate the diversity of the Swiss people and to 
give them a constitution that represents the democratic 
model closely than in any other country (Louw and Kendall, 
1.986: 126). 
According to Steiner(1974 252), the Swiss constitution 
is a system of amicable agreement rather than majority 
rule .. He mentions a build-in restraint that is present in 
the political system and regards the cross-cutting of 
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political parties with other groups as the reason for the 
political stability in Switzerland - this prev~nt them from 
di ffe:-1ring strongly in their demands on the political 
system. Steiner also claims that the Swiss example has 
proven h.i.s hypot.ht":lsi~'5 c:orrec:t: 11 :Cn a political syst<f?m with 
strong subcultural segmentation, the more often political 
decisions are made by amicable agreement, thcf? more 
prc)bc:\blei is c:\ lr..>w l~?vel of int.er·subcult.ural hostility" 
(1974: 252). 
Slabbert. and Welsh agrees in principle with Steiner's 
thesis and add that all or most of the politically salient 
groups -hould be represented in the executive. They find 
support in Smoc:k "Only when a syst!f?m that gives t1·1e 
constituent groups a believe that they are equitably 
represented in the central decision-making orgaris can be 
devisE-~d, has the mc)st ·fundamental issue been resolved" 
(Slabbert and Welsh, :I. .q. 7) .. In this respect 
Switzerland seemed to have succeeded greatly. 
The 1848 Swiss constitution's essential feature was that 
the unity of the Helvetic State c:culd only be realized by 
respecting the autonomy and individuality of its member 
sta te~s, which today numbers 26 Cantons and half-Cantons. 
These have much political and administrative freedom and 
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each have its own constitution and make its own laws. 
The duties cf the Federal government (the Confederation) 
are strictly defined by the Constitution which include. 
internal and external security, diplomatic relations, 
customs, moneta~y controls, post and telecommunications 
and among others. In many areas the government merely 
legislates and observes, 
carry out the legislation. 
leaving it to the Cantons to 
The Federal state consists of the people, the Cantons,. 
the Federal Assembly, the Federal Council and the Federal 
Tribunal. Government at federal and cantonal level takes 
the form of a direct democracy. 
Individual rights are guaranteed by the constitution and 
are upheld by the Federal Court against arbitrary measures 
taken by the state. All citizens are equal before the law 
and enjoy the following freedoms freedom of trade and 
inc:lust.ry, freedo~ of choice of domicile, f n~edom of thei 
the right to private property and the rights of 
association and of petition. All citizens are allowed to 
vote, with the exception of women in some Cantons, and to 
take an active and direct role in legislative e:\nc:I 
constitutional matters in an unique Swiss way: 
Any ci t.izen c:an pr<:>pose a partial or" c:c:impl.eb;;) 
modification of the constitution by getting 100 000 
90 
people to sign his petition in what is called the right 
cf initiative, to which the Federal parliament can 
ahswer with a counter~proposal 
taken on both proposals. 
and a vote is then 
The Referendum is a different method by which the 
people have a say in constitutional changes. The 
Obligatory Referendum is used in this way on federal 
and cantonal levels. The Optional Referendun refers to 
the p•ople's right to hav~ a say in any Federal 
legislation or decree. It requires 50 000 voters 
signatures or the support of 8 Cantons. 
The Swiss government operates not from the top down, but 
from the bottom up. The Swiss citizen belorigs firstly to 
his Commune, a unit small enough for the exercise of 
direct democracy. There are 3 020 Communes, each run by a 
local authority, with rights and duties laid down by the 
Canton of which they are part off. Their authority covers 
areas such as schools, energy, traffic regulation, roads, 
fire services, social care, sport and refuse collection. 
The Communes have a high degree of independence and 
autonomy and are run by a Commune Assembly or p~rliament. 
By electing their own representitives directly and by 
exercising their rights to initiatives and referenda, the 
citizens run their own affairs and enjoy a very direct form 
of democracy. 
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The Canton is a small and manageable autonomous political 
unit, which governs the middle area between Commune and 
Confederation. Areas over which the Cantons extend their 
influence include the Interior, Justice and Police, 
Military, Fiance, Economy, Health and Social Services, 
Education and Public Works. 
direct taxation. 
The Cantons are funded by 
The size of a Canton varies from the size of a city e.g. 
Zurich with a population of 1,1 million, to Uri, which 
has a population of only 33 000. Zurich sends 35 deputies 
to the Nati6nal Council and Uri only one, but both send 
two representitives each to the Council of States, a 
system which protects smaller Cantons against complete 
domination by larger ones, 
approved by both Houses. 
since all laws have to be 
There are 26 autonomous Cantons and half Cantons, of which 
19 are German, 6 are French, and 1 is Italian. In almost 
all of these Cantons, the largest single ethnic group 
accounts for more than 80%of the population in each Canton 
(Lijphart, 1980 58). Out of the 19 German Cantons, 18 
have a majority of about 90% German-speakers and in the 
French region, the average French majority comes to about 
70% of each Canton. It is therefore clear that a high 
degree of territorial segregation between the ethnic groups 
exists. 
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Each Canton has its own constitution, and laws are made in 
a one-chamber parliament which is normally elected by 
proportional representation and consists out of between 51 
and 200 members. Apart from the Cantonal Council, the 
voters also elect an executive body of 5 to 9 members. 
At the national level, legisl~tive power is vested in the 
Federal Assembly, which consists firstly out cf the 
National Council which represents 
members, elected on the 
In the case of 
It has 200 the people. 
basis of proportional 
with only one Canton representation. 
representative, a simple majority system is uaed. Each 
Canton or half-Canton has at least one member. The 
President of the National Council has the highest post in 
the Confederation in terms of protocol. 
The Council of States, secondly,· has 46 members, and 
Cantons are represented here equally, with two members per 
Canton and one member per half Canton. Most members are· 
elected by ballot for four years. 
The above two bodies hold four meetings annually, each 
lasting three weeks. Both have equal status and each bill 
has to be approved by beth. Differences have to be settled 
by compromise and trade-offs. The two houses meet together 
at least once a year to elect the Federal Council and its 
President and Vice-President~ the Federal Chancellor ~nd 
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the Federal Court. The Federal Assembly also has to pass 
federal laws and ratify treaties. 
Executive authority is vested in the Federal Council which 
consists of seven members, each presiding over a Federal 
Dc:partment. Each member is elected individually for a 
four-year term by the Federal Assembly's joint sitting. 
The Council ensures that current laws are observed, drafts 
new legislation, conducts foreign affairs and authorizes 
the mobilization of troops. 
responsibility for dec1sions. 
The members take collective 
One of the Federal Councillors is elected each year for the 
post of Federal President. He chai~s the meetings, 
little other extra duties er privileges. He can be ele~ted 
from any ethnic group. 
The composition of the Federal Council is cf special 
interest since Switzerland has many political parties and 
three major ethnic groups. The present composition ensures 
that all four major political parties are represented. The 
"magic:" formula emsun,~s th.;~t the Radical-Democratic c:tnd the 
Social-Democratic Parties c:ach h<-avc~ t.wt1 sea ts, whi l(: the. 
Swiss Peoples' Party has one seat, resulting in a 2:2:2:1 
proporti<:m. No Canton can have more than one Federal 
Councillor in the Council and the three largest Cantons 
have regularly been represented in the Council since 1848. 
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The election of a Federal Councillor is the result of 
'political chemistry' and a delicate and subtle c:t1mple:·: 
balanc:f:? has · to be struck in terms of language, 
denomination, regional and political considerations. In 
the words of KLlmmerly .. md Frey (1985 : 41) : "The Council 
has a great measure of autonomy. It is not directly 
responsible to the legislature for its actions, and the 
Council does not lose office (as would the Cabinet in 
Britain) just because one of its policies has been defeated 
in the legislature. A chief function of this close-knit, 
seven·-man <a~N~?c:u ti ve is cor1e: i 1 ia t.ion and co·-ol"·d ina tion. " 
The Federal administration is divided into the following 
departments: Foreign Affairs, Finance, Customs, Justice and 
Police, Economy, Tra~sport and Power and the Interior. 
The Federal Court is based in Lausanne and it is the 
supreme arbiter of justice. It is the highest court of 
appeal, and acts according to its Constitutionally defined 
power-s. It lays down definitive inter-pr-etation of the law 
as a guide-line for the whole country and acts as a State 
Tribunal when conflict ar-ises between Cantons or between 
Cantons and the Confederation. The Federal Court also 
upholds the Constitution and pr-otects the conititutional 
rights cf citizens against arbitrary measures taken by the 
It has, however, no powers for testing the 
constitutionality of federal law. 
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The country's seven national political parties are all 
equally moderate in most respects. There is no incentive 
for hard-fought, winner-takes-all political campaigning at 
na,t.icmal level because all major political issues are 
essentially localized to Cantonal and Communal levels. 
Freedom of movement of goods, capital and people between 
Cantons is entrenched in the Constitution and therefore, 
any extremist policies from the ruling party in one Canton 
will result in its residents moving away to another Canton. 
According to W.elsh and Slabbert ( 1988 55), linguistic 
issues are always suboidinate to religious, class and 
economic: issues in the Swiss political party context. 
Political parties are not based on ethnic/cultural lines, 
but cut across these divisions to concentrate on religious 
and socio-economic factors. 
Acc:c1n:ling to Lijphart (1980: 59), the fo1•·mLtJ.a 
the management of linguistic diversity consists cf a high 
degree of homogeneity in the units of the federation 
cr~ated by territorial segregation of the ethnic segments, 
and the assignment of these cultural function~ to local 
(Cantonal) levels, rather than to a federal 
cone l Ltsion that Switzerland ·i "" 
""'' .. a an 
level. His 
a 
plural society can operate successfully on federal l .i.n~?S 
if it uses an asymmetrical rather than symmetrical model 
of federalism. The former refering to mutually 
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reenforcing federal and segmental boundaries rather than 
the cross cutting boundaries. In the case of Switzerland, 
the different segments .of the plural population are 
by-and-large neatly divided into territorial areas and 
Cantons in those areas reflect a high degree of 
homogeneity. The· homogeneity of the cantons lead to 
distinct lines of cleavage and high internal cohesion, 
according to Lijphart. He argues that clear bounderies 
between subcultures limit mutual contact and consequently 
reduce the chances that potential antagonisms may erupt 
into actual hostility. 
This is in total contradiction to the thesis of Steiner. He 
proposes that there are no distinct lines of cleavages in 
the Swiss soci~ty and that all major cleavages in the Swiss 
political system crosscut one another. According to 
Steiner, with the exeption if trade unions, all other 
groups such as political parties, economic interest 
groups, . voluntary associations, newspapers and even 
religion follow cross-cutting patterns. All these groups 
overlap with the formal decision-makers on federal, 
cantonal, and local levels. There is even a strong overlap 
between government and oposition parties, to such an 
extend that there are no distinct cleavage between them. 
(Steiner 1974: 255). 
For support of his proposition that Swiss cantonal, 
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linguistic, religious, and party lines are intertwined and 
that the constant interactions these subcultures on a mass 
level result in a low level of intersubcultural conflict, 
Steiner uses a corresponding argument by Lipset : Lipset 
an;;JUEa'S that federal units should hot coincide with 
segmental bounderies "Democ:r.;~cy needs c: leavi:.'\ge within 
l inguist.i1::: c>r religious ~;Jrt)L.tp~;;, not. betwEa>~m them" 
Both the above views have some merit. On the one hand, 
Switzerland does have political partie~;, ec::onc:>mic: 
ir1tere~::;ts !' religious groups etc. tl,at adhere to the 
cross-cutting model, but on the other hand the four ethnic 
groups tend to follow a pattern cf territorial. segregation 
and of largely homogeneous federal divisions. 
It must be finally said that much of Switzerland's success 
in dealing with its plurality can be contributed to its 
uniqueness. The countries' stability was not conceived 
ovta>rnight !' but is the result cf 700 years of domestic 
conflict during which a variety of pluralistic options were 
experimented with, and the best one chosen. Secondly, the 
country managed to stay out of all the major conflict of 
the 20th century and so succeeded in avoiding the profound 
structural changes that ruptured European society during 
this period. Furthermore~ this policy cf neutrality 
traditionally enjoys the support of all Swiss political 
parties and helps to foster national unity. 
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CYPRUS 
Having mentioned earlier that political secession is an 
ultimate step, taken only when all other constitutional 
measures have failed,~~ can therefore accept that the 
forced partition of Cyprus and the secession of the Turkish 
dominated North after 1975 occurred only after all other 
efforts by the Cypriots failed to briMg peace tc this 
deeply-divided country. Cyprus is a clas•ic case of 
constitutional failure because of excessive provisions for 
minority rights. This is quite unique since the conflict 
in plural societies is more often caused by inadequate 
prot•ction cf group rightsi 
Cyprus .is a small island in the Eastern-Mediterranean with 
a population of about 650 000, of which roughly 80% is of 
Greek origin, with the remaining 20% being of Turkish 
origin. The island was ruled for 300 years by the Ottoman 
Turks in spite of the fact that the people were 
predominantly Greek. It ~as finally taken ever by Britain 
in 1878 and it became a British crown colony in 1925. 
Throughout the 20th century the Greek Cypriots showed an 
inclination for incorporation into Greece (Enosis), while 
the Turkish Cypriots demanded the partition of the island. 
When the British replaced the Ottoman rulers in 1877, the 
Turkish Cypriots lost their special status, after which 
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the Greek Cypriots began developing more rapidly. The 
Turkish Cypriots saw themselves over the next few decades 
steadily losing ground n1.11ner ic:.~ 11 y, e~onomic:ally and 
politically. Apart from existing linguistic and religious 
cleavages (77% Orthodox vs 18% Muslim), class differences 
also be~ame a dividing factor as the economic disparities 
followed ethnic lines. 
The Greek Cypriots claimed th~ir improved position was a 
result of hard word and due to their particular social and 
cultural outlook on life, rather than to deliberate 
exploitation cf the numerically inferior Turkish Cypriots 
( Loi .~os 1976 2 l. ) • The latter took in the opposite 
viewpoint by claiming the Greek Cypr i<::its 
systematically exploited and impoveri~hed them. Ac:c:c>rding 
to l:..oizos the Turkish Cypriots had an average per capita 
income of 20% lower than that of the Greek Cypriots in 
1960. Whoever should carry the blame for this disparity in 
wealth and development has yet to be determined, but the 
fact remain that the Greek Cypriots showed no inclination 
to share their wealth in accordance with the demands of the 
Turkish Cypriots. According to a Minority Group Survey on 
Cypn.1~.;; ( 1976 en the latt~,r· were re<;;Jar·ded as "lazy 
inefficient and uncivilized II by the Greek Cypriots, who 
objected strongly to subsidizi~g the 
Cypriots. 
.1.00 
TLtrkish 
Cyprus became independent in 1960 i::\n L\l"liqL.le 
constitution was formulated to accommodate and protect the 
mincwi ty gr·m..1p rights of the Turkish Cypriots. The 
constitution recognized the existence of the two separate 
groups in Cyprus by the creation of separate communal 
structures, separate seats in the legislature and separate 
voters rol l.s. Several. other measures included: The 
president of Cyprus would be Greek and th~ vice~president 
Turkish; the same would apply in the Clf 
Representatives; three out of seven cabinet ministers were 
to be Turkish; t~e civil service, army and police all 
consisted out of similar. ratios. 
Even in the larger cities, the two groups were allo~ed to 
have their own separate municipal councils. Al. l the keiy 
provisions were made unamendable. Lijphart (1980: 62) 
uses the term corporate federalism (coined by Friederich, 
also known as non-territorial federalism) to describe the 
II conscJc iationc\ l II crJn1sti tut ion of CyprLts. According to 
Lijphart, the residential patterns of the Greek and Turkish 
gro~ps were so highly interspersed that regular territorial 
federalism was impossible (unlike in the case of the 
Flemings in Belgium, the French Canadians and the French 
and Italian minorities in Switzerland). Therefore the two 
ethnic groups were given autonomy and legislative powers 
over their separate religious, cultural, educational and 
personal status matters a well as a veto over matters such 
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as foreign affairs, security and defence. The legislature 
was elected by separate voters' rolls for each group and 
separate majorities were required to pass legislation with 
regard to electoral taxes and duties (Slabbert and 
Welsh 1979 : 72). The President of Cyprus was Greek and 
the Vice-President Turkish and both were elected by their 
respective communities. In the cabinet, three ministerial 
posts out of seven were reserved for Turkish Cypriots. 
Decisions were made on the basis of a simple majority, but 
the Pr~sident and Vice-President both had a veto over 
foreign affairs and defence. According to the Minority 
Rights Survey (1976:8), 30% of the seats in the House of 
Representatives, 40% of the posts in the army and 30% in 
the civil service and police were reserved for Turkish 
Cypriots. Seen in the light of their actual population 
size (20%), these were very generous concessions and 
along with the reserved cabinet posts (42%) represented a 
strong degree of over-representation, especially seen in 
the light of the relatively weak socio-economic position 
the Greek Cypriots found themselves in. In fairness, it 
must be added that the Turkish Cypriots were already 
strongly represented in the police and military. 
Furthermore, each community was also allowed to have its 
own municipal councils in the 5 biggest cities. The 
Supreme Constitutional Court, en which both groups had 
representation, was the final arbiter in constitutional 
matters. 
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The result of the statistical over-representation of the 
Turkish Cypriots in the constitution was that the latter 
enjoyed guaranteed participation in the government of 
Cyprus to such a degree which was proportionally far above 
their actual population size (40% representation versus 18% 
act.L.1c:~J. p<:)pulation). As a consequence, the Greeks 
continually tried to strengthen their position at the 
expense of the over-represented Turks, while of course the 
latter used their veto powers to block any such moves, 
resulting in a constitutional deadlock (Sigler, 1983 
113). Arguments between the two groups continued non-stop, 
covering virtually all spheres of activity. Slabbert and 
Welsh (1979 : 73) mentions some of the specific problem 
areas as the composition of the army and the civil service, 
tax laws and the establishment of separate municipalities 
and especially the subsidizing of the poorer Turkish 
Cypriots by their more prosperous Greek counterparts. 
With regard to the civil service fixed ratios, the Greek 
Cypriots claimed the Turkish Cypriots did not have enough 
qualified people to fill these positions, while the latter 
were determined to maintain their quota. According to the 
Minority Rights Survey 
compromise was shot 
( 1976 9) , €:.•very 
down by one of the groups. 
effort to 
Finally, 
in 196~;:, !I the President, Makarios, made a proposal to 
drastically change th constitution, especially with regard 
to the fixed ratios of civil service appointments. The 
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Vice-President, Kuchuk, vetoed these, and the constitution 
broke down. 
A combination cf factors led to the eventual failure of the 
1960 Cyprus constitution: The very complicated nature and 
the unworkability of the constitution was the result of 
over-ambitious efforts to avoid majority domination by the 
Greek Cypriots. Palley (1978 :17) sees the demand by the 
Turks for over·-·generous ca lcu lat.ion of II c:ommuna 1 
proportionality" as the major· stumbling block. Slabbert 
;and Welsh (1981 73) give as reasons the alienation of the 
Greek majority by the over-representation of the Turkish 
minority, the low level of cooperation between the leaders 
of the two groups and the practical unworkability of the 
constitution. They then ask the very relevant question: 
'' .•. wheth~r formal abridgements of majciritarian power will 
not do more to alienate ~he majority than provide security 
C.')f th~? minor i t.y? 11 Sig 1 G)r ( 199:3; :: l l. :~:;) agr<,~r..1r.s by suggestin<;;J 
that the extensive grants of minority rights caused severe 
instability in Cyprus and adds· to this the opinion that the 
ethnic groups lacked the sense of nationhood and loyalty to 
a single state. Loizos (1977) cl.aims that the in~ompetence 
of thf.-, twcl groups and the in'l:<~?r·fc~ren<:e ·from Turkey and 
Greece al.so helped to cause the downfall of the Cyprus 
R<?.PLlb l ic:. 
The constitutional crisis worsened and turned the country 
towards violent conflict. In 1963, intercommunal fighting 
104 
broke out, and in 1965 the Turkish Cypriot vice-president 
the two communities settled down to separate lives in a 
state of dormant hostility. In 1974 the ruling Greek Junta 
staged a coup and shortly thereafter Turkey invaded the 
island and occupied the northern 40%. A massive population 
transfer occurred in that 200 000 Greek Cypriots fled 
south. It resulted in two more homogeneous areas and 
allowed the northern part to be proclaimed into a 
Turkish-Cypriot Federated State (Sigler, 1983 ~ 113). 
Today the border is heavily fortified and the conflict is 
far from resolved. Possible solutions include a double 
'Enosis', ie the Turkish Cyprus becoming a part of Turkey 
and the rest of Cyprus becoming part of Greece; or a 
pClSSible re-·un if i c: 1:.\ t .i or, the two parts into a 
<;;Jeographi<:::al fedE•ration (this time territorially-based a ..... :::, 
opposed to non-territorial thirdly, two 
completely independent Cyprus states; or fourthly, the 
virtually impossible alternative - a unitary Cyprus in 
which ethnicity plays no role and everyone is firstly a 
Cypriot (ie~ an individualistic approach). 
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NORTHERN IRELAND 
Several distinct peoples can be identified in the United 
Kingdom and Ireland. Apart from th• Irish which gained 
independence in 1921 after a long struggle" groups such as 
the Sects, Welsh and smaller group• from Cornwall and the 
Isle of Man can be identified as being cf separate ethnic 
origin as the English. The distinct languages, cultures, 
economic development and history found in these regions 
help to boost their separate ethnic consciousness. Scotland 
especially, which uaed to be an independant political 
entity fer many centuries, experienced a strong emergence 
cf nationalism in the 1970'&. linked to the discovery cf 
oil in the North Bea. The fact that both the Labour Party 
and SOP-Liberal Coalition includad into their constitutions 
a much greater level of autonomy for Scotland, including a 
separate Scottish Parliament, shows the serious light in 
which Scottish nationalism is still bein; vi•w•d in 1987 
(everi after it had receded considerably in th• 1980's). 
The biggest problem fer the English hcweverp has always 
been the Irish. The English occupied Ireland in the 
twelfth century, but never managed to complete the 
political assimilation of the indigenous Caltic pacple. In 
the seventeenth century, English and Scottish settlers were 
placed in the Northern part of Ireland, but various factors 
ensured a permanent hostile atmosphere between the two 
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groups. The indigenous Irish spcka a diffarant language, 
were Catholic and had a different culture. 
drivan from thair land by tha Protestant Sattler• who ware 
accncmically strcn;ar, and had tha En;lish stat• bah.i~d 
tham. By 1703 tha Catholics ownad lass than 14% cf tha 
land (Arthur 1984 2). The settlers' position was only 
secured in 1760, after Catholics ware defeated by the 
Protestant forces of William cf Orange. Because of their 
170 000 in all, they were salf-aufficient 
and developed their own separate economy distinct from the 
native Gaelic Irish and became firmly incorporated in the 
periphery of English politics (Arthur 1984: 2). 
Although the conflict in Northern Ireland is perceived as 
being primarily of a raligious nature between Catholics 
and Protestants~ Schmitt 
ethnic 11 d :i.1: f f.,ll'"tf!nc: &~~~ 1: l'"E).i.n f c:>rt:f!:,d by e,c: c:>nt::>m.i. c:: ~~ r .i.l!l,1vanc::er:~ i1 
cultural hcst.i.lity and centurie• cf political ccnfl.i.ct~ •• 
the root cf the problem. Rel.i.g.i.on is merely tha vassal 
which carrie& tha various 
groups. Dickie-Clark (1976 
cleavages between the two 
55) usas Daly's argumant that 
tha Northern Irish conflict ia not a raligioua problam, but 
a aactar.i.an cne, to substantiate hi• own claim that 
sectarianism, Just as racism in South Africa, is highly 
affective to keep groups apart. Sectarianiam in Northern 
IraJ..;,md h;; df.;,'f.i.n<,id by D,-al.y as "the af.SBl..lmpticm th,at cm<*' tnii,\Y 
or ought to discriminate socially~ economically or 
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politically batwaan ;roup• or individuals on religious 
It is a matter of course that the 
conflict in Northern Ireland is much more complex thaM mare 
religious diffaranc••· 
Whan Ireland becama independent in 1921, six predominantly 
Northern Protestant counties ramainad loyal to Britain and 
became the Province cf Northern Ireland. Unfortunately 
the problem did net step hara because, instead cf a 
hcmo;enacus Protestant Northarn Ireland, one third of its 
population consisted of Catholics whose loyalty ramainad 
with the Catholic Beuth. The result of the partition of 
Ireland was that it gave the majority Protestants in 
Northern Ireland the ability to dominate the region 
according to thair own will. Thay ~era given thair own 
Parliament to control local affairs incl1..1d:i..ng mc:>f.,i t. 
government offices, police and the judiciary. A unit•ry 
state from in the Westminster tradition w•• implemented 
which resulted in the dominance cf the Protestant majority 
at the expense cf the Catholic minority. Disc: r· imina ticn 
against the Catholics, en political and economic levels 
became the norm. According to Schmitt (1977 233) a few 
of the mere blatant discriminatory practices which affected 
both government and private sector employment were~ The 
stacking of local elections in favour of the Protestants 
and gerrymandering to weaken the Catholic vote. 
system worked against the Catholics because the 
l 08 
Thc;:i legal 
judiciary was a Protestant preserve. Tha police, who ware 
supposed to keep a neutral presence between the hostile 
groups, were exclusively 
B-Specials. 
Protestant the so-called 
The 1920 Act which was imposed in Ireland, was reluctantly 
accepted by Northern Ireland and produced a constitution 
which was virtually still-born and a legislative ruin 
within savan months, according to Arthur (1984 ~ 32). Tha 
previsions of the 1920 constitut~on were as fellows It 
craatad a parliament consisting cf a House cf Commons and a 
senate~ the former which was to be elected by proportional 
representation and PR was replaced by a plurality system in 
1929. By 1921, the Protestant Unionists_ wen 40 seats cut 
cf 52, and never got less than 32. This remained the 
fundamental problem fer the Catholic mino~ity the 
majority of Protestants always voted fer the Unionist 
party, ie strictly along sectarian linea (and re•ulted in 
what LiJphart refarrad to as a majority dictatorship. 
Ncrtharn Iraland's political systam 
since· the 1920'•, but according 
relatively minor until the mid-1960. 
to 
caused instability 
Schmitt, it was 
During this period, 
some ccnscciational davicas war• axparimantad with, 
without much success. In 1973 for axampla, proportional 
raprasentation was introduced, but failed to make a big 
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impact, as tha Catholic& wara cutnumbarad 2-1 and because 
voting patterns followed raligicu& divisions, 
hope cf aver achieving a significant dagraa of power~ It 
had tha sama conaaquanca& a& a simple majority system 
Tha Catholics' feeling of powarl•••n••• 
bacama more acute a& tha time passed and aftar 1965, a 
turning point, violence incraasad dramatically. Thousands 
ware injured in fighting between the two groups, while the 
IRA and the British army also incraasad their prasanca. 
Soma further reforms of a communal nature ware introduced, 
including tha phasing out of tha Protestant police, tha 
abandonment of discriminat6ry electoral practices and tha 
fair allotment cf housing (schmitt 
measures were sabotaged by extremists on both sides and 
specifically by the Protestant majority fearing for their 
dominant position in Northern Ireland. The Prote&tants 
rejected the concept of a powar-sharing Executive and the 
Northern Ireland collapsed (Palley, 
Violence continuad and Britain introduced a new symtem of 
direct rule in 1972, suspending the Parliament and ruling 
Northern Ireland by a British Cabinet minister the 
sc-called Secretary fer Northern Ireland. 
In 1973 tha Protestants vctad ovarwhelmingly to remain part 
of tha UK~ while many Catholics boycotted the referendum, 
Thr:?. British government introduced new conmtitutional 
reforms again in 1973, once more with the accent on 
110 
canaociaticnal method& which included a power-sharing 
executive, proportional rapramantation, the encouragement 
cf the el•cticn cf moderate-party candidate&p and the 
cvarseaing by Britain cf the appointment of neutral Jud;as 
and in general, the equal treatment of all Northern Irish 
pecpl~?. In 1973 elections were held under the naw reformed 
ccnatitution, with the result that mostly moderate parties 
were elected which managed to work out a power-sharing 
arrangement (Schmitt, 1977 : 241). 
This newly-elected body soon made plans far the formation 
of a touncil cf Ireland, consisting cf members of both 
I t'"€i~ l ,i:\tids. Although it would have been a weak advisory 
body, it certainly was a step towards unification of the 
Republic with Northern Ireland. This prospect scared the 
Protestantsp and larga-acala p l'"C) t.Ef)~ii ·t i' C 1 ). (:)W!iflC:I ~ W hi C: t, 
resulted in the failure cf the new conatituticri in 1974. 
Schmitt gives aevaral reasons for the failure~ Firstly, 
continuing violence by both groups hardened the attitudes 
of the people and further polarized them. Sec:oncl 1 y !' thei 
11 int~?rf1ii:\tic::inal dirmmaic)r·1 <:lf e:~thn.icity", wt·1ic.:h re·rr~rss to the 
fears of the Protestants cf being swamped .in a unified 
Catholic Ireland. Thirdly, he mentions that the settlement 
came from an axtarnal sourc:a (Brita.in) and not from an 
agreement among the relevant elites of Northern Ireland. 
In the following years aavaral attempts to reach agreements 
1.1..1. 
most.ly of tha total rajacticn of 
power-sharing by thu Protestants. In 1987 a new agreement 
with the Republic was raachad. Through the historical 
Angla-Irish Agreement, tha Irish Republic will have a ••Y 
fer tha first time in tha affairs of Northern Ireland 
through a joint body, much along the lines cf the proposed 
1973 Council of Ireland. Of course, many Protastanta, 
amon(.~ them Ian Paisley, are vehemently opposing this 
The Northern Irish question is far from being salved in 
l C~EIEl .. It remains on• of the most burning issuaa in today's 
spectrum of ethnic conflicts. The Catholic minority, after 
being opprassad for centuries, is determined to change laws 
and politics that keep them powerless and saparata from 
thair br6thars in the South. At tha same time the 
Protestants are Just as determined net to ba swallowed in a 
united Ireland and not to give tha Catholic minority an 
ovar-prapcrtional say in government. In ether words the 
Protestants are not prepared to make any effective changes 
tc:l their maj Cll'" i tar i.an way cf rule and insistence on 
individualism, bacausa cf an all-dominating fear. Yf:,'l':. i• 
certain communal measures have bean taken in the past~ 
which did not work because of the irreconcilable nature of 
the maximum demands cf the two sides. Power-sharing and 
cc-cparation en any level seems impossible and total lack 
of prc;rass in finding a solution gives the coAflict an air 
of intractability. The ranawad cycle of violence early in 
1988, brings us to the inevitable questionn could a society 
be so deeply divided that divisions could reach a level of 
.1.12 
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permanency, and the only •olution than could be physical 
p.;i1··t.i. t..icJn? In my c.1pin icm, l .•.. ,,::> a strong poasibility in 
Northern Ireland, i.a. to further divide the province into 
a hamagenecus Protestant section and a Catholic aectian~ 
the latter which should be fr-• to Join the Republic of 
\_ 
If partition is that easy it must have baan given 
consideration, but it must be remembered that partition is 
the ultimate solution taken when all else has failed - no 
nation er majority group likes to admit that the foundation 
en which the atate was founded (its constitution) had 
f i:it :i. l €i)d • Yet, in tha case of Northern Ireland, partition 
seems to be the only option, rather than continuously 
imlimenting fruitless conscciational experiments, which are 
doomed to failure, and drags out the agony cf this divided 
s;oc:: :i.f::ity. 
SPAIN 
The Basques comprise about 5% cf Spain's population cf 33 
million and the Catalonians about 16%. Both th••• groups 
have a long history of struggling for independence from 
(.~ . 
,.)pa.1.n. Both have their own c:u 1 tuna 1 1:rad :L ti<:ms 
and are highly concentrated in a specific area. Th• 
Basques reside in four northern-Spanish provinces and in 
three French districts which together make up the Basque 
homeland called Euskadi, Th• Catalans reside in the Spanish 
regions of Catalonia, V-lencia, The Balearic Islands and 
in a small part cf southern France, but the focus point 
of Catalan half of whose 
population lives in greater Barcelona. 
Both thasa groups have a long history of autonomy and 
independence. The Catalans wera deprived of their autonomy 
in 1714. Bacause they supported the Republican causa 
befcra and during the Civil Warp they ware rewarded with a 
few years of autonomy until the end cf the war in 1939 when 
Franco's Nationalists tock control of tha country. France 
formed a stran; centralized unitary state in which 
determined efforts ware made to stamp cut th~ Catalan and 
Basque culturep local nationalist parties w•ra forbidden 
and regional movements saverly suppressed. The Franco 
government was undemocratic aMd Fascist .and an effort was 
made to axpand Castilian hagamcny over all of Spain 
(Tudjmanp 1991 90). The Basques, •• in the case af the 
Catalans, also managed to ratain their national, linguistic 
and cultural heritage under very unfavourable conditions 
for many canturias, but also sufferad because of Franco's 
obsession for creating a unitary and individualistic 
by suppressing all vestigas of regional cultures. 
r . 
~pain 
The Basquas'claim for autonomy is every bit as strong if 
not stronger than that cf Catalonia. The Basques ara 
probably cne of Europe's oldest nations, with a language 
which has nothing in common with any of the Ibarian 
languages like Castilian, Catalcnian, Galician or 
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Portugasa. Thay have managed tc remain ralativaly 
independent for large parts of long history and had to 
rasist assimilation from both tha Franch and Bpani•h. 
According to Tudjman (1981 u Bl), tha less than two 
million Ba•qua• net only managed to maintain their own 
culture despite their small numbers, but al&o provided 
Franco's unitarist policies with tha most fierce 
resistance in all Spain. 
Both Catalonia and tha Basque ragicns ware, and still are 
today, highly industrialized, per capita among the 
in Spain and economically strong and waalthiast 
independent. Vat for many decades they were politically 
ccntrollad by Castilian-spaaking bureaucrats from Madrid, 
and ware kapt subdued under the harsh rule of the Spanish 
national army. Beth groups found this state of affairs 
most unsatisfactory and strong regional 
davalopad against th• afforta cf the cantral ;ovarnmant. 
Catalonia had &trongar historical, cultural and political 
traditions, as wall a& a much larger population, with the 
result t~at their demands for autonomy ware much mora 
affective than tho•• of tha Baaquea, who had to raaort to 
violence instead (Tudjman, 1991 79). Fer this purpose 
tha ETA (Basque Homeland and Freadom organization) was 
founded with the aim cf winning freedom through a domast~c 
•truggle and terrorism, 
aasassinationsp political pretests 
.dissemination of propaganda. Tha ETA 
including bombings, 
and through tha 
stands for total 
independence and its activities often transgress the 
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Spanish border. 
Fer almost 40 yaara Franco chcsa to i;ncra minority groups 
in an affcrt to cansalidata tha hagamcny of Castlla over 
the whole of Spain. This dalibarate attampt to i;nora the 
plural character of Spain was mostly unsuccessful. With 
France's daath in 1975, tha demand fer regional autcncmy 
in Catalonia and in the Basque provinces was still a~ 
strong as ever. Tha new govarnmant realized that the most 
viable option would ba pluralism and communalism, and soon 
started tha process cf dacantralizaticn cf tha central 
state and the granting cf regional autonomy. 
The new constitution recognized tha autcncmy of Catalonia, 
tha Basqua and four other regions, but also stressed the 
unbraakabla unity cf tha Spanish nation (Tudjman, 1981 
83). Spanish was still the official language, but Catalan 
and th• Basque language were allowed to be used officially, 
along with Spanish in thasa provinces. In Catalonia~ for 
example, the BOO-year-old governing body was restored to 
rule ever regional affairs such trade, primary 
education, industry and housing. Tha regions were also 
allowed to display their own flags. 
According to Linz (1980)~ tha Spanish state, under great 
domestic pressure from regional groups, had three choice&: 
firsly, it could carry on in the same individualiatic 
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pattern by ignoring cultural hatarcganaity and by using 
much force to maintain stability (and suffar the 
r•aulting ccnaaquancas, lik• intarnational ostracism); 
saccndly, it could allow tha sacassion of Catalonia, the 
Ba•quaa and 6thaia, but at tha cost cf latting Spain 
disintagrata into about savan separate entities. By.giving 
tc all six ragions damanding autonomy 
(Catalonia, the Basque Provinces, Valencia, Galicia, Aragon 
and tha Canaries) would about half its 
population, territory and waalth, which,•• an altarnativa, 
was a non-starter Th• third option fac~ng tha Spanish 
govarnmant was communalism, which bain~ tha most sensible 
ona, was prefared. It allowed a distinct level of 
ccmmunalism through regional autonomy and the recognition 
of cultural and lan;ua;• rights. Unfortunately, aven this 
big concession did not pacify the more r~dical alaments 
among the Basques, which resulted in frequent violence in 
the form of ETA terrorist attacks ~nd led to police and 
army retaliation. Even in the more peaceful Catalonia, 
according to Peffer (1984), Catalans frequently dispute 
whether their relationship with Spain is viable. 
NB. Shortly after this _chapter was completed, France 
declared th• French Basque inciapandance movement illegal(on 
July 16, 1987), after an extensive spate of bombings and 
violanca in France in support cf the struggle of the 
Spanish Basques across tha border. This was the first 
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wava of ••rious political viclanca from tha Franch Basques~ 
and fellowing th& normal course cf ethnic struggles today, 
violan~• will probably incraasa bacausa, aa provan bafora, 
cppr•••icn cf minority movamants only tends to incraasa 
thair strength. Early in 19BS ETA mada tha Spanish 
gcvarnmant an cffar cf a conditional caasafira, in ordar to 
gat negotiations for ;raatar autonomy under way. 
THE SOVIET UNION 
Events during tha course 
that avan tha Soviet 
cf the 20th century 
Union is not immune 
hava shown 
tc the 
world-wide upsurge in ethnic and national consciousness. 
Ethnc-nationalism has baan plaguing tha Soviat Union since 
tha tim•• cf tha Russian Empira of tha Tsars and is today, 
according to Lapidus (1987 g 73), one cf tha most serious 
problams facing tha country. Ha bases hi• thesis en 
Zbigniew Brzezinski's prediction that the Boviat Union 
could well fragment into several ethnic nations within the 
next 20 years with each ens making cradibla demands for 
indapandance .. 
Tha Scviat Union has a population of 270 million and in 
view of its ethnic composition, cannot be regarded as 
homcganecus. Thar• ara many diverse groups with 
distinctive linguistic, religious aMd cultural 
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characteristics. This is apart from distinct class 
differences, based en income levels, status, prestige and 
influence wielded, which can be found in this so-called 
The country officially recognizes 110 nationalities, of 
which hava political representation (1983 ~ 187). The 
Ukranians are the second biggest group after the Russians~ 
with a population of 47 million (TudJman, 1981 : 201). A 
further 22 group& have a population of over one million. 
The USSR the only great power today where the dominant 
group barely has a majority. The dominant group, the 
Russians, have Just 53% of the total population of the 
Soviet Union. Yet they dominate all apheres of Soviet lif• 
.to an extent which is totally out of proportion to their 
actual numerical strength. Apart from the Russians, the 
other major groups are : 
the Ukranians and Beloruasiana, both of whom are of 
Slavic origin; 
the Muslims, who ara Sunni by religion and Turkic by 
racial origin; 
the Georgians and Armenians; 
the Jews; 
the three Baltic nationalities the Estonians~ 
Latvian& and Lithuanians; 
acme Western European and East Asian groups of which 
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three million Germans arm th• largest grcup. 
In pre-rmvolutionary time•~ • policy cf Russificaticn was 
followed by many cf the Russian Tsars, in an effort to 
colonializ• Asia and to unit• tha ampira (Katz, 197e : 14). 
When Lenin came to powar in 1917, he claimed to be opposed 
to th• Tsarist approach to mincritima and ha guaranteed 
their self-determination. 
Batwean 1917 and 1918 Lenin's newly c:: r fh! ci~ t f~ c:I 
political order faced a crucial test in that several cf the 
minority groups seized the opportunity created by Russia's 
collapse, to break-away to proclaim independence. The 
l.Jk ,· .. ainian~s, Po 1 e~s 1, 
Latvians and Lithuanians were among these 
most of whom warm destined to loose their indepandenca 
shortly after. Only Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia 
remained indepandant until the Second World War and of 
thasa only Poland did not officially become part of tha 
USSR. Finland was more fortunate, because she managed t6 
maintain her independence up tc this day, even surviving a 
full-scale Soviet military attack just after the start of 
World War 2. Finland's independence is slightly hampered 
by a prc:ir.:t~fSS which .i.!!!i rr:.~·fe)r€',)c:I to i:\t~s 11 Finl.<1,\r·1d:i.z.,\t.ion'', 
meaning that the country's freedom with regard to foreign 
policy is limited because of pressure from the Soviet 
lJnion. 
.1.20 
Shortly aftar Lanin astablishad firm control ovar meat of 
the non-Russian groups, tha USSR was transformed into a 
fadaration by which soma limitad autonomy was granted to 
tha various Soviet republics. Tha naw ra;ima did not 
intarfara with the cultural, political and economical 
autonomy of minorities as long •• followed tha ganaral 
policy diractivas of II democratic centralism II By 
following this policy, Lenin contradicted the doctrine of 
Karl Marx, for whom minority rights in any form wara 
unthinkable and anachronistic, According to Lapidus (1987 
1 25) Lenin did actually agree with Marx that nations and 
nationalism were merely transitional phenomena which would 
eventually disappear in the classlaas society. However, 
being a skilled strategist, ha used ethno-nationalism as a 
powerful tool to assist him in his revolutionary strategy. 
Although strongly 
adherad to soma dagram cf autonomy, 
the 1924 constitution 
giving the republics 
limited autonomy in cultural affairs and the thmoratical 
. right to sacada from the USSR. 
Stalin changad all this - h• beliaved in tha primacy cf the 
Russian culture~ and fearing the rise of nationalism among 
non-Russians, ha tock away all vestiges cf autonomy from 
Soviet minorities (Katz, 1975 14). Under Stalin, a 
high degree cf Russificaticn cccurad once mcra, fer 
Russian was mada compulsory in all non-Russian 
laadars of minority cultures ware dona away with, 
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and Ru••ian official• tock cvar most non-Russian party 
organization. Whan Stalin diad, measures taken against 
mincritias wara ralaxad considerably but tha autonomy of 
groups was still saan •• a threat to tha unity of tha 
~~ti::1 t.a. ~::rl.tshc h.-1:1v 1'.i.ni:'ll. J.y <::\dm.i. t tf:;,d 
dif·firer1r.:~;rnr, wc.1L.tld pf.~l'"S.i!mt C¥.N<+H'l c:\'ftcir the:~ 11 w<::irld- wir.:le 
v.i.c:t1::,r:i.€1:1s 1:1f c:omrm .. 1n.i.~11m 11 (S3ic;;Jlar, 1t;9~; u H:l7) 
Sinca Krushchav, Russification policies have declinad in 
intff:1n1:~i ty 1, mostly bacausa cf tha disaatiafaction it. 
Bc,mc~~ m .i. n rJ r it i 0»!,s (f~V('l!ll"l 
recognition, eg The Ukraine•, who formally became tha 
second nation in tha USSR and racaived the right of 
separate representation at the United Nations. In Georgia 
strong pretest against certi:'lin Russification measures led 
to the public rancuncemant cf tha&a in 1978. Alsc:1 :l.r-1 
Armenia aocialism was unable to erase nationalism and 
Armenian culture, a culture which i• even elder and more 
established than that of th• Russian•. 
states were just as resiliant and have steadfastly 
resisted assimilation into the Russian culture. Moscow 
initiated a more subtle policy to strenghtan control over 
these areas through the permanent settlement cf Russians in 
t.h€i!Se l'"E'l<,:;JiC:ll"l!:li n 
With regard tc 1'ec:leralism, 
constitutions (of 1924, 1936, and 1977) fellowed certain 
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federal principles in theory, such as giving limited 
autonomy to tha republic•, including the right to secede, 
the ~i;ht to enter into forai;n relatidns with other 
to conclude traati•• and to exchange diplomata. 
In reality any such moves were regarded with suspicion and 
viewed as treason. With regard to domestic autonomy too, 
things were not much better. According to Lapidus (1987 
79) the desire cf the republics fer greater autonomy in 
adapting centrally directed policies to suit 
conditions often results in conflict with Moscow. 
local 
The 1977 constitution proclaims the equal rights of all. 
C: :i. ti~~ (;?l"l !L, , 1'"€f)g Ii:\ l'"C11 f.i)$,S of I"' i::'\C~: f.,~ 01'" n c::\ t. :i. C:) l"l , c::\r'ld c:rny mc:>V€"' to 
esb;;.bl i.sh c::ertain pl'" i V :i. hH.~€~S 011 thc,i/1 l::>i::'\!iii i g; o·f l'"ii~C<~ 01'" 
r'li'i:\t.i.C:)Mii:\l :i. ty i SS l.lf'l l li:\W 1' l.\ 1 (Sli!;Jlf:i!!r, .1. c,El~~ c :I.E:17) . Y~I)t., t.hi,~ ·f r~~w 
minority rights that have been allowed in the past, seems 
to have been not the result cf a definita policy, but 
on political axpadiency, for example, the 
fact that tha Baltic states ware often allowad to conduct 
~ducaticn according tc native traditicM, wh.ilt"? c::m the 
other hand, tha rights cf the Ukran1ans, Jews and Asian 
groups were often neglected, 
c:c:mdi. t.i.OliSS n 
depending on international 
According ta Palley (1978 n 1~), avan whara some form of 
autonomy has baen given to certain minorities and federal 
it has bean of such limited nature 
"irH:iitit.ut.i.(::ll"lc::tl. c,~\ffiC)U'flm(~(.,) 11 ~Hi~S b(.;;H:,m 1...\15(,i!!d t<::> 
12:.:~ 
disguise tha limited affect. Lika in tha case cf Beuth 
Africa~ grandiose con•titutional plans proclaim false 
individual and grcup rights while affective constitutional 
protection i• absent. Furtharmcrap whila propar fadaraliam 
previdas for a division of powers batwaan the central 
government and the fadaral units, the quasi-federalism of 
the USSR does not meat. this requirement. 
have nc independent taxation power• er a separate budget. 
Mere than 60 central government ministries intervene in all 
spheres cf the republics' affairs. Finally, the central 
government alcna can amend the constitution, 
rapublics no right cf 
b..;ac:: k en tc::, • 
judicial review or a veto to fall 
According tc official Bcviet ••••••mants, 
unresolved national que~tions in the Soviet Union as they 
have been definitely '•olved' by Marxism (TudJman, 
.1.4-(1) • Therefore, idaolcgically, minority rights do not 
exist, although certain rights are bain; accommodated. 
What ts clear though, is that the ultimate classless 
society has net yet cvarccme ethnic differences in the 
Sr.:ivi€ilt Union. 
Finally, what is the position of minorities in the Soviet 
Ur1 :i. cJn in 191:31:3? Under Gorbachev's restructering policy, 
Pereatroika, there saams to be an acceptance of the. 
prc:ic:laimed g 11 Wel l.ivC:~ irr <i.'\ m1.t:1.t.i.r1<:atic:mf.al c:oun'l:.1'"Y ••. wh.ic::h 
:i.s a ·t'ac:::t:or c:>f its:J might rather than c:>f its welar:.nes:1s ••• 11 
( 1<:;>97 118-122). H• admit• however that, although the 
Revolution (cf 1917) has done away with th• oppre•aian of, 
and inequality b•tween minorities, and en•ured the.ir 
Difficulties are created 
by what Gorbachev describes as narrow nationalist views, 
naticn•l rivalry and arrogance and he pledge• to combat 
narrowmindedness, chauvinism, parochialism, 
Zionism and anti-Semitism. 
According to Gorbachev, Soviet society would have bean much 
poorer without its ethnic diversity, which he defines as 
diffenwnc~,s 
m<:An :i. his 'l:.,a ti ens: 
c::J::\nnot be J.o~,;t'' .. 
,,.. i ti.1al s 
11 Ev~ery nm tic::in1'iA]. .c:::u l. t:.urc1 is a ,:.rcH\fiSur11w th1iil t. 
Being of Russian origin him•elf, he does 
in 11 ~sol v inc;;J" the ne:,t.i.c::>ncd i ty 
question. My immediate retort would be firstly, that the 
nationality question is f•r from being resolved, and this 
is visible in recent demands for greater autonomy by 
various ethnic groups. This is eapecially the case under 
the new Glasnost (op•nness) policy .. Secondly, the fact is 
t.hi::\t. thf!:l 1'0L1t.s;t<i."ln<:l.i.ni;;J l'"ole)'' pl.ii:\Ylil.~d by thfi,) r~uss.i.e:\n~;; Wii:\B 
nothing else than ruthless imperialism and the oppression 
of ethnic m.i.nor.i.t.i.ei which makes up 47% of the population 
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cf the Soviet Unicn. 
With regard to tha practical difficult!•• of such a hu;a 
multi-ethnic mcciaty with 110 nationalities, Gorbachev 
ar;uas that the country cannot do without a common means of 
cummunication, a role which Rumsian naturally fulfil. Ha 
recommand• that all Soviet citizens should be trilinqual, 
i.e. be able tc speak Russian, their own ethnic language 
and a foreign one. He compare• this with the position in 
the United States, Where all the various ethnic groups 
decided on Engli•h •• a common language. 
In •hart, ethnic minorities in the USSR have found in 
Gorbachev a man who, like Lenin, understands the delicate 
nature of minority rights and are not prepared to ignore 
them. 
I will conclude this &ection with a remarkable statement by 
one of the five deputy directors of the USSR Academy of 
Sciences, Prof. Gleb Starushenko, on the South African 
minorities question. (Cape Times, 31/8/81) Accordihg to 
Pref. Starushenkc, Beuth Africa consists cf at least savan 
national groups with population each cf more than one 
million which need to be con&idered in any search for a 
solution. He further said that a negotiated settlement 
should be broadly based and that minority vetoes for Whites 
could be considered. While his view draw soma criticism 
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from the ANC, it may b• indicative cf the new Soviet way 
of locking at minority rights in line with Gorbachev's 
pl!iH"C:!a~pt..it11'1!S u 
NIGERIA 
Africa's most populous state, with a athnic 
population of 80 million, has been experiencing a typical 
African problem since 1ts independence in 1960 : how to 
craata a democratic unified nation-state out of a loose 
•••ortment of ethnic groups, and whether it is possible to 
change the structure cf a society by creating formal 
institutions (Mawhood, 1 C:-/E:lO 104) • 
Africa's most notable faderal state, has between 1967 
and 1977 experimented with federalism in an effort to 
acc:ommc::ida te the 11 danger<::>t.H'li p 1 Llra 1 ism" th<i11 t w,as t.hreatc~r1in;.1 
the existance cf the state itself, according to Mawhccd. 
Nic;,:ier.i.a was und,1r British con t.rcl l LH'l t.i. l ], CJ6t~ n 
Two-hundred-and-fifty antagonistic tribes were put together 
in one state by tha artificial boundaries created by the 
Britsh colonial rulars. In 1914 the British formed the 
colony from the former protectorates of Southern aMd 
Northern Nigeria. It became a federation in 1954 and 
became independent in 1960. The federation consisted of a 
Western, Northern, Eastern and Midweet region. The 
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North•rn region cover•d two-thirds of the country's ar•• 
and almost half the population. 
At the outaat of colonial rula th•r• were three ethnic 
grouping•, namely the Hausa-sp••k•r• in the north, the 
Yoruba in th• wast and th• Ibos and oth•r smaller groups in 
According to Mawhood (1980: 107), diff•rances 
between these groups were based on language, traditions, 
. mod !fil"' n i ;: a t .i. c:m 
m1:1t.:i.vc::\t.i.on 11 • 
Political parti•• were ccnc•ntrat•d in cert-in regions 
where their ethnic pcwarbase were and politicians app•aled 
mostly to ethnic loyalties rather than to national policy 
issues. With independence Nigeria was ruled by a coalition 
and Bouth•rn P~rties, with on• 
party, AG, based in the W•st, in opposition. 
cleavages intensified, new alliances were formed and by 
1964, the main cleavage was between North and South. Th& 
North used its numerical superiority to dominate the 
. central government and ac:c:ording to Panter-Brick (1980 
118), this domination was achieved through the North's 
commanding posit.ion in of 
Represe~titives. 
In other words~ the c:cnstitut.idnal settlement of the late 
1950's which led to independence, was dangerously 
imb,:;i. l anc:ed, bacause it turnad the central gcvarnment into 
.r:,n insti tut.ion me:~1··1::?ly to protect regional 
int•r•sts. Furthar problems aro•• bacaus• of the lack of 
ccmpromi•• b•twean th• main partias and th• failur• to k••P 
a check en the majority party/s•;m•nt of this higly plural 
S(::lt:: .i.f,~ty n 
Thia imbalance led to frequent crises. In 1966 a military 
govetnment suspended the constitution and divided the 
country into 12 stat••, to provide a more balanc•d federal 
structure. This did not solve all the problems bacaua• in 
1967 the Eastern region, population by the Ibos, secaded 
and formed the Republic cf Biafra. It led to a civil war 
costing two million lives, B.i.afra's daf•at and reabsorption 
into Nigeria in 1970. Tha civil war laft the dafaatad Ibos 
wit.h l.:i.ttl.e to ~~h<::,w ·for. t:h«fli I'" !io t, f'"U~,~ g ], (ii) !I cimd m.:i.stt"'l.tst .i.n the~ 
re<.:J.ion pc;,rt:;;is·l:f~d. Ai' tc:!lr .1 ::::: yf:wf.ars t';)'f .m.i. l i ta~ry l"'l..l l f.il' ia 
c .:i. vi l. :i.l~f') ~Jc:>vernm«;in t c::amtw into pow&.1r in N :i. g t;i r· .:i. c:, in 1cnc, 
(even this only lasted until. 1983, when another military 
coup ended the Second Republic). 
The Second Republic'• ccnstitut.:i.cn had•• a goal increasing 
federal influence. According to Panter-Br.:i.ck (1980 :118), 
the federal. system was changed in three ways: 
1) through th• increase of the number cf faderal. states 
2) in the manner in which revenue& (from oil) are al.lo-
cated to the central and state governments 
3) tha growth of the federal govarnment. 
Thti» 11 C:)l.11'" l'"fi:)<.~:1.ons!i WG:'ll"'fi) <::liv:1.c:lf:i!d :.l.nt1:) :.1.2 ~!itii:\ tf.~!l:1 1 ri 19c:,7 c'i.~nc:I 
i.ntc., :L c:, ~'lit~l tt~l!!i :l..l"l 1 'r7c~ .. Th<!i! mail"! pLlr"pOii!ifi! W1r.\1:i tc:1 l:lrf::f:Ak I.Ip 
t. t'H.w t t·1 r«~~i~ mc:i,in €-l!thnic: ~~rc:1t.1ps CJf the! Ha1 .. 1s,r.1ss 1, ! t:,1:1s anc.1 
Ycwubas. Ravanuas from tha oil boom ware distributad 
through th• Distributabla Pool Account diractly to tha 
central govarnmant of indirectly to tha stata govarnmant. 
El€~ 1:: a t.1 !iii fi! only soma statas hava oil, rulaa wara latar 
introduced which arranged a more aquitabla distribution of 
tha ravanua among all Furtharmcra~ fadaral 
1':1\LI t:hCJl"'.i ty We~f:S !:Stl'"f.·:n~J th(\'l'lli(!:d by .i.1'1(:: l'"!e1'ii1Sf::d 
incraaaad ravanuaa. 
Tha constitution rafrainad from stipulating a proportional 
or quota system for tha various ethnic groups with regard 
to civil servants, Judges, polica and armed forces, but 
with regard to tha Constituent Assembly, clearly indicated 
that all aagments cf Nigeria's plural population should be 
raprasentad (Panter-Brick, 1980 :127). 
Despite all these dalibarata federal arrangement•, the 
Second Nigerian Republic .i.n 
polarization cf ethnic and regional conflict which brought 
on the First Republic, was alao a central concern of the 
Second Republic, according to Diamond (:.1.997 .: 210). 
The basic source cf the continuing instability in Nigaria · 
1 ic;:?s5 wi t.h its i1H~b.i 1 i ty to dcf:i~:i\ 1 with t.h<;~ d~\\'IM\t'H:js c)f its 
hataroganao~s population and to give dua attention to the 
rights of minority groups, according to Pallay (1978 :14). 
This inability caused, for example, tha 'uneasy' coalition 
that existed between the Hausa-Fulanis in the North and the 
Ibos in the East to disintegrate. Ethnic tension increased 
after independence (Slabbert and Welsh, 1981 gl36), and 
with a population of BO million - divided into 250 separate 
ethnic groups - these tensions ware difficult to contain. 
This was especially the case since tha centre of the 
federation, i.e. the federal government and administ~ation, 
was weak and powerless (relative to the power structures in 
the different regions/states). Furthermore, the huge 
population combined with inadaquata local resources in 
certain ragiansp led ta fiarc• rivalry and friction batwean 
tha various federal units and ethnic groups aver th• 
allocation of resources. 
After the disintegration cf the Second Nigerian Republic in 
1983, Ayoade (1984 :105) claimed that the cause for this 
occurrence could b• found in the ethnic struggle fer 
power. He argued that although the struggle was not so 
conspicuous as it used to be, it was still present, but in 
a mere sophisticated form. Even corruption was explained in 
term& of the competitiveness cf ·ethnic groups. 
axplaied that the civilian governm•nt's con~titutian of 
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1979 succaadad only in so far as it changad tha language 
and strategy of ethnic competition but did not attempt to 
''k?.Ju·l:. it"l tl,e~ ii~ttcf.~mpt tc:l re.wqul;,,\i:.e~ r"'1t.h11.i.c: 
anarchy, the constitution 
Ayaada based his claim an tha failure of tha constitution 
after four brief yaarm since itm formulation. 
In 1981 Slabbert and Walsh voiced the opinion that the new 
1979 constitution was similar to their proposals for a 
~onsociational democracy and the rajaction of a mimpla 
mii:\j c.,,, .. i t.;:\r iii~n i~::;m, c::\nc:I th<'f:!Y ii:\c:lc:lt;)d: ''l\li~~Ef)I'' iii,\' s l'"f,~C:cl<;;Jl"li t:.i.cln c:>f 
the ethnic factor is indirect in that it is seen a~ a 
danger to ba nautralizad by making it virtually impossible 
1981 : 49). This assumption proved to be ovar-optimimtic. 
The attempt to prevent large-scale ethnic mobilization and 
to ansura that smaller ethnic groups have affective 
was proven to be unsuccessful by the 
collap&e of the constitution in 1983. Ayoac:le (1994 :105) 
agrees that Nigeria found it very difficult to build 
national unity via ethnic differentiation. 
The Nigerian experience once more illustrate& how delicate 
· bii~lanc:e:~ ,j ., • ..,\,.,,> deficient and axcassive 
communali&m. Whan minority right& wera neglected, l\ligaria 
paid the price in blood through the attempted secession of 
the Ibos. Whan the new constitution of 1979 waw implemented 
in trt':ldt.tf.:f:?. a communal approach through <':ln t'<lf fC)l'"t t.o 
c: c:> n s (:l c:: .i. 11~ t .i. o n ii:\ J. maa•uras, tha constitution 
saamingly bacausa of 
c:I :i.. ·H e.1 r • 1"1 ·t. i .. d:: i c:m • 
much at.tent.ion ta athnic 
Diamond (1987 ~210) suggests that any naw constitution 
shoulc:I not ignore the positive ~spects of the BecoMd 
Republic, .such of the breaking up of Nigeria'• largest 
ethnic groups, tha dacentralization of ethnic conflict, tha 
fostering of cross-cutting cleavages, and in ganaral the 
c:cm tiidnmen t o·f th<,: 11 pc:iw~:irfu l c:fim tr :i. f1..1q~~ l fon::at:;; ir,hf::wen t in 
fl» t hn .i c:: c:: <::>m pclm1 it :i. c:>n '' .. In tha light of the 
secession attempt of the Ibos, followed by a violant civil 
war, the davalopment of cross-cutting institutions like 
political parties that move across ethnic boundaries, is 
probably tha most viable option available tc en•ura future 
Nigerian stability. 
ZIMBABWE 
Britain tcck cvar the area known•• Southern Rhodesia in 
1923, and after years of colonial rula, eventually granted 
.i.. n t0~ ,,·r1 • 1 
administration. Finally, .when the 'winds of ch~nge' began 
blt:Jw.ir1g (::>Vf.:11'" Af ,, • .ic::: ,::1 .in the 1~60's, and w.ith the 
commencement of tha liberation of Black Africa, the British 
made efforts to transfer the remaining vestiges of 
political power to the people of Rhodesia, both Black and 
Whi tf-]. 
In 1961 the Boutharn Rhodesian Constitution was formulated 
under British superv.is.ion, and for the first time Africans 
Wl!::!l'"liii1 tel r f!;t c:~ G,i i v f.f) sc:rnlf,? political representation in 
Only 15 out of 65 seats ware allocated to 
Black•~ even though they were about 15-20 times more 
numerous than the Whites. According to Boulle (1995 :119), 
t.1"1:i.s "f,;mc::y fr,,mch:i.m:.1.) 11 c;,'H'"ii,\ reprf,~~sf.~ntf:,ic~ m1,,my md.m:i. lr.":\I"' mc:~vE~m; 
which purported to involve Blacks in th• political system, 
but to maintain White control. The system amounted to 
c:c.:1mmu11• :1. representation for Whites and Blacks in the 
unicameral parliament, in a typical Westminster system. 
Dissatisfaction from both Black and White leaders resulted 
in the constitution never being implemented and the latter 
opting for an 'independent' Rhodesia under firm White 
c:cint.rc:il. In 1965 Ian Smith announced his country's 
unilateral declaration of independenca. Britain declared 
this action illeg•l and rafused to accept Rhodesian 
independenc under White rule. Banet.ions were implemented 
by the whole world, except Beuth Africa. Britain kept the 
Whita gcvarnment undar continuou• economic and political 
pressure, while Black resistance movements kept up military 
The new 1965 constitution ;ct rid of all forms 
of external control, but remained firmly aligned to tha 
Westminster system. A deviation was tha introduction cf a 
second House in Parliament, the Senate, which had tan White 
and tan Black members while a further 3 Senators were 
appointed by the President. According to Boulla (1985 
:118), the colour determinants of the voters roles 
guaranteed a form of communal representation in the 
legislature. As for the rest, several deviations in the 
constitution indicated that it was net based en 
conscciationalism, ag. the gross under-representation cf 
Blacks in the legislation, majority party cabinets and the 
absence cf a veto. 
A new constitution in 1969 gave the appearance af equal 
Black raprasantation, but cleverly preserved tha ••••nee of 
Whita minority domination (Siglar, 1983 104). In 1970 
Rhodesia became a Republic with provisions for the 
separation of franchise along racial lines, and the 
election law 
representation 
constitution 
effactivaly 
through income 
full 
tax requirements. 
Black 
The 
provided fer a two-House legislature. The 
Whites had a large majority in the Assembly where tha power 
was actually situated. 
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During the next few years several attempts war• made to 
reach a sattlamantp without •uccas& until 1979n when an 
internal aattlamant was finally agreed upon. Under the new 
Constitutionp Whita& would held 28% of iha seat•, and 
although they were totally over-represented relative to 
their number•, thay at least gave up thair axclusiva held 
en the political power. Yet at the same timep White 
privileges were entrenched fer another ten years, according 
to Sigler (1983 c105), and the police, military, Judiciary 
and civil service was going to ba affectively under White 
control until the late 1980'&. Entrenched provisions in 
the Constitution ansured that these White privilagas could 
not be done away with by the Black majority in Parliament. 
Smith and three Black leaders under Muiorewa tcok control 
of the government, but had ta put up with great opposition 
from the two large resistance movements under Nkomo and 
Mu;aba, which were stationed cutiida the country~ and who 
I'" fl~ 'fl.UEH*1 d t. 0 a c: c c~ p t t h it:;; II 11 !!A I'" c: i c a l II ~;; e t. t. l £,HnE+H'1 t. • E.10 Lt ], l (\fl ( l. 9 8 ti 
: 120) regards the 1979 internal agreement as a type of 
consociaticnal pact. It provided for an Executive Council, 
a Ministerial Council, consist.in; of equal White and Black 
members, fer over-represent.at.ion for Whites and substantial 
veto power for Whites. The Senate remained at a proportion 
cf ten Whites and tan Blacks elected by the House, •• wall 
as several traditional Chiefs. 
majority government. now for 
Although there was a Black 
the first time in Zimbabwe, 
control remained in White hands through a conclusiv~ veto 
which the Whites could usa to control 
govarnmant institutions. 
th• main central 
In 1979 a caasa-fira was raachad batwaan tha Muicrawa 
government· backed by tha Whit•• and the axtarnal Black 
movements. A Constitutional conference Was held in London 
and after fraa alactions ware h•ld in 1980, Robert Mugabe 
came to power and formed an uneasy coalition with the Black 
minority leader in Zimbabwe, Joshua Nkomo. The White 
minority, although at this staga consisting of 100 000 
people out of a population of eight million, i.e., 1,25% 
was guaranteed 20% of tha saats in parliament for seven 
years (in the lower chamber). 
Ths naw constitution protactad tha prcparty interests of 
the Whites, gave them cvar-raprasantaticn in parliament as 
a group, but according to Bigler (1983 :106), restrained 
their ability to frustrate the Black majority. f.\11 the 
civil service positions, police, military and the Judiciary 
were opened to Bl ,-ac:: ks. Although there was a degree of 
discrimination against Whites (re. job allocation etc.), 
Whites in general prospered since independence and the fact 
that they received constitutional safeguards as a group 
mLust hi::\Vf.·~ pl .;:\yed S(::lrYH?. re::, h~ tc::i this f:f 'fG~ct. f.!lnd l'H:~ l. Pf?.C::I to 
ease them into accepting a compromise and majority rule. 
Cf the 230 000 Whites in Rhodesia, only about 100 000 have 
remained in Zimbabwe undar tha laadarship cf Mugabe. Th••• 
Whit•• ara predominantly tha larger farmar-landownar•, 
profe•sional and uppar-incoma groups" all of whom have 
pro•parad, according to Shaw (Capa Tim••, October 29, 
1997). Thair lifa•tyla has hardly changed, thara has bean 
no nationalization cf smaller businassas, no Whita property 
has baan confiscated and thara has bean no revan;a or 
retribution, according tc Shaw. Today 4000 White farmers 
still occupy 32% of land in Zimbabwe 
February 21, 1989). It is obvious that White managerial and 
economic skills gave them great political leverage and 
•ecurity in Zimbabwa, aspacially as saen in light cf tha 
chac• in Mocambique and Angola when the Portuguese left 
these countries after independence and tock their skills 
w.i ti, thfi:lm. I must also ba added that the parcaivad South 
African accncmic and military threat may have helped the 
position of the White Zimbabweans - not by the fcrca cf the 
threat alone, but bacausa Zimbabwe may have bean trying to 
create an example cf racial harmony fer South Africa. 
With regard to the nature cf tha 1980 Constitution, several 
con soc i,i tional :i.f'l(.': l. U(:J&d, sue: h '-~Cl" ...... ~ 
ever-representation of Whites, a legislative vatc, and a 
c: cn:\l. i t i cm cabinet which initially included two White 
ministers. Because cf the sparsity of the Whitas in such a 
large territory as Zimbabwe, segmental autonomy was net 
possible, according to Boulla (199~ :123). 
the 20 White seats were abclishad and 
subsequently the White Z :Lmb.;:1.bwc~.;:i.ns lest their last 
ramainin; vestiges cf political power. The crucial aspect 
cf this development is to••• whether this will make any 
difference to their relative position in Zimbabwe. In 
ether wards, will the Whites in a non-racial Zimbabwe be 
better off if they are treated as individual Zimbabweans, 
irrespective of their race, than when they were seen as a 
group and treated accordingly? Ad~m and Mccdley (1986 
206) seem to argue .in favour cf the 1987 Zimbabwean 
1:lJi t1..1c:,\tic,n where communalism (at least as regards the 
Wh.i'\:€:~s) hfl~'ll b<,irnm 1sl..1l::rnstitut£~c::I ·fc.>1·· by .i.nr.Li.vic::ltH:i\l.i.9.sm ... 11 In ,:a 
n C'.ll"l-" I'" ii:\C:: :.i. ii\]. society dependent en competition 
individuals, achievement replaces ascribed minority atatu• 
as the) c::1"':.l.t.!fi)r:Lr.,n 111:11'" thc0i al l.<::)c:c::\t.i.cJn <::if P.ii!::ii~rr.::Ew rE,isourc::<¥JJ!lli .. '' 
"lJnder ( !r.H..1c:l1) .a li:lysbzHn .... 1, mi1·1cw.i ty mv.wmbe.;i1•·s 
would fare batter than under a system of racial group 
rights". 
Since these new developments happened so recently, it is 
not yet possible to determine the long-term effects of tha 
changes in the Zimbabwean Constitution .. However, if tha 
Whites in Zimbabwe are going to be better off under this 
new individual approac::h without any constitutional 
like Adam and Moodley claim they will be - it 
will ba contrary to the position I took in this 
paper, nam•ly, that ccmmunaliam and tha prctacticn cf 
group rights ara the bamt solution• to tha prcblam craatad 
by plural and divided •ociati••· Bo far, it doas not •••m 
that tha Whit•• will raally mi•• thair twenty r•••~vad 
seats in parliament, and already •evaral Whites have bean 
appointed to Parliament by tha ruling Zanu-PF party of 
Mugaba. Tha pra&ant •ituaticn, early in 1988, is •• 
follows: Robert Mugabe became tha Executive Prasidant, 
Zimbabwe became a one-party state, and after a unity pact 
batwaan tha count~y·s two main political parties, Nkomo, 
former Zapu leader, and three Whites have bean included in 
a naw cabinet. 
As an addendum, I should also add that apart from the White 
minority, there i• also a Black minority in Zimbabwe which 
has been experiencing similar oppression to what they 
Joahua Nkomo. subjected to 
maasur•• such as tha exclusion from govarnmant position~, 
state sponsored violan~e and political repression, fer 
example, Nkomo waa for a lengthy period banned from making 
speeches or holding rallies. According to Glover (1987), 
it was not so much the Whites who needed safeguards at 
Lancaster House, but the Ndebele. 
It might be safe to assume that the struggle for power 
between Black and White has been replaced permanently by 
the atruggla batwaan tha Shona and the minority Ndabala, 
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tha latter constituting only 19% of tha population. 
Par haps thy should hava racaivad . similar communal 
safeguards at Lancaster Hausa•• tha Whit•• did. Only in 
1988~ ••van years aftar indapand~nc•~ ha• Nkomo bean 
brought back into th• govarnmant on • parmanent basis. 
Whathar this will r~duca tans ion bat wean the two Back 
groups, only time will tall. 
WHAT CONCLUSIONS CAN BE DRAWN FROM THE EXPERIENCES OF 
THESE PLURAL SOCIETIES? 
Siglar (1983 ~195-196) lists soma ganaral characteristics 
of minority rights~ all which hava coma to.the fora during 
the discuasion of the problems cf tha nine salactad plural 
societies in this paper. I will briefly mention thasaa 
Minority rights ara group rights that ara asserted whan 
a group saaks differential treatment distinct from tha 
majority. Some minority groups .are content with the 
passive recognition of their separate language, culture 
or religion, while others actively aaek economic and 
political power and even autonomy and secession from 
the majority. For example, one can compare the passive 
stance taken by the Catalan& to the more aggressive 
methods cf the Basque minority in Spain. It muat also 
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ba notad that soma groups hava baan forcad to accapt 
treatment instead of seeking it, for 
example, the Black groups in South Africa. 
Minority rights may also include individual rights. 
Tha mora successful countries mostly managa to maintain 
• fina balance batwaen group and individual rights, 
while in ethers, abuses of minority rights normally go 
hand in hand with similar abuses of individual right~, 
for example, Cyprus, Sri Lanka, Spain and Zimbabwe. 
Plural societies ffll.l!l!lt decide whather they have 
minorities and then~ if necessary, act accordingly to 
recognize the legitimacy cf these minority rights. 
£3:i.nc::e:i. mcJs1t c::cJL.1ntr.i.e~r: .. he:\Vfi~' m:i.1·,c)rit.ilil,lf:ll c:\nd l'"f:11c;c.>c;;Jnizffj/ the:! 
fact, the only question that remains is to what extent 
thay muat ba accommodated. Ari 
interpretation of the rights of different groups in a 
plural society can be harmful to the unity cf the 
central state, while an inadequate recognition of such 
rights will cause sttuggle for autonomy and 
Same countries make no constitutional 
provision for minoritia- at all, for example, the Kurds 
in Iraque and Turkey, and the Alsatians, Bretons and 
Corsicans in Fanca; the Indiana in Canada, and the 
Abariginies in Australia. 
Camplata fraadom of association should ba tha norm, 
i.a. mambars of a group should ba fraa ta ramain in or 
to laava a group. South Africa is tha only country 
whara group mambarship is imposad from cutsida tha 
;roup. India's caste systam which produced a group af 
9~;!: mill.iC)f'l 11 L.ln tc:>t.1c: h,::\b 1 es 11 (surely not a status 
voluntarily accaptad) 1 can ba compared with tha systam 
of Apartheid in so far as inhumanity is concerned. 
1'1 i Ii('.:) r .i'l: y not ba a prataxt for 
discrimination and legalized domination, 
India, Cyprus, Northern Ireland 
and in fact most countries whare minorities ara baing 
trampl€flcl 1.1pr.:in. 
Unclar conditions of axtrama deprivation and prajudica, 
minority rights justify spacial traatmant, for axampla 
political and socio-aconomic support. 
tha Ibos in Ni;aria and tha Black groups in South 
Africa, this has not happanad. 
Minority ri~hts include the right to ciuc::onomic:, 
political and social justice. This is the crux of the 
minorities debate~ Minorities are not an end in 
themselves and do not exist just fer sentimental or 
· historical reasons. They ~lways have a goal, namely 
socal, economic and political justice and relative 
equality (relative t6 th• siza of tha minority in tha 
total pc~ulation). .If a minority is denied access ta 
th•••, than ethnic violanca will ba th• inavitabla 
rasult. 
Minority rights do not include tha right to revolution 
or aacassicn axcapt on tha sama basis •• individual 
rights. Ba~ession l·~ .  always tha last alternative 
when all else has failed. Of tha axa~plaa discussed, 
Nigeria, Cyprus and tha Baviat Union experienced 
sacssion and tha sama thraat has mada its appearance in 
Belgium, Canada, Northern Ireland and Spain (and of 
ccursa in numerous other countries not discussed in 
this paper). 
South Africa is an the road to similar ethnic conflict as 
axpariancad by othar plural societies of the world. Tha 
only difference at this stage is that so far, the oppressed 
'minority' has bean in fact the Black majority. As•uming 
that a compromise between Black and White will be reached 
sometime in the net tac distant future, by which time the 
Whites will actually have tc accept that they, in fact, are 
the minority, then which is the best way to secure their 
minority rights? This is the quasticn which I shall 
discuss in the rest of this paper. The point of view which 
I am taking assumes that, given the history of ethnic 
conflict in other parts of the world, minority rights in 
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South Africa may best be protected by communalism. Th.is 
implies • distinct recognition of minority rights and tha 
acceptance that individual and group rights can coaxi•t. 
Van Dyka's (1983 g 20) ar;umant that.th• intaraats of tha 
· individual can be protected and prcmctad bast by giving 
status and rights tc the group tc which tha individual 
belong, does make a lot of sense. It would probably ba 
tha only way by which a compromise between Black and White 
could be reached, and peace secured. South Africa's future 
have to follow tha conflict-ridden past of 
Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and others. 
Communalism could provide the answer. 
5. THE SOUTH AFRICAN MINORITIES QUESTION. 
''I pointed out that the history 6f ethnic conflicts in 
recent years gave little assurance to ethnic minorities of 
their rights being protected after the transfer of power". 
-Hermann Giliomee, reporting back from Dakar after meeting 
with the ANC on July 15, 1987. 
Professor Giliomee's argument has been confirmed previously 
by the findings of many political scientists in the field 
of minority politics and by the bitter experiences of 
political leaders of ethnically divided countries 
world-wide. As has been asserted earlier in this paper, 
minority questions in plural societies· can most 
successfully be solved by recognizing minority 
through in a system emphasizing communalism. 
rights 
In South Africa, the question of how to deal with the 
plural nature of the population is still unresolved, but is 
of such crucial importance that without a satisfactory 
solution peace will not be possible. When deciding on how 
to accommodate plural diversity, the choice .is firstly 
between individualism and communalism, and if the latter is 
given preference, a further decision has to be made on the 
na~re thereof, i.e. which communalist devices to apply, how 
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to apply these, and finally whic:h constitutional system as 
such will best accommodate minority rights as envisaged in 
communal ism. 
There is a wide variety of views on and interpretations of 
minority rights in South Afric:ap coming from all sections 
of the political spectrum. The two opposite poles of this 
spectrum are being represented, firstly by the National 
Party and other conservative elements who regard racial 
groups as the foundation of their political philosophy. 
The second extreme is the African National Congress and its 
internal surrogates like the UDF, who totally reject group 
rights in the political sense and support individualism. 
In between these two extremes can be found many 
accommodating, compromise positions which try to secure a 
balance between group and individual rights. Advocates o1 
these centrist positions can be found among the Prog~essive 
Federal Party, Inkatha and others who reject the use of 
groups for the purpose of maintaining White racial 
domination and prefer to use the concept in a way to 
enhance democracy and to facilitate compromise by 
recognizing the rights of groups formed through voluntary 
association. 
This chapter deals 
political groupings 
with the attitudes 
in South Africa 
and policies 
with respect 
of 
to 
minority rights, as well as with the important issue of how 
to identify the relevant minorities in South Africa. Since 
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compulsory racial classification is totally unacceptable to. 
most South Africans, the question arise- as to whether a 
system based on free association will be the solution. On 
what basis will such groups be formed language, race, 
culture, religion or ideology, and which of them will be 
regarded as legitimate by a democratic government? 
Furthermore, should these salient groups operate as 
political parties or be represented in parliament as ethnic 
categories, as in the case of the KwaNatil Indaba propsals. 
One also has to look at which constitutional system will 
best provide protection of minorities and· ensure their 
political participation? Having previously discussed the 
unitary nature of the British Westminster and the federal 
nature of the American Presidential systems and by 
considering the divergent constitutional options 
implemented by the nine plural societies mentioned in 
Chapter 4, and by eliminating non-democratic, authoritarian 
systems and military dictatorships, the best pos•ible 
solution that could be considered I for South Africa is one 
that espouses a. strong form of power-sharing and 
decentralization of power, as can be found among 
consociational and federal systems. An analytic discussion 
of the suitability of these systems to South Africa's quest 
for a democratic solution will conclude this chapter. 
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Having considered the above c:riteria in an effort to 
suggest a path to a democratic: alternative for South Afric:a 
through proper power-sharing, it is necessary to contrast 
this model with two opposing alternatives c:urrently being 
presented to South Afric:a. 
The first of these is the simple majority system in a 
(?u,f',(.J{l. 
one-man-one-vote elec:toral system, supplemented by a 
unitary state. As I have indicated before, this system is 
not ideal bec:ause it does not nec:essarilly result in 
democ:rac:y in plural societies, as it normally ignores the 
rights and aspirations of minorities. In South Afric:a 
today, simple Blac:k majority rule is, rightly or 
wrongly, the foc:um point of White fears of being swamped by 
a majority bent on revenge, with a total disregard for the 
sec:urity and survival of the White group. Although these 
fears are probably exaggerated, enough examples of ethnic: 
c:onflic:t and majority domination exists today to prevent 
the White minority from following the way of "total 
abdic:a.tion" (Van Niekerk, 1988 c 14). 
The second alternative model, whic:h, unlike the previous 
one, has already been introduc:ed in South Afric:a, entails 
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the cooption of certain racially defined groups by granting 
them limited democracy and material benefits, while at the 
same time, maintaining White domination. According to Van 
Niekerk (1988 1 15), the Tricameral Parliament is the prime 
example of such cooption. 'This ideology, turned into 
National Party policy, has as little chance of gaining 
acceptance among Blacks as a simple majority system has 
among Whites, because firstly, it ignores the majority of 
t~e South African populationa secondly, it does not 
represent real power-sharing, and thirdly, it has the 
unacceptable notion of legally prescribed racial groups as 
its basis. 
It should be obvious that these two alternatives would not 
be acceptable to either the Black numerical majority, nor 
the politically, economically and militarily dominant 
White minority. Thim chapter will therefore deal with. the 
third option, the democratic sharing of power between all 
groups, as envisaged by a consociational/federal model. 
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5,1 CONTENDING PERSPECTIVES RELATING TO MINORITY RIGHTS 
AND ISSUES IN SOUTH AFRICA. 
Th• National Party and other factions on the Right. 
For the National Party, the concept of 'group' is the 
foundation of its political philosophy. In a speech in 
Parliament (Cape Times, 17 August, 1987), President Botha 
confirmed the party's commitment to the primacy of groups 
in South African politics - "Miriority rights exist where a 
group of people is distinguishable from other groups in the 
state on the basis of one or more factors such as their 
physical attributes, their language and culture, origin and 
nationality and their religion". 
Botha also mentioned what he regards as the "myth of the 
melting pot" (i.e. a complete non-racial society) which 
confirms his strong preference for a group-based ideology 
as opposed to the individualism which a 'melting pot' 
inevitably suggests. According to Professor David Welsh 
(1987 a 5), Mr Botha's speeches over the last few years 
show his c:on~istenc:y in insisting on a group basis for his 
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government's constitutional planning. This include* the 
White group's rights to its own community life, including 
separate residence and schooling facilities. Mr F.W. de 
Klerk's view on groups is very similar to that of President 
Botha. He believes that the recognition cf the importance 
of a group existence is not in itself discriminatory, but 
in fact, a prerequisite for peaceful co-existence. Each 
group has to have its own community life, including own 
residential areas, own schools, and own institutions. 
(Race Relations Survey, 1986, Part 1, p.161). It must be 
added that in 1987 the government accepted the principle cf 
the local option in an amendment to the Group Areas Act. 
This means that municipalities can decide for themselves if 
they want to open their residential areas to all races. 
Botha made it clear that it should net change the present 
situation with regard to separate schooling or the voting 
system. 
Although the group approach of the National Party appears 
reasonable at first, especially seen in the light of 
communal measures taken in other plural societies, there is 
a big difference between the Nationalist conception of 
groups and the normal meaning of the concept. The 
difference is that the composition of groups in South 
Africa is determined not by an organic: process cf voluntary 
association, but by the compulsory assignation of eac:h 
individual to a racial or ethnic group (Welsh, 1985: 6). 
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This peculiar way of 
on-going process to 
looking 
justify 
at groups is part of an 
~ac:ism and to ensure White 
domination, also being.termed "divide and rule". According 
to Alexander (1985 c 45), every government since 1910 has 
looked at the concept of group in this way, by at first 
categorizing South Africans on racial terms into Whites, 
Coloureds, Indians and Africans. Then, since 1948 the 
National Party has divided the Africans into a further ten 
or eleven ethnic: groups, for example, Xhosa, Zulu, Sotho 
and others, in order to revive and entrench antagonistic: 
feelings between these groups. One of the pillars of 
Apartheid, the Population Registration Ac:t, is being used 
to define and organize groups, and is used in conjunction 
with the Group Areas Act to ensure that population 
categories are kept segregated by law. 
The Minister of the Department of Constitutional 
Development and Planning, Chris Heunis, is at present 
trying to devise a system of 'power-sharing' with Blacks 
but at the same time, under a c:loak of liberal-sounding 
utterances, to ensure that the White group will never lose 
its hold on political power. Let us look at some of his 
recent statements with regard to groups According to 
Heunis, the National Party places a high value on the 
protection of groups and the right of each group to 
determine its own affairs, and on power-sharing by groups 
when it comes to communal affairs. In his view, 
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the National Party recognizes on an equal basis the rights 
of the individual together with group rights. The scant 
regard held by the government for individual rights can be 
seen in the system of detention without· trial, in the 
torture and murder of detainees, in the restruction of free 
speech and censorship with regard to literature and the 
press. For example, on 17 August, 1987, President Botha 
once more lashed out at the Press for "blatant distortion, 
stage-setting, m~srepre~entationm and the creation of 
negative perceptions" - this kind of critisism and veiled 
threats aimed at an institution which serves as a restraint 
on government power in most democratic societies, has 
become common-place in this country where democracy has 
become an extremely contracted concept. In other words, as 
soon as the media threatens the legitimacy and 'security' 
of the ruling White-dominated government, and in favour of 
other political groupings, it comes under fire for being 
11 1111ubversive 11 • Any group-based system that works 11110 totally 
in favour of one dominant group at the expense of other 
groups, can never hope to gain legitimacy domestically or 
internationally. 
As can be seen in the proposed amendment of the Group Areas 
Act, there seems to have been a shift in recent months away 
from rigid interpretation of groups based on race and 
ethicity towards a more flexible approach. Mr Heunis 
(Rapport, April, 19, 1987) claims that the NP may also in 
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the future consider accepting oth~r forms of group 
association 9 apart from fixed racial and ethnic ones, such 
as "geographic concentrated communities". He uses the 
example the self-governing Black units and the combined 
executive of Natal-Kwazulu. (This did not prevent him from 
rejecting the Indaba proposals). 
Mr Stoffel van der Merwe motivates the NP's preference for 
group rights (and violation of individual rights by 
cdmparing South Africa at present to Europe in earlier 
centuries (Sunday Times, 9 August, 1987). He claims that 
only after European states managed to consolidate their 
groups safely behind international boundariesp did they 
devote their attention to safeguarding individual rights, 
and at times of war, for example. during World Wars One and 
Two, individual rights were quickly moved to the background 
as the overall safety of the group was threatened. Van der 
Merwe claims that South Africa is in a similar situation to 
that which Europe used to be in, and he claims that 
inter-group conflict takes on ''international dimensions" to 
some extent. He critisizes Hermann Giliomee's argument 
that conflict in South Africa is basically between two 
competing nationalist groups, viz., the Afrikaner and the 
African Nationalist, and claims an oversimplification on 
Giliomee's part - " ••• it a fallacy to 
cultural divisions in the ranks of 
glibly terms as Africans". 
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disregard the many 
what he (Giliomee) 
Van der Merwe continues: "the mistake of disregarding the 
group loyalties of, for instance the Zulus, the Xhosas or 
the Tswanas, will be at ,the cost of a peaceful future''• 
What the government ignores though, is the fact that quite 
a few of these divisions between the different Black ethnic 
groups were artificially created by Apartheid legislation, 
while other division which existed were perpetuated and 
formalized. Soweto serves as a perfect example of how 
various ethnic groups can live together as a Black South 
African group, ethic differences all but forgotten. 
The foundation 
should be the 
of the NP's group policy is that groups 
basis of any future constitution. Groups 
should be seen here in an assigned racial context and when 
it comes to the protection of group rights, the NP really 
means White minority privileges these are 
non-negotiable. Compulsory group membership is 
unilaterally determined by the government and forms part of 
any power-sharing proposals. It will probably be enforced 
by measures such as a blanket veto and White dominance in 
crucial spheres of society, such as the economy and the 
Defence Force, since. it has always been the 
Botha-government's aim to share power without losing it. 
(Not unlike the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Constitution of 1979 
which was drafted by Smith and Muzorewa, but which had no 
legitimacy among the maJotity of Zimbabweans).) 
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Van Zyl Slabbert (1~95 a 164) sees the government's stance 
with regard to the concept of groups as a major reason for 
the lack of Black/White negotiation. The policy of 
entrenching racial or ethnic group membership 
constitutionally, is nowhere to be seen more clearly than 
in the tri-cameral Parliament, where the choice of voting 
for any chamb~r is limited by a voter's racial 
classification. 
The Conservative Party. 
This partyp and the remainder of the Far Right, have the 
same basic group philosophy as the NPP although they 
envisage a slightly more traditional type of constitution. 
Heunis claims the the difference between his party and the 
Conservative Party (CP)p is that in the latter ideology, 
one finds absolutism of the group concept and secondly, 
that the Conservatives make no provision for power-sharing 
on matters of communal concern among groups. 
The basic objectives of the South African Far Right, which 
includes the CP, the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP), the 
Afrikaner-Weerstands Beweging (AWB) and the Afrikaner 
Volkswag and the Vereeniging van Oranjewerkers, to name the 
most well-known, are: 
-The total partition of South Africa based on race; 
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The creation of Coloured and Indian Homelands; 
-The maintenance of White self-domination; 
-The rejection of co-responsibility and 
co-participation between race groups; 
-The rejection of federalism in South Africa; 
-The economic separation of groups by means of separate 
business districts (Van Vuuren, 1985 :40). 
The AWB in particular is very seccessionist-oriented, and 
has as its policy the reinstatement of the Boer Republics 
whic:h will be populated solely by members of the Afrikaner 
group. Their leader, Eugene Terre'Blanche, accuses the 
National Party of using the term "minority rights" to give 
greater respectability to Apartheid (Burger, 11 February, 
1998). In his view, his organization represents the true 
cultural nationalistic: aspirations of the 11 Boeremense 11 and 
he is prepared to acknowledge the similar aspirations of 
other "nations" in South Africa. 
The Progresive Federal Party. 
The Progressive Federal Party (PFP) officially stands for 
individual as opposed to group rights. Individual rights 
refer to a "the right of every person to the protection of 
their life, liberty and property and free access to the 
judiciary in defence of these rights" (PFP Policy 
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guideline , 1987) 
protected by a Bill 
equal rights for 
These individual rights will be 
of Rights which guarentees full and 
all citizens and will prevent 
discrimination against any individual or group on grounds 
of race, language, or religion. The policy guideline does 
mention at the same time that provisions are made 
for the protection of certain group rights "the 
constitution ••• must have safeguards to prevent the 
domination of any individual or group of individuals'' The 
crucial difference between the PFP's perception of group 
and that of the National Party, is that the PFP's 
envisaged constitution will be free from racial structures 
and freedom of choice will replace compulsory group 
membersh~p. When. the PFP speaks of groups, it refers to 
groups formed through voluntary association, such as 
religious, language and cultural groups. 
With regard to the actual .protection of group rights, 
various constitutional devices which will make political 
minorities indispensable to the decision-making process are 
envisaged by the PFP, for example proportional 
representation of minorities on legislative and executive 
levels; also the decentralization of power from central 
government to federal units; and finally a Bill of Rights 
guarenteed by a strong and independent judiciary (Policy 
guideline, 1987). The PFP also makes provision 
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for a minority veto by which any group with 10% to 15% 
representation can veto legislation in Parliamen~. This 
provision ·was under consideration in 1987 to be removed 
from the PFP's constitutional proposals, due to the 
controversial nature thereof. According to Professor David 
Welsh (19B7i, the minority veto provision was never 
intended to be a means to protect racial privilege - It was 
more 11 an effort to cope with the problem that plagues 
divided societies, viz., the presence of permanent 
minorities, with the latter being excluded in perpetuity 
from a share of power" •. 
Welsh, a member of a PFP commission investigating the 
minority veto, argues that his concern is with the problem 
of permanent minorities with which the minority veto is 
supposed to deal with, and leaves it to the PFP to decide 
whether the veto is the best solution to the problem, which 
he describem as "a real one, and hardly deniable". Alili 
evidence he lists two countries where this 
11 excluded-minority problem" 
Ireland and Sri Lanka. To 
is present, viz., Northern 
this list one can probably add 
half the world, but the most obvious examples, some of 
which have been discussed in Chapter 4 of this paper, are 
Nigeria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Lebanon and Israel. 
Welsh concludes that constitutional mechanisms cannot by 
themselves regulate and mitigate social conflict in divided 
sc:ieties and will have to be merely secondary methods 
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against minority excesses - ultimately three interl~nked 
factors will provide the best protection for minorities1 
Their usefulness to the majority; 
Their interdependence with the majority; 
The extent to which they are perceived as 
non-threatening to the majority. 
The White minority in Zimbabwe meets all three the 
above-mentioned criteria and it is doubtful as to whether 
they are powerful enough to be regarded as a threat to the 
Mugabe government. According to these criteria, their 
minority position seems relatively secure, even without 
constitutional mechanisms like a minority veto. Whether 
the Whites in South Africa can adjust with equal ease under 
a majority government, is debatable. 
According to PFP policy the "Federal State" is the only 
institution where provision is made for cultural groups in 
Parliament, and Cultural Councils will each send one 
Senator to Parliament. Each cultural group is allowed a 
Cultural Council.Let us look at what some of the other 
members of the PFP have to say about group protection. 
According to Mr Ken Andrew (Rapport, April 12, 1987), the 
PFP does not deny the existence of groups, and in fact 
insists on the protection of minorities from domination by 
majority groups. But in his view the best way this can be 
done is by protecting the individuals out of which such a 
minority group exists. He justifies the removal of a· 
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minority veto out 
Blacks 
impossible. When 
of PFP policy because it is seen by 
mechanism which will make real change 
asked by Rapport if the PFP's policy will 
refiult in Black majority government, Andrew anmwered that 
under a democratic: system the majority group should take 
over government - the fact that they are Bl~ck, is not 
really relevant. Yet even under a Black government, the 
previously-mentioned minority protection mechanisms should 
provide adequate protection for a White minority (e.g. 
proportionality, decentralization, federalism, a Bill of 
Rights, etc:.), according to Andrew. Professor Nie 
Olivier's view (Rapport, March 29,1987) is that the group 
concept should be rejected, and he argues that one cannot· 
talk of multi-cultural and multi=ethnic when one really 
means race - 11 If the argument was not one of race, but one 
of cultural, religio~s and ethnic diversity, then you could 
not throw Hindus and Muslims .into one group". 
The essence of the PFP's policy is that they adhere to 
individual rights as opposed to group rights, but with the 
understanding that whatever groups form on the basis of 
voluntary association, 
In the PFP's view, 
political minorities, 
minority rights will be protected. 
protection should be accorded to 
as represented through political 
parties, i.e. not ethnic or racial groups as such. When it 
comes to firm, unbreakable constitutional guarantees to 
allay White fears of Black domination, the PFP admits that 
the constitution is no guarantee by itself, but merely 
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merely an .instrument on which to build cooperation and 
trust. According to Mr Colin Eglin, the PFP is committed 
to giving security to South Africans because in Eglin's 
view, security is something the National Party simply 
cannot give them. Unfortunately 95% of the White voters 
disagreed with Mr Eglin in the May 1997 election. 
Other movements to the left of the National Party. 
At the time of writing, the former Independen~ movement 
split up into the National Democratic Movement of Mr Wynand 
Malan and the Independents under Dr Dennis Worrall. They 
are to the left of the NP and oppose the Nationalist 
argument that group identity should form the basis of any 
future dispensation. They believe in the principles of 
free association and in certain minority · protection 
mechanisms. Groups are defined not as racial groups but as 
interest groups and as such could be granted protection if 
needed. In this respect 
idealogically by the 
Nationalists who differ 
but are 
these two Movements are joined 
so-called 'New Nats' (liberal 
from the traditional NP 
trying to change the Party from ideologically, 
within ). These 'New Nats' believe, according to Nina 
Rand Afrikaans University (Cape Times, 27 Overton of 
April, 1987), that there should be White security, but at 
the same time, rejects racial groups as being the 
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building blocks of political structures, preferring 
interest and cultural groups instead. 
Both these viewpoints meem to favour a non-racial democracy 
for South Africa based on the principles of freedom of 
association and a form of universal franchise (Financial 
January 1987). They further stand for 
decentralization of power and for the idea of local 
political options, for example, the Natal-Kwazulu Indaba. 
The differences between these groups and the PFP are over 
the manner of group protection. According to Martie 
Meiring (Sunday Times, April, 1997), the PFP stands for 
individual rights only, while the other two movements 
insist on some kind of mino~ity protection. Meiring uses 
the Kwa-Natal Indaba as an example of what Malan, Worrall 
and the. liberal Nationalists adhere to, i.e. 
one-man-one-vote with strong element of group 
protection. Since Worrall's return from his posting in 
London and his credible perform~nce agai~st Heunis in 
Helderberg (he lost by a mere 38 votes against the 
Chief-planner of the NP's group-based constitutional 
'reforms'), he has made it clear that he is in favour of 
scrapping the Population Registration Act, and that he is 
again~t the legal enforcement of racial group boundaries. 
The main difference between Worrali and the NDM on the one 
hand, and the NP-policy on the other hand, is the idea of 
group formation by freedom of association and a deviation 
l 
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from the argument that racial groups must form the basis of 
any future constitution. 
In the National Democratic: Movement's(NDM) Manifesto issued 
in October, 1987, Wynand Malan explains the split between 
his movement and that of Dennis Worrall as inevitable, and 
gives as a reason Worrall's insistence on directing the 
movement's strategies at White politics only, while Malan 
himself wanted to include both parliamentary as well as 
extra-parliamentary politics. The Manifesto lists the NDM's 
basic principles with regard to human rights as follows1 
"We believe that t.he cultural d.i.vers.i.ty of our people 
is a national asset and that the national groups can 
develop their own cultural traditions in a spirit of 
mutual respect, tolerance and conciliation. 
"All South Afric:1:ms should be treated ;,~s equmlsp 
without discrimination on the grounds of race, sex, 
language and religion. 
This means the ending of the era of White domination 
and its replacement with a democratic political order, 
ensuring political participation for all South 
Africans. 
At the same time there should be effective 
constitutional protection of basic civil. rights and 
indivdual freedoms, a.swell a.s the rights of all South 
Africans to their language, religion an culture - based 
on the concept of freedom of association; 
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the enforcement, where necessary, of these 
constitutional provisions by an independent judiciary." 
The Black view of minority rights. 
Adam and· Moodley (1986) distinguish between the four 
different Black groupings. I will use these as a basis for 
discussing the various Black views towards groups and group 
rights: 
1. Patronaga - Client Alliances 
These groups consist of the Coloured and Indian Members of 
the Tricameral Parliament, the Urban Community Councils, 
and the leaders of the 'independent' homelands like the 
Transkei, Ciskeip Boputhatswana and Venda. 
coopted by the National Party into becoming 
They have been 
part of the 
system of Apartheid in return for financial rewards and 
other benefits such as status, prestige and power. 
Of course all of these groups are opposed to Apartheid and 
racial discrimination, and in the homelands, such 
legislations 
Publically the 
we~e removed soon after 'independence'. 
leaders would condemn Apartheid, but at the 
same time they have allowed themselves to become part of 
the system, and are duly scorned as traitors by the 
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rest of the Black community. In the homelands, force has 
had to be used to keep dissidents under control, and the 
Urban Community Councils have all but ceased to exist. 
Most 'independent' Homeland leaders seem to favour a 
geographical/ethnic-based federation of South African 
states, i.e. based on ethnic groups. According to Forsyth 
(1984: 8) the view of the respective leaders of Lebowa and 
the Transkei (during 1992), Phatudi and K.O.Matanzima, were 
that a confederation between South Africa and the 
independent homelands was inadequate, and that what was 
required was a federal system where Black~ were 
constitutinally accommodated. 
The Coloured Group in the Tricameral Parliament have become 
part of the group-based system in 1983. The elected 
leaders received an average vote of 20X of the eligible 
votes in the only election to date, according to Adam and 
Moodley (1986 237). Except for improved socio-economic 
conditions for their own group, the Coloureds have achieved 
very little inside the system, although the leader of the 
Labour 
removal 
Party, Alan Hendrickse, 
of the Influx Control 
claims 
laws, 
credit for the 
for changes to the 
Separate Amenities Act and for a more relaxed official 
attitude towards the Group Areas Act. Only in 1987 did 
members of the House of Representitives began to take 
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in a more aggressive stance towards government policies, 
especially those aimed at strengthening group structures. 
The Coloured members in the Parliament seem intent on 
getting rid completely of the two of the remaining pillars 
of the Governments' Group policy, namely the Group areas 
Act and the Separate Amenities Act.By threatening to use 
Labour Party's veto as dominant party in the House of 
Representatives to force a general election for all Houses 
in Parliament in 1989, the LP hopes to get these two Acts 
repe~led or changed drastically. 
Some recent declarations made by the Labout Party included 
Hendrickse's call for a geographical federation, not one 
based along ethnic lines. He also proposed the 
introduction of proportional representation in each of the 
federal units. Calls have also been made for the removal 
of the cornerstone of the NP's group policy, the Population 
Registration Act and for the government to create a 
democratic and non-racial South Africa. (Cape Times 4 
January 1996). 
The National People's Party, majority_party in the House of 
Delegates and its leader, Mr. Rajbansi, support the 
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principle of group rights "You 
fac:t that you belong to a group. 
based on groups" (Post Natal, 
can't run away from the 
Self-determination is 
February 12, 1986). 
Rajbansi's attitude is not surprising, for two reason• 1 
firstly it must be remembered that he has chosen to be 
coopted into a political system based Gn forc:ed rac:iai 
group assignment and secondly, research has shown that 
Indians are the non-white group most conserned about 
maintaining their group identity (discussed in chapter 5.2) 
2. Pragmatic: Institutional Opposition 
The groups in this section are less involved with the 
Government and can therefore afford to be more critical of 
it. The most important organizations are Inkatha and the 
umbrella body for the Trade Unions, Cosatu. The degree of 
participation in the system is limited, in KwaZulu's case, 
to receiving a subsidy from the government to finance the 
homeland's expenses and in the case of the trade unions, to 
the 'advantages' that the union enjoy under labour 
legislation e.g. legal strikes, access to the Industrial 
Court and the right to colec:tive bargaining. 
Even though Cosatu rejected the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba. 
proposals, which contains elements of both group protection 
and individualism, it is difficult to be sure what exactly 
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they stand for with regard to group rights. Alex Erwin of 
Cosatu (Leadership 111 1987) states that the lndaba is 
"totally inappropriate to our c:irc:umstanc:es 11 and doubts the 
sinc:erity of the proc:ess, which is based on c::onsoc:iational 
democ:rac:yp i.e. power-sharing · between segments'groups. He 
c:onc:ludes that lndaba offers no real 11 ec:onomic: and material 
gains" for the workers, whic:h I presume is his primary 
c:onc:ern. However, Cosatu has adopted the Freedom Charter 
and has thereby firmly moved into the 11 Charterist 11 c:amp, a 
move whic:h may sow seeds of discontent within the 
federation with its many divergent Blac:k politic:al 
tendenc:ies (Financ:ial Mail, 24 July, 1987). 
Inkatha is reasonably c:lear about its polic:y on group 
rights. In the words of Gibson Thula (1980 1 161) Ink•tha. 
stresses firstly the rights of individuals and sec:ondly, 
the rights of groups to whic:h those individuals belong 
Part of this polic:y is the rec:ognition of free assoc:iation 
of the individual within larger political, cultural or 
soc:ial groups. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi (Business Day, 7 
July, 1987) argues that although most Black people prefer 
a one-man one-vote system in a. unitary state in which 
individual rights and the rule of law were entrenched, he 
also knew about White fears and perceptions about Black 
majority rule which would make them reluctant to venture 
into such a. system. Therefore Blacks are prepared to heed 
to White fears and to 
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sacrifice a unitary system for a federal one in which White 
minority rights will have more protection. In this 
respect, Buthelezi and the PFP's policies seem congruent. 
If Buthelezi acknowledges White minority rights to such an 
extent, what is his view of Zulu group rights? When 
refering to his own ethnic group, he claims 1 "We are South 
Africans with a Zulu contribution to make. It is an 
historical absurdity to -ssert that only thcs• who have 
shed their cultural identity, can shape history in the 
right direction '' (Adam ~nd Mocdley 1985: 83). According 
to these authors, Buthelezi asserts equal value of the 
ethnic contributions to an overriding South African 
nationality. It is obvious that the Chief Minister 
attaches great value to ethnicity and its use fer the 
mobilization of his Zulu constituency. 
In a slightly different vein, Oscar Dhlomo, Inkatha's 
Secretary-general~ states ''We ~bhor ethnicity in so far 
as it is used to determine people's political rights II 
(Adam and Moodl~y 1985 82). A.H Zulu, speaker of 
KwaZulu's Legislative Assembly, confirms Dhlomo's view by 
saying that, by guaranteeing the rights of individuals, the 
rights of all minorities will be protected any ether way 
(i.e. group rights) will, in his view, be perceived as a 
continuation of Apartheid (Zulu 1987: 50). 
It seems that Buthelezi's belief in a relatively strong 
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group approach triumphed when the lndaba propos•ls were 
formulated, because the Indaba, i~ my view, has strong 
elements in group representation contained in it, 
especially in the Second Chamber. 
3. Extra-Parliamentary Alliances. 
Of these, the most important are the United Democratic 
Front (UDF) and the African National Congress (ANC). The 
ANC is based outside South Africa, but is engaged in 
guerilla warfare inside the country. The UOF is an 
umbrella organization for several hundred anti-Apartheid 
groups with widely divergent views on the nature of "the 
struggle". Nelson Mandela is regarded by both as their 
'spiritual leader, but while violence is a strong element 
in the ANC's struggle against the Government, the UDF 
adheres to non-violence, although by following a strategy 
of making townships ungovernable, violence surely cannot be 
excluded as a likely result. Adam and Moodley (1965 1 93) 
have no doubts about the depth of militancy and the 
widespread legitimacy of the UDF, which "inherited the 
ANC's mantle" inside the country. 
The Freedom Charter forms the basis cf the ideology of 
both groups, although there exist within them many 
divergent beliefs. The .Charter accepts that several 
"national groups" exist, recognizes the right of the people 
to develop their own language, own folk culture and 
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customs. It furthermore mentions the following aspects of 
its policy towards groups1 
All National Groups shall have equal rights; 
There shall be equal status in the bodies of state, in 
the courts and in the schools for all national groups 
and races; 
All national groups shall be protected by law against 
insults to their race and national pride; 
The preachihg and practice of national, race or colour 
discrimination and contempt shall be ~ punishable 
crime a. 
All apartheid laws and practices shall be set aside. 
According to Adam and Moodley ( 1985 99) it also 11 ti!Hi:!eks 
equal status" for ethnic: groups in schools, courts and 
other state institutions. These authors claim that the 
Chcii\rter "flirts with group rights" by stating that 'all 
National groups shall have equal rights'. In fac:t, critics 
of the Charter point out that it ~erely follow the 
cl~ssific:ation of 
Registration Ac:t. 
groups 
According 
made by the Population 
to many observers', the 
Freedom Charter's notion of several "oppressed nations" may 
be out of touch with many of the younger generation of 
Black leaders. According to Tom Lodge from the University 
of the Witwatersrand, (Washington Post 2 February 1997), 
the ANC will not be keen to make any substantial 
concessions towards the protection of White Minority 
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rights and at most may be prepared to guarantee White 
property rights and put off the nationalization of major 
ind~stries. He doubts whether ·the organization, when in 
power, will accommodate Whites on separate voters roles or 
experiment with other constitutional protective devices -
"They are adament about the need to eliminate all traces-
of ethnicity and the entrenchment of legally defined race 
groups with special rights''• According to Oliver Tambo, 
the official ANC policy states that. "The idea .•• of 
so~called white minority rights proceeds from the ba•is of 
a racist and anti-democratic: thesis. That thesis is that 
the genetic features of the white population of our country 
defines this population as a distinct political 
group ••• whic:h are different from and opposed to those of 
the rest of the population of the country. We reject this 
thesis" ( 1311 iomee., 1886 a 23). According to Murphy Morobe 
of the UDF (Sunday Times,April 5, 1987), only cultural 
group rights •hould be recognized, as opposed to 
constitutionally defined group security for minorities. He 
uses the Freedom Charter's notion of guaranteeing equal 
rights for all national groups and protection by law of 
"cultural, religious and other freedoms". Morobe insists 
that protection of these rights will not mean the 
protection of minority privileges based on domination of 
the majority. NUSAS, member of the UDF, states its view of 
group protection quite clearly "If the rights o·f 
minorities are protected by law, surely there is no need 
for minorities to be protected". (One Person, One vote -
1997 NUSAS pre-election publication). 
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Slabbert and Welsh (1979: 117) claim that, in spite of the 
fact that the traditions of the ANC are not opposed in 
principle to constitutional protection for minorities, they 
believe that Black nationalists will be against such 
protection, because of years of the political manipulation 
of "ethnicity" by the government. Hermann C:Hliomee.(1987) 
agrees that any effort to use racial groups and the 
protection of suc:h groups as basis for negotiations will 
"face massive black rejection". Shortly after meeting with 
the ANC in Dakar, Giliomee made a plea to the ANC to 
seriously reconsider its opposition to White group 
representation and to a power-s~aring compromise (Sunday 
Times., August 2, 1987). He claimed that the 11 em;sence of 
ethno-nationalism in South Africa and elsewhere is the 
self-identification of a group" 
Whites, especially Afrikaners, 
their own leaders. 
and that the majority of 
will insist on choosing 
If Giliomee is right, the Black Nationalist Movements may 
have to look again at the importance of group in South 
Africa, and especially with regard to the group 
consciousness of the present ruling minority. 
Finally I shall look briefly at the view of Nthato Motlana, 
former chairman of the Soweto Committee of Ten and a 
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prominant Black political figure. According to Motlana 
(1980 :42), individual rather than group rights, need to be 
protected, and in his view, no provision must be made for 
the prote~tion of minority rightmp because of the divisive 
nature of such protection on the unity of the country. He 
especially opposes a veto right for Whites which can be 
used to block necessary changes. Although he rejects a 
blanket veto by any group~ he would be prepar•d to accept 
a veto system which would require, for example, 80% support 
of states in a federation to pass legislation, i.e. in a 
federal system. Motlana also claims that Afrikaners are 
not any more interested in ethnicity and group identity 
than he himself is, but merely uses it as a useful 
political ploy to stay in power. In this respect there is 
a strong difference between his view and views of people 
like Hermann Giliomee and Stoffel van der Merwe, who, 
albeit from different perspectives, insist that the 
Afrikaner is determined to safeguard his own future, 
culture and group identity (ethnicity), instead of just 
being interested in his material well-being. 
So although there are different interpretations of the 
ANC-UDF alliance's group policies, one thing is cleara· the 
constitutional protection of White Minority political 
rights and p~ivileges are not acceptable. The only 
consession that may be obtained is the acknowledgement of 
languagep cultural and religious rights, and even then it 
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may be done on an individualistic: instead of a group basis. 
The most important organizations under this heading are the 
Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), the Azanians People's 
Organization (AZAPO) and the Pan African Congress (PAC). A 
basic: tenet of the policy of these groups, is a form of 
reverse racism, for they try to exclude Whites from 
membership in their organizations, although this position 
is changing, especially after the murder of White activist, 
Neif Aggett (Adam and Moodley, 1986 a 101). The policy of 
these groups emphasizes a two-nation approach, namely the 
existence of an oppressing White- and ar, oppressed Black 
nation, and the aim is to mtrive for psyc:hologic:al 
liberation from Apartheid and to concentrate on the role of 
the Black working class in the struggle for liberation. 
The emphasis is on the Black working class and the attitude 
is strongly anti-capitalistic:. In contrast to the Freedom 
Charter's notion of.different national groups, AZAPO for 
example, demands the development of 11 one National 
progressive culture", and totally rejects the concept of 
ethnicity as being divisive. .According to Adam and 
Moodley (1985 99), BC strives for cultural uniformity, 
.and their logo , "one national, progressive cul ture 11 , seems 
to imply linguistic: and educational indoctrination. 
177 
As can be seen from these stated policy objectives, none of 
these groups seem to show a great affinity for group 
rights. AZAPO, for instance, regards Whites (who have been 
in South Africa for about the same length of time as 
Blacks) as alien settlers who have little claim .to property 
rights. 
Let us look at what one of these organization's 
ideologists, Neville Alexander (1985 :41-56) has to say 
about groups. Firstly, . he argues, the whole struggle 
against Apartheid is a class struggle not Just an 
ordinary class struggle however, but a Black working class 
struggle - "only the Black working class can take the task 
of completing the democratization of the country on its 
shoulders". Obviouslyp White workers are not welcome in 
this struggle, no matter how liberal they are. 
With regard to groups, Alexander refers to the policy of 
"divide and rule" by which white governments since 1910 
have created, revived and entrenched antagonistic:· feelings 
between language groups (Xhosa, Tswana, Zulu etc:.); 
religious groups (Muslim, Hinsdu,Christian etc:.); cultural 
groups (Griqua, Malay, Coloured etc:.), and racial groups 
(African, Coloured, Indian and White). The concept of 
ethnic:iy was and still is used to fragment the Black 
oppoSti tion, and in Alexander's words, 11 to serve the 
int.erests of the ruling c: lass by preserving Aparthe.i.d 11 • 
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Alexander believes that by recognizing groups in whichever 
form, one reinforces separatist and disruptive tendencies, 
as it provides for ethnic: separation. Yet he does not 
totally ignore group realities, which he defines as 
economic, material, language and religious differences. 
However, he claims, theme differences are neither permanent 
nor necessarily divisive if they are redirected for the 
purposes of national liberation. Alexander also indicates 
ways to overcome some of these differences, for example in 
the c:ase of languages, he suggests that all "Azanians II 
should be able to speak English as well as their own 
regional group language~ 
Alexander, in arguing against group rights, makes some 
points which I cannot agree with in ac:c:ordanc:e with my 
perception of the value of groups, but he does ask certain 
relevant questions, which form a integral . part of this 
chapter , eg ''What determines the positive features of a 
national group? What are the limits or boundaries of a 
national group? Is a national group a stunted nation?" 
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5.2 WHO ARE THE MINORITY GROUPS IN SOUTH AFRICA? 
The postulation has been made that in the case of deeply 
divided plural societies, a political approach emphasizing 
group rights is preferable to one that concentrates solely 
on individual rights. The rest of this chapter will deal 
with the question whether such an approach is suitable to 
South Africa, espe~ially •een in the light of Adam and 
Moodley's contention that the country could actually 
develop within the framework of individualism according to 
the Liberal model, to become a common society where race 
and ethnicity are irrelevant •• Furthermore, would it be 
possible to predetermine the nature of group configuration 
under conditions of free association in the post-Apartheid 
South Africa? 
__ , Before attemting to indentify present and future groups, it 
is necessary to recap on the definition of "group" or 
"minority" as formulated in chapter two, to see whether it 
can be made applicable to assist us in identifying 
minorities in South Africa. Sigler (1983: 5) defines a 
minority as: " ••• any group category of people who can be 
identified by a sizeable segment of the population as 
objects for prejudice or discrimination or who, for reasons 
of deprivation, require positive assistance of the state". 
Schlemmer (1983 489) supplements this definition by 
saying that group identity depends largely on the 
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awareness of identity contrasts, i.e. on perceptions of how 
the group differs from others. These differences again, 
originate in conflict, because of close proximity with 
others in a geogeraph~cal area or alternativelly by 
collective demoralization. Several other differentiating 
factors are used to identify groups, eg. skin color, 
religion, language, cultural differences and socio-economic 
conditions. 
As has been said before, South Africa is the only plural 
country in the world where group membership is not on a 
voluntary basis, i.e. it is imposed by the state. This 
results in a distinct racial and ethnic configuration, 
strongly influenced by the ideology of the ruling White 
minority. 
RACIAL GROUPS 
The most well-known view of plurality 
the four-nation thesis by which the 
consisting of four racial groups as 
in South Africa is 
country is seen as 
determined by the 
Population Registration Act. The four groups are the 
Whites,Blacks, Indians and Coloureds. According to the 
figures given by the Race Relations Survey (1986, Part 1, 
p.2), the population figures of the four racial groups are: 
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Gre:>up. Population Proportion 
·Afric:an 24 901 139 74p1% 
Asian 878 30() 2.6% 
Coloured 2 881 362 8.6% 
White 4 961 062 14.7% 
Total 33 621 863 .t ()()% 
Alexander (1985 : 14) identify three variants of this 
view Firstly the liberal perspec:tive maintains that the 
four groups, according to the Population Registration Act, 
are races (and not nations), which can coexist in a single 
state; The second view, also from White liberals, 
developed from a multi-racial position into a more subtle 
ethnic ideology; Thirdly, the Youth-League perspective 
sees the South African nation as consisting out of Blacks, 
while the other three "nationalities" (races) constitute 
national minorities. This third perspective can also be 
found in the Freedom Charter, according to Alexander (1985 
15) • Some adherents of this view regards the "national 
groups" as nations, while others see them as ethnic groups 
in a single state. Alexander himself rejects any ideology 
which refers to ethnic or national groups because "such 
approaches are the thin edge of the wedge for separatist 
movements and civil wars". 
Another perspective comes from the Black Consciousness 
Movement and PAC (Alexander 1985 18) n 
organizations claim that there are two nations in South 
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These 
Africa, an oppressor-White and an oppressed Black nation. 
A distinctive aspect is that the perceived end-result of 
national liberation will be one socialist nation in which 
the White nation will have disintegrated. Alexander's 
criticism against this perspective is that it increase the 
danger of anti-White, Black chauvinism and ethnic 
separatism. 
One also needs . to 
Nationalist/Conservative 
a multi-ethnic society 
look at the Afrikaner 
perspectives of South Africa being 
(by virtue of compulso~y 
assignation) complementing the multi-racial view. 
According to this interpretation, the Black race group can 
be subdivided into at least 11 ethnic nations, each with 
separate languages and separate territories. After 1948 it 
became the National Party policy of Apartheid and was used 
to justify the increasing frag~entation of Blacks and to 
create, revive and entrench antagonistic feelings between 
groups. Although the Blacks carried the brunt of this 
fragmentation policy~ the Coloureds were also divided into 
three ethnic groups (Malay, Cape Coloured and Griqua). 
With the implement~tion of the T~icameral Parliament, the 
Coloureds~ it seems, have been let off the hook (of further 
ethnic tragmentation). 
The crucial question as to whether racial groups have any 
right to existence as legitimate groups outside 
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of the Population Registration Act. A closer scrutiny of 
the nature of. existing groups is therefore necessary, 
starting with the Whites. 
. I 
The White group is heterogeneous to a high degree. 
Apart from the three million Afrikaners, there are also two 
million 'Non-Afrikaners', consisting mostly of 
English-speaking Whites, 500 000 Portugese, 120 000 Jews 
and other European groups numbering in tens of thousands, 
eg. Germans, Dutch, Greek and Italian speakers (HSRC, 1985, 
The South African Society: Realities and future 
prospec.ts) • The White race group, or at least a section of 
it, seems to be the only one wanting group rights and 
protection for their group identity (Adam and Moodley, 1986 
:196). They hold most of the economic and military power 
and have the training arid e>:perienc:e in running a state 
bureaucracy. For the reasons of security, for determining 
their own destiny, for the protection of their rights and 
material interests and for the general advantages stemming 
from political participation, Whites want guaranteed 
participation in future democratic South Africa 
(Schlemmer, 1980 :491). The question of whether the White 
group should be further refined to an ethnic Afrikaner 
group and others, for purposes of identifying minorities, 
will be dealt with under the heading, 'ethnic groups'. 
The Black race group also consists of different 
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cultural/ethnic segments. They number about 24 million, 
and are dispersed throughout the country, partly in certain 
homogeneous geographical units called Homelands, and partly 
in relatively integrated Black urban areas like Soweto. As 
a racial group, they enjoy generally low standards of 
living and have suffered to a great extent under Apartheid, 
especially so on socio-economic terrain. Even though 
compulsory ethnic and race classifications have been forced 
onto Blacks, this has resulted in only dividing them into 
ethnic categories, but not ethnic communities (Adam and 
Moodley, 1986 : 53), and with one or two exceptions, it is 
unlikely that future stratification among Blacks will occur 
along ethnic lines. The general impression is that Blacks 
would prefer a on-man-one-vote system in a unitary South 
Africa, with provision only for the protection of 
individual rights, although more moderate elements (and the 
Freedom Charter) do accept some form of cultural group 
rights. As shown in the previous section, there is a wide 
divergence of views among the Blacks, ranging from 
ethnic-based capitalist, to socialist 
According to Slabbert and Welsh (1979 
app~oaches. 
95), Black 
Nationalism in South Africa has always been made up of 
groups with different ideological, class and regional 
interests, held together by a common rejection to 
Apartheid. They doubt whether this grouping would remain 
intact in the post-Apartheid era or, alternatively, that 
purely Black ethnic groups would have great support. 
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The Colourads make up 9% of South Africa's population. 
They are of mixed racial origin, but because of the 
similarity of their language, history, and religion to that 
of the Afrikaners, they are often referred to as 'Brown 
Afrikaners', and no discernable different ethnic: criteria 
exist between them and the White Afrikaners (Adam and 
Moodley, 1986 :13). The authors rightly critisize the 
perception of Coloureds as a "separate sub-nation". They 
argue that although it was possible for a separate Co~oured 
group identity to have formed because of a long history of 
discrimination and stigmatization, it did not happen, and 
as proof Adam and Moodley use tha low level of 
participation by the Coloureds (on average of 20%) in the 
group-based Tricameral elections "Since political 
participation is only allowed on an assigned group basis, 
it is rejected altogether", according to these authors. 
Even if one does accept that the 20% of Coloureds who did 
participate in the elections did support group structures 
(personally I think that they participated to try and 
change the system from the inside and for the economic 
benefits), there is still rejection of group-based politics 
by 80% of the Coloured population ( Even though Alan 
Hendrickse, leader of the Labour Party, believes that the 
House of Representatives can expect a 48% poll in the next 
election - Cape Times, September,17 1987). 
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Research by De Wet Schutte (1985 364-376) gives a. good 
indica.ion of the Coloureds' socio-political perspectives on 
change in South Africa and of a separate group-identity. 
Schutte reached a conclusion that the Coloureds have never 
seen themselves as possessing a distinctive cultural 
identity, and because of this, oppression never affected 
them in the same way as, eg. the Afrikaners or Zulus (i.e., 
they never developed a distinct group consciousness). 
The Indian race group numbers just over one million 
people, 
85'Y. of 
or about 3'Y. of the South African population, and 
them live in Natal, mostly in the greater 
Durban-Pietermaritzburg area (Cann and Duignan, 1981 :35). 
They came to South Africa in 1860 to work on sugar 
plantations, experienced discrimination to the same degree 
as the Coloureds, and eventually f6rmed an intemediate 
caste, having neither the numerical strength of the Blacks, 
nor he political power of the Whites. 
According to Moodley (1980 251) the levc~l of 
sociocultural cohesiveness of the Indians is much higher 
than the "virtual anomie" of the Coloureds, as can be seen 
in the vast discrepency between the two groups in crime 
rates, illegitimate births, alcoholism 
spheres of social integration. 
and in other 
Moodley argues that this degree of cultural cohesiveness 
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is remarkable, seen in the light that the Indians are the 
most highly diversified group in South Africa, comprising 
Hindus, Moslems, and other smaller groups and speaking 
several languages such as Tamil, Telegu, Hindi and Gujerati 
(especially the older generation). The Indians emphasize 
"culteral superiority" in their search for identity and 
Moodley notes the high level of group self-confidence 
flowing OLtt. of this, but warns t.hat "cultural narcissism" 
could prevent inter-racial alliances with other oppressed 
groups. 
However, during the past decade, ethnic group solidarity 
has been breached on working class level and sentimental 
community affiliation has weakened, according to Moodley. 
To what extent this will continue to happen, depends on the 
security the Black Liberation movements can offer the 
Indian minority. 
Indian 
lower 
participation 
than that of 
in 
the 
the Tri-Cameral elect.ion was even 
Coloureds (about 10%) which 
indicates the sentiments of Indians towards group-based 
constitutional plans. Research done by Couper, Rhoodie 
and de Kock (1983-84 : 379-393) indicates that while the 
vast majority of Indians reject Group-based politics, they 
are, in general, very aware of their double minority status 
in Natal, vis-a-vis the Whites and the Zulus. Furthermore, 
the findings of the research also suggests that fear of 
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Black domination appears to be more wide-spread and 
substantial among Indians than among Coloureds. In the 
sample taken, the majority of Indians (57X) indicated that 
Blacks sho~ld not be allowed to live in Indian residential 
area, as opposed to 46% of the Coloureds. About half of 
the Indians interviewed felt that Black Influx-control 
should be more strictly applied. 
In spite of this research which was done in 1983-84, 
Couper and his fellow researchers acknowledge that one 
cannot ignore the vital role that Indians play in Non-White 
Liberation Movements like the UDF and ANC and their 
continued alignment with Black opposition forces. What is 
clear, though, is that Indians have perhaps the highest 
group consciousness of non~White groups·in South Africa. 
ETHNIC GROUPS 
Adam and Moodley (1986 16) make the claim that South 
Africa's forced racial segregation policy has contributed 
to the rejection of ethnic boundaries. Alexander (1985: 
46) confirms the general rejection of ethnicity by arguing 
that, because of the way the National Party has abused the 
term "ethnic group", it is rendered useless as a tool o·f 
analysis in contemporary South Africa. Welsh (1987) agrees 
"the government's approach is such as to discredit the 
entire principle". The important issue however, is whether 
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the rejec:tion of ethnic:ity is merely a temporary 
phenomenon, because of its c:onnotation with Apartheid, or 
whether it is based on deeper fundamental reasons whic:h 
means that even under a system of voluntarily assoc:iation, 
ethnic:ity would still be rejec:ted by most South Afric:ans? 
It is doub~ful that ethnic:ity in South Afric:a ~an be wished 
away, ignored or forc:eably destroyed if based on democ:ratic: 
princ:iples. There exists muc:h historic: evidenc:e in support 
of suc:h a view, espec:ially if c:onsidering the rec:uring 
nature of inter-ethnic c:onflic:t in other plural soc:ieties. 
Internationally, all efforts to eradic:ate ethnic:ity, apart 
from mass-genoc:ide, have failed dismally. It is unlikely 
that South Afric:a's ethnic: position would be any different. 
It is possible 
replac:e rac:e as 
stra.tific:a.tion? 
then that in South Africa, 
the most important 
ethnic:ity 
fac:tor 
may 
of 
Adam and Moodley (1986: 16) stress the 
importance of not obsc:uring the difference between these 
two c:onc:epts and argue that the preservation of ethnic:ity 
"for the maintenance of cultural heritage" may. be 
worthwhile, but to stratify society along racial lines, is 
unac:c:eptable. The cruc:ial question is whether the c:onc:ept 
of ethnicity can ever shed its "apartheid cloak" and gain 
a respectable image which can be used to justify the 
stratification of the South African society? 
A general definition of the term 'ethnic group' is given by 
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Slabbert and Welsh (1979 •10): 
" ••• a group that is bounded off from other comparable 
groups or population categories in the society by a sense 
of its difference, which may consist in some combination of 
a real or mythical ancestry and a commom culture and 
experience". The authors add that the basis of ethnic 
group formation lies in factors such as race, culture, 
language, religion or a combination of 
they also insist that the existence of 
these. However, 
these distinctive 
ethnic features do not imply that it is inevitable that a 
group will develop a sense of ethnic identity. As an 
example, they mention the fact that the English-speaking 
White South African never became an ethnic group in any 
significant sense, in spite of a distinctive language, 
traditions and origin, as in the case of the Coloureds. 
The reason why neither of these peoples became 'true' 
ethnic groups is because they 
power by themselves, 
could never 
and therefore 
hope to achieve 
rather aligned 
themselves with a larger White or Black consciousness 
(Slabbert and Welsh, 1979 37). This argument is 
debatable, because if this indeed was the reason for the 
lack of ethnicity among smaller groups, why did minorities 
like the Turkish Cypriots, the Tamils in Sri Lanka or the 
Catholics in Northern Ireland develop such strong 
ethnicity if they too never had a hope of ''attaining 
significant power"? I think that the reason for the lack 
of ethnicity lies rather in the absence of a communal need 
to be identified as a group. 
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According to Professor David Welsh (1987), it is impossible 
to predict with any certainty what configuration of 
political groupings will crystalize under circumstances of 
voluntary ~ssociation. But Welsh does go as far as to 
speculate that South Africa's "legacy of racial, class and 
ideological divisions" will play.a role in the formation of 
parties (groups). Adam and Moodley's (1986 :29) definition 
of ethnicity are similar to that of Slabbert and Welsh and 
is as follows: 
"Cultural ethnicity refers to feelings of commonality based 
on language, religion, regional particularities, and shared 
values and customs''. Distinctive ethnic features such as 
these can be used as a. starting point to evaluate the 
legitimacy 
democratic 
of self-proclaimed 
constitution and 
association in South Africa. 
Language 
ethnic 
a 
groups 
system of 
in a future 
voluntary 
According t6 the 1980 census (HSRC, 1985 -The South African 
Society: Realities and future Prospect~), the major 
languages spoken in South Africa are: 
Afrikaans 
English 
4,9 million 
2,8 million 
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Zulu 6,0 million 
Xhosa 5,4 million 
Tswana .2,3 million 
Tsonga o,a million 
Ndebele 0,4 million 
Swazi 0,6 million 
Venda 0,5 million 
Sotho 4,3 million 
Others 0,7 million 
TOTAL 29 million 
The statistics had to be supplemented with information from 
Du Pisanie and Kritzinger (1985 :451) in order to get 
correct totals for the Xhosa, Venda and Sotho groups as 
these were excluded from the HSRC statistics because of 
their 'independent' homeland status. 
As shown in these figures, there are a few major language 
groups in South Africa and sevefal less important ones. 
How important is this language division in the concept of 
group formation? 
Throughout history, language was one of the most important 
rallying points of ethno-nationalism and was used to a 
great extent to a~centuate ethnic consciousness. In 
defining'nationhood', Krejci and Velinsky (1981 :33), 
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mention such factors as language, race, natioal character, 
religion, territory, political institutions and economic 
integration, but insist that among. these, language is 
considered as the most important. In Europe, most 
successful linguistic units have succeeded in forming 
nation. states while the less successful ones have remained 
frustrated minorities inside these nation states. Only in 
a few cases did any language group come close to being 
completely assimilated. In a study on linguistic 
min6rities, Alexander (1985 :7) quotes Anderson's dictum to 
justify his own notion of the importance of la~guage in the 
creation of a National identity: "from the start the 
nation was c:oncieved in language, not in blood". 
If language is so important that it is the "badge of 
nationality" a11d that it helps to c:reate natio11s, !should it 
then be assumed that the multi-linguistic: natu~e of South 
African society will determine the future division of a 
plural South Africa under a system of free association? Or 
perhaps even 
language-based 
National Party 
result in the creation of several 
nation states in accordance with the 
theory? It is doubtful as to whether this 
will indeed be the case and whether language will pliy such 
a major role in group formation, except perhaps in the case 
of the Afrkaner, to whom Afrikaans remains of historical 
and cohesiva importance. 
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According 
degree of 
especially 
to Adam and Moodley (1986: 221), there is a high 
bilingualism among South Africa's Blacks, 
in urban areas. Most Black students, for 
example, want to be educated in English, but at the same 
time, do not want to give up their linguistic heritage, 
i.e. indigenous languages retain their regional 
importance. In other words, language may not be crucial in 
group formation in South Africa, because of the existence 
of a common denominator, English, which the majority of 
South Africans understand and speak. Alexander (1985 :55) 
holds a similar view: "All Azar,ians must have a sound 
knowledge of English whether 
language". The other ten 
as home language or as second 
or eleven languages would 
probably be regulated to regional use, eg. a person in 
Natal/Kwazulu could speak English and Zulu and in Pretoria, 
English, Afrikaans and Sotho. If language does have a role 
to play in ethnic group formation in South Africa, it will 
probably be in coordination with ideological and 
socio-economic factors, and not as a factor by itself. 
Religion 
According to the 1980 census (Loader, 1985 275), the ten 
most popular churches in South Africa are: 
The Black independent churches (5,07 million), 
The Roman Catholic churches (2,35 million) 
The Methodist church (2,11 million) 
Nederduitse Gereformeerde church for 
million) 
.1.95 
Whites (1,69 
Anglican churches (1,61 million) 
NG church in Africa for Blacks (1,11 million) 
Lutheran churches (0,83 million) 
NG Mission church for Coloureds (0,67 million) 
Apostolic churches (0,62 million) 
Presbyterian church (0,49 million) 
Religion is not crucial to the ethnic stratification of 
South Africa, and the chances are small that it will be in 
the future. Hamish Dickie-Clark (1976) · lists the iolowing 
corresponding injustices as being responsible for the 
"minority position" of both the Catholics in Northern 
Ireland and the Blacks in South Africa: 
centuries of war; colonialization; opression and 
economic inequalities such as unequal employment 
no Just political 
that religion in South 
opportunities, 
representation. 
housing arid 
It is a fact 
Africa, unlike in Northern Ireland plays a relatively 
small role in the oppressed position of the Blacks. Of 
course the Dutch Reformed Church helped to formulate the 
discriminating nature of Apartheid,but nowhere to the 
degree as the sectarianism introduced in Northern Ireland 
by Protestantism. 
Northern Ireland 
above-mentioned 
The difference between South Africa and 
is that the latter defined the 
injustices against its minority in 
religious term~, while in South Africa discrimination is 
defined on racial terms. 
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If Dickie-Clark is correct in saying that religious or 
sectarian/ conflict has geater staying power and greater 
potential for perpetual antagonism than racial 
then South Africa's problem seems relatively 
conf.lict, 
solvable. 
South Africa should therefore be grateful, according to 
Dickie~Clark'i thesis, that 76% of South Africans belong to 
Protestant Christian churches. 
Brewer supports Dickie-Clark's thesis by claiming that 
differences exist between the Catholics' struggle in 
Northern Ireland and that of the Blacks in South Africa and 
that racial issues in South Africa are more negotiable than 
religious issues in Northern Ireland: 
Firstly, he claims that the Blacks do not want to destroy 
the South African state, but merely want to change the 
government unlike the Catholics who want to destroy 
Ulster in order to unite Northern Ireland with the Republic 
of Ireland. Secondly, the majority (80%) of the Blacks do 
not support violence and it is notable that an organization 
like the ANC has a long tradition of non-violence. In 
contrast, the Catholics in Northern Ireland regard 
political violence as legitimate and have a long-standing 
tradition of violence. 
In the light of the above-mentioned factors, it is with a 
degree of relief that one can assert that religious 
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differences in 
religion as such 
Unlike Northern 
South Africa are relatively minor and 
unite rather than divide the Country. 
Ireland and Lebanon, race rather ~han 
religion is the key to stratification and domination. 
In South Africa there are no strong unifying churches like 
the Catholic Church in Spain and Brazil. There are many 
different denominations and churches, but none are really 
politicized. At the same time, the church as a 
group-mobilizing factor for Blacks is not very important, 
because of the many popular religions and the lack of a 
"unified pervasive church". Furthermore, Black theology 
does not promote a separate religious ethnicity, but rather 
a common fate with White Christians (Adam and Moodley, 1986 
:50). Even the mainly Black Zionist Christian church with 
a self-proclaimed membership of four million - Adam and 
Moodley (1986 201) put the figure at one-and-a-half 
million, has so far played almost no political role. The 
only strongly politicized religious figure is Bishop Tutu 
and the only active politically-oriented churches today are 
the White churches to the right, which are used to mobilize 
Afrikaners to the Right. 
In short, religion does not seem to be a factor which plays 
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a important part in cultural ethnicity in South Africa, 
because of the insufficient power attached to it for it to 
become politicized (Adam and Moodley, 1986). If religion 
cannot fulfill a mobilizing role at this crucial stage in 
Black South African political development, which is 
caracterized by economic and political repression and 
humilliating race laws, then there is not much chance for 
it to play an important rqle in ethnic stratification in a 
future democratic society. 
Shared values and customs 
The third aspect of cultural ethnicity, ~amely shared 
values and customs, is not a mobilizing· factor per se, but 
is part of the larger concept of cultural ethnicity and 
ethnicity in general and acts as a group-differentiating 
factor. Shibutani and Kwan in Alexander (1985 136) 
mention the importance of shared values, traditions and 
beliefs in creating ethnicity: 11 An ethnic group consists 
of people who conceive of themselves as being of a kind. 
They are united by emotional bonds - they share a common 
cultural her~tage, including usually a common language••. 
In South Africa, most tribal Blacks still adhere to thei~ 
customs and traditional way of life which distinguishes 
them from other groups. But whether these will play any 
role in future Black politics is doubtful. Yet the role o~ 
shared values, customs and traditi6ns can be used very 
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effectively to create ethnic consciousness, as can be seen 
throughout Afrkaner history compare the role that 
'Boeremusiek', mampoer, Afrikaner 'Volkspele', Jukskei and 
the Day of the Covenant play in the Afrikaner tradition. 
According to Giliomee (1983), the Afrikaners developed as a 
separate group with a high degree of endogamy during the 
first two centuries of White settlement, and by 1850 came 
to regard themselves as an ethnic group with a separate 
identity by virtue of intermarriage, language, customs and 
shared historical memories. He emphasises that the origins 
of Afrikaner Nationalism can be found in the era of British 
imperialism, but also in a "much wider economic, 
institutional and generational context". Only after 
unification in 1910 however, did the construction of 
Afrikaner Nationalism become a priority. Because of much 
internal conflict and disunity in Afrikaner politics, and 
as a result of socio-economic factors between 1910 and 
1948; the Afrikaner Nationalist movement only reached a 
peak after 1948. Van Zyl Slabbert (1980 5) rejects the 
myth of Afrikaner unity, but points out how this myth was 
used for the purposes of ethnic mobilization. The ethnic 
moblization which Slabbert talks about was created by the 
belief that Afrikaners were a unified nation, had the same 
desires for freedom and independence, adhered to the same 
religion, spoke the same language and came from common 
blood. Slabbert uses Singer's concept of 11 ethno-genesis 11 
to describe the birth of Afrikaner ethnicity, in which the 
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church and language played the major part in creating at 
shared group identification. The strength of Afrikaner 
ethnicity, although not without deep divisions, ~as finally 
proven in 1948 when the National Party took over the 
government. Between 1948 and 1982 Afrikaner Nationalism 
has strengthened greatly, but in 1982 unity received a 
decisive blow by the breakaway of the Conservatives, who 
drew nearly half-a-million Afrikaner votes in the 1987 
election. 
When evaluating the legitimacy of Afrikaner "group" claims, 
one has to take the disunity in Afrikaner ranks into 
consideration. It is quite possible that half the 
Afrikaners have turned their backs on the group-based 
"reform" policies of PW 
segregationist policies 
doubtful whether one an 
Botha and prefer even more 
like total partition. It is 
stil taik of the Afrikaner as a 
monolithic: group making claims for group protection. The 
days of a homogeneous Afrikaner group is long past and one 
cannot ignore the strong differences within the spectrum of 
Afrikaners like Van Zyl Slabbert, PW Botha, Eugene 
Terreblanche and Breyten Breytenbac:h, to name but a few. 
The only thing these people have in common is their 
Afrikaans language, but even this ethnic: bond is dwarfed by 
the strong ideological differences.Today the concept of 
minority rights is strongly associated with the Nationalist 
Afrikaner's goal of sharing power without losing it, while 
the Conservatives reject the term outright, because it 
would imply capitulation to the Black majority. 
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In a recent article, Giliomee contended that the conflict 
in South Africa is a communal conflict between Afrikaner 
and Black nationalists in which they struggle for control 
over the same homeland (Sunday Times, 2 August, 1987). In 
this respect I agree with Giliomee's contention that the 
essence of Afrikaner nationalism is not just external 
ethnic manifestations such as language, colour or religion, 
but goes much deeper - according to Giliomee, the most 
important factor is the belief that the group is unique and 
must continue as a group (Argus, 13 February, 1988). In my 
opinion, the essence of the Nationalist Afrikaner's concern 
with minority rights is not just a matter of securing their 
cultural rights and their belief to exist as a group, but 
is also tied to their desire t~ survive on economic and 
political levels in the new South Africa Gi 1 iomee quotes . 
PW Botha as saying: 11 The Afrikaner is determir1ed never 
again to be subordinate in his c:ountry 11 , and in a 
correspondance with the ANC he states his belief that the 
majority of Afrikaners will do everything possible to 
retain their political existence as individuals and as a 
group. In short, available evidence indic~tes that the 
Nationalist Afrikaners will make extensive group claims 
under a new political dispensation. Whether these will be 
regarded as legitimate by the Black majority is an open 
question~ The obvious reply would be negative, but on the 
other hand, when all concerned is faced with a contracted 
civil war resulting with total destruction, compromise from 
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e~ther side is possible. 
A further question one must look at is whether the 
Afrikaner, even with the divisions between 'centre' and 
Right, is alone in his nationalist struggle, or whether it 
is the whole White group that is engaged in the nationalist 
question. I believe, keeping in mind the strong 
ideological differences among the Afrikaners and the strong 
support the National Party and its policies received from 
the English-speaking electorate in the 1987 election, we 
should rather think in terms of a general White group, for 
~hich there are more important values at •take than 
language, religion and other cultural issues. In this 
respect I refer to matters of socio-economic and security 
nature, which hold much greater practical implications for 
the ruling White group. In other words, when it comes to 
the survival of the White group, group autonomy in cultural 
matters is really an issue of lesser importance which will 
only be relevant to a smaller group of conservative 
Afrikan•rs. The latter group will probably have to be given 
total independence in an Afrikaner state which could be 
loosely incorporated into a confederation. When one is 
talking in more general terms of future South African 
groups, cultural ethnicity is really a non-issue and will 
take an inferior position among issues such as political 
and economic power. It is with this aspect that I will 
deal in the final section this paper. But before turning 
to that, I will briefly discuss economic ethnicity and the 
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class perspective as the third way of stratifying South 
African society. 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC OR CLASS-BASED GROUPS. 
The concept of class refers to factors such as incqme, 
occupation, status and relations to the means of 
production. In South Africa the concentration of wealth 
among the Whites and the general poverty among Blacks 
results in a convergence of race and class. Simplified, 
this means that if you are Black, you belong almost 
automatically to the working class, while a white skin 
reserves you a place among the 'exploiting' capitalist 
class. In more extreme socialist terms, this means that 
there are only two groups, namely, a Black working class 
versus everyone else in South Africa, with the latter 
groups including members of the White working class as well 
as the Black middle class. According to Alexander (1985: 
55), the Black working class is the driving force of the 
liberation struggle in South Africa. 
Personally, I strongly disagree with a simplistic class 
explanation of the political situation in South Africa: 
Firstly I believe that the concept of a Black working 
class opposed to a White capitalist class is outdated 
because of fast-changing racial components of the so-called 
working class as well as the middle class. Black upward 
mobility has rapidly increased since 1970 and especially 
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in the 80's because of the abolishment of certain Apartheid 
laws such as influx control, the opening up of Central 
Business districts of cities, and because of deliberate 
policies of closing the gap between Black and White 
incomes. The latter measure originated in the private 
sector, especially with foreign companies facing 
disinvestment pressure, but later also spread• to a lesser 
extent, to public corporations and government departments, 
the most recent (September 1987) being the 
Transport, which promised equal 
rapid rise in 
wages 
Department of 
for all races. 
Statistics show the share of national 
income of Non-Whites from 26,5% in 1970, to 40% in 1980 
(Louw and Kendall, 1986 :95). 
Neither do I believe that class factors will play a major 
role in future South African politics, because acco~ding 
thesis (1986 137), "the to Van Zyl Slabbert's 
majority Of people define the conflict in racial 
racism versus non-racism; racial exclusion 
vast 
terms: 
and 
discrimination versus non-racial inclusion and 
non-discrimination; White domination versus Black 
subjugation 11 • Slabbert argues that the basic conflict is 
still over racial issues, despite attempts to ideoize it 
along class lines. Such attempts originate from factors 
both left and right of the political spectrum: 
On the right is government, which does the unthinkable by 
reasoning in "class" terms, and has as goal the creation 
and strengthening of the Black middleclass as a vanguard 
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against the "revolutionary"working 
through a process of co-option 
classes. l'his is done · 
of sectors of the Black 
urban population by granting them 'favoured status' and 
certain economic: advantages, according to Adam and Moodley 
(1986: 142-154). In the view of these a~thors, the policy 
of co-option of the middle classes may backfire because it 
is mostly the lower-income and less-educated sections which 
let themselves become co-opted in order' to obtain the 
economic advantages being offered. 
class are now leading the demands 
l'he new Black middle 
for economic: and 
political freedom (Time , February 29, ~988). Yet if this 
is the case, the government still achieves its ultimate 
goal, namely, the neutralization of revolutionary 
potential. Adam and Moodley summarize, this strategy as 
fol lCMS "the efforts of tec:hnoc:ratic: reformers trying 
to de-racialize White domination by substituting c:lass for 
rac:e''. l'he degree of success is visible in figures given 
by these authors: more than one fifth of the Black 
population is employed by the state and has therefore, a 
distinct interest in the survival of the state. As Adam 
and Moodley (1985 :143) put it, these people "are in 
prac:tic:e removed from active resistance". 
From the socialistic: left we also have an effort to 
ideologize politics along class lines, but for different· 
reasons. Alexander (1985 :41) claims that ''the immediate 
goal of the national liberation struggle is 
destruction of racial capitalism", and that in South 
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the 
Africa, this capitalist or ruling class consists of owners 
of capital, mines, factories, land etc. Furthermore, this 
ruling class has to ~ecure its cheap labour supply to 
sustain its industries and therefore it created Apartheid 
for this purpose. Alexander rejects ethnicity as being 
devisive and argues that the working class and more 
specific, the Black working class, can wage the struggle 
against "capitalist and racial oppression" by themselves. 
In contrast to the two "class-based" strategies on the left 
and right of the politi~al spectrum, Nathan Glazer (1982 
:47-56) argues that there has been a world-wide trend away 
from class-based politics towards ethnic-based politics, 
which is similar to the viewpoint of Slabbert, namely that 
in South Africa the issue is race and not class. This is 
of course, also the view I have held throughout this paper, 
namely that ethnic- and group-based politics are taking a 
larger place in the politics of plural soceties worldwide. 
This is why I reject the contention that the South African 
question is primarily class~based or that class will 
determine future stratifica~ion instead of ethnicity. 
This does not mean that socio-economic factors will play no 
role in future South African ethno-pol~tics. In fact, the 
kind of economic system that a future South African 
government will choose, will determine the strength of 
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political ethnicity. Adam and Moodley (1986 :210) argue 
that ethnic sentiment declines when it impedes economic 
advantages and that an urban consumerist electorate in an 
indusrial society, which has few links with institutional, 
ethnic or racial differences, will best succeed in creating 
stability in South Africa. This view is not without its 
critics, such as Wolpe and Melson (1970: 113), who argue 
that "modernization, far from destoying communalism, in 
time both reinforces communal confl.ict and creates the 
conditions for the formation of entirely new groups'' (in 
Slabbert and Welsh, 1979 : 37). They find support in 
Walker Connor (1972 347), who claims that increases in 
communications and transportation between groups causes 
discord instead of harmony. 
Melson and Wolpe and Walker Conner may be slightly 
overpessimistic. It may be true that modernization and 
initial economic contact between groups can cause. conflict, 
but surely as time goes on, these groups will get used to 
one another and especiall~ in an industrial society, as 
Adam and Moodley argue, the market and consumerism can help 
to normalize inter-group hostility. This has already 
happened in most Black townships, where economic 
necessities are making ethnic/cultural differences between 
Blacks disappear. McGregor (1987) uses the example of 
Soweto where more than two million people from all ethnic 
groups h~ve become a homogeneous group in their own right. 
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Whether this will happen also between Black and White in 
the marketplace, is not certain. But 
Soweto at least destroyed 
South Africa .consists of 
the National 
what happened in 
Party myth that 
several distinct Black nations. 
It also takes us back to Giliomee's argument that the 
conflict is basically between African nationalism and 
Afrikaner/White group nationalism. 
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5.3 WHICH GROUP RIGHTS ARE RELEVANT AND HOW CAN THESE BE 
CONSTITUTIONALLY 
AFRICA?. 
ACCOMMODAT.ED IN A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH 
Having 
plural 
accepted the proposition that South Africa is a 
society in which the existence of groups with 
legitimate aspirations canriot be ignored, I have tried to 
indicate in the previous section that it is difficult to 
determine beforehand which groups may evolve in a future 
system of voluntary association in the Post-Apartheid era. 
However, the one group that will undoubtedly make 
group-claims in a future South African dispensation, is the 
'White Nationalists'. This group presently holds most of 
the power in all spheres of South African society and I 
shall therefore limit the rest of my discussion to the 
nature of its particular demands for group rights and 
minority protection. Although Giliomee (Sunday Times, 
August,2 1987) claims that the struggle is a communal one 
between Afrikaner and African Nationalists, I shall give a 
wider meaning to the concept of "Afrikaner Nationalists" 
to include not only Nationalists Afrikaners, (excluding 
Afrikaner Conservatives) , but also English-speaking Whites 
who hold similar beliefs and values and to whom I refer to 
as the White group. Motivation for such a view can be 
found in the believe that a substantial majority of 
Afrikaners and English-speaking Whites share similar views, 
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when it comes to physical, economic and political survival, 
as could be seen in the fact that no party in the 1987 
elections advocated simple majcirity rule. Only when one 
includes more specific cultural matters such as language, 
religion and customs, can the Afrikaner be separated from 
the general White group consciousness. 
The issues that needs some clarification concern th~ kind 
of rights that Whites as a group will want protection for, 
e.g. cultural, economic and political rights. Secondly, 
how these rights can be protected, i.e. through a Bill of 
Rights and the other formal constitutionaly entrenched 
communal measures such as a minority veto, proportionality 
alternative and minor autonomy etc. An 
minority rights informally, 
it in a constitution - examples 
is to accommodate 
Switzerland, Canada, 
without actually entrenching 
are the informal veto in 
Lebanon and the Netherlands, and 
the informal coalition in the case of the former two. 
WHICH RIGHTS? 
According to Gordon, the most favourable position for a 
minority to be in (in a democratic-equalitarian pluralistic 
society) is one in which it ''has an intermediate degree of 
power - less than that of the majority, so that it cannot 
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disrupt the society completely, 
levy strategic influence to 
Slabbert and Welsh, 1979 : 39.) 
but enough so that it can 
protect its rights" (in 
The phrase "levy strategic: influence" is of crucial 
importance in the study of minority rights and one has to 
determine which minority rights will bestow such an 
influence on a minority group. In contrast, the Freedom 
Charter merely refers to the equal rights of all people "to 
use their own language and to develop their own folk 
culture and customs'', but mentions nothng about national 
groups having any strategic leverage. The concept of 
strategic influence refers to a wider interpretation of the 
rights of minorities than the protection of cultural 
rights, to include for example the sharing of power through 
a grand coalition, a veto, proportional representation and 
segmental autonomy, ie. to have a say in the distribution 
of resources, foreign relations and security. 
The granting of cultural rights to minorities, protected by 
a Bill of Rights or a veto, and here I specifically refer 
to the maintenance of a particular language and traditions 
communal schools, in churches and in public institutions 
like broadcasting, newspapers etc., 
guarantee the survival of a group. 
and Moodley's proposition (1986 
will not by themselves 
But I agree with Adam 
: · 29), that "cultural 
ethniticy is inextricably intertwined with individual 
identity, and a good case can be made for its perpetuation 
and cultivation". Therefore, although I support the 
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notion of cultural protection for minorities I do not 
believe that cultural demands is the essence of White 
minority demands. It is rather only part of the White 
group's wider demands for economic and political 
survival-guarantees. Others, like Giliomee (Sunday Times 
August 2, 1987) place more accent on the Afrikaner's ''deep 
emotional attachment to the ethnic group. I tend to 
support the ANC's viewpoint (as stated at the 1987 Dakar 
meeting) that Nationalist Afrikaners would increasingly 
place their immediate- physical survival and economical 
ahead of their Afrikaner-ethnic/cultural well-being 
sentiments but with the provision that even these are 
secured for them in a group context, not on individual 
basis. In other words, they might believe that their 
salvation lies with the larger White ~roup and perhaps a 
centrist alliance, including Black moderates who may share 
similar values e.g. democracy and on adherence to 
capitalism. This believe may be helped on by:(1) increasing 
economic and social hardships caused by sanctions, 
international boycotts, etc. and (2) because of the 
moderating influence that two million English-speakers will 
have on the Nationalist Afrikaner who may want to see 
himself as part of a five million strong White group rather 
than a smaller Afrikane~ ethnic group numbering only three 
million (11%) out of a population of 34 milli6n. A larger 
White Group-consciousness should not exclude ideological 
alliances with other moderate Black individuals or groups. 
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Adam and Moodley (1986 : 16) 
preserving ethnicity for 
accept the 
the purpose 
legitimacy of 
of maintaining 
cultural heritage, but not for the purpose of making 
racial distinctions. They are supported by Claude (in Van 
Dyke 1983: 12) whose basic argument is that nationality 
(ethnicity) must be made applicable to the cultural sphere 
only, and ought to have no political implications. It is 
with regard to this bias towards cultural ethnicity where I 
part ways with these authors, since. I am of the opinon 
that minority rights should entail not only cultural 
safeguards, but real power-sharing too. For the present 
White government to give up their dominant hold on power, 
effective minority guarantees will have to be considered. 
This include entrenched constitutional participation oh all 
levels of government as well as a system of checks and 
balances and political and economic security. An informal 
system of safeguarding individual and perhaps certain 
cultural rights do not fulfil these minimum rights that 
Whites may demand under a Black majority government. 
Most examples of 
Africa, have as 
individual rights 
a proposedBill of 
a starting point 
with perhaps some 
protection for groups •. 
Rightsfor South 
the protection of 
kind of cultural 
Dennis Cowan (Leadership Vol.6 No.3, 1987) argues that a 
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Bill of rights has to meet South African realities and must 
safeguard individual human rights as well as well as the 
rights of 
communities. 
various cultural, religious and linquistic 
Such group interest must be equally 
recognized and must be non-racial. Furthermore, a Bill of 
Rights must ba Justiciable, constitutionally entrenched 
and should protect human rights such as the equality of all 
persons before the law, no detention without trial, 
freedom of association, speech, religious worship, to own 
property, of movement and the right to vote (regardless of 
race, colour or beli-f.) 
Louw and Kendall's (1986 171) proposed Bill of Rights 
cover the same basic spheres such as freedom of movement, 
property rights, the right of free association and rights 
against victimization and intimidation. They claim that by 
protecting these individual rights, minority rights are 
also protected in an constitutionally ent~enched Bill of 
Rights. 
A third exampl~ of a Bill of Rights originates in the 
Natal-KwaZulu Indaba. It. consists basically out of the 
same provisions as the previous two and also mentions 
ethnic, linguistic and cultural rights. 
Another example, is that of the Freedom Charter, which 
refers tel the rights of diff<\?rent "national" groups and 
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accepts the right of people 11 tci use their own language and 
t.o develop their own ·folk c~ulture arid c::ustoms". Iri ~sh1::,rt, 
the Charter seeks equal status for ethnic groups in the 
courts, schools and other state institutions. 
These proposals acknowledge and aim to protect cultural 
rights, but they do not go much further than that. In 
other words, no guarantees are given to ensure that 
minorities:.; will share power at the highest levels of 
government, retain the~r share in the economy or on 
security issues. As will be shown in the ne~t chapter, the 
Natal-KwaZulu Indaba Proposals come very close in dealing 
with both informal and cultural rights as well as the 
constitutional entrenchment of a system of power-sharing 
between minority and majority groups in Natal.(i.e. through 
the granting of some degree of strategic influence to 
minorities). 
The legitimate minority claims of the Whites as a minority 
in a future democracy have to be distinguished from the 
National Party concept of minority rights which is based on 
the fixed idea of forced racial group classification, with 
the ultimate intention of perpetuating White economic, 
so~ial and political dominance. By legitimate rights I 
. refer to the claims of groups formed through free 
association who seek participation in issues concerning 
that group in the highest echelons of power. Ckoups like 
these, whether they are of purely ethnic Afrikaner origin, 
a broader White racial group or e.g. even a multi-ethnic 
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such as a White/Indian/Coloured/Zulu political grouping, 
could make legitimate group claims through a political 
party. In the latter case such a group would unite on 
ideological basis and would have cross- cutting ethnic 
affiliations. 
A further important issue is how to determine which 
constitutional system will best accommodate such rights? 
The nature of such a constitution will have to be 
determined by negotiation and compromise 
•· 
between, on the 
one hand, the adherents of an individualistic approach, 
and on the other hand, adherents for comprehensive 
minority safeguards entrenched in a ·constitution based on 
effective power-sharing. 
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES 
Schlemmer (Sunday Times, Sept. 13, 1987) mentions the 
following elements or basic requirements to which a 
compromise constitution have to conform to: 
Full majority representation in the highest organs of 
governmcmt without refere-mce t.o any formal 
co,·,s ti tu tiona 1 distinction between the powers of 
c; om mun it i es. Any divisions of powers making for 
elements of self-determination would have to be part of 
the? agreement. 
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A formula which will ensure the creation of equality of 
opportunity in the civil service for all groups. 
Sufficient reassurance regards checks and balances 
in government, law and order and efficiency of 
administration. 
According to Van Niekerk (1988: 19) the basic requirements 
to which a democratic constitution for South Africa should 
comply with are: 
All South African individuals and groups must have an 
effective say on all levels of decision-making~ 
Consensus politics should be promoted. 
Non-racial or non-ethnic based politics should be 
rewarded. 
Political power should be decentralized as far as 
possible. 
A rejection of all political violence. 
Keeping these points in mind, we can now look at possible 
constitutional options which will help facilitate a 
minority compromise and could help bring a democratic Black 
majority government to power. 
Since the central thought throughout this thesis is that, 
in view of the experience of other plural societies, simple 
majoritorianism, an individualistic system or a unitary 
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constitution are not ideally suited for the protection of 
minority rights in South Africa, I will therefore look at 
two other options, namely federalism and consociational 
democracy. Both concepts have as a starting point the 
devolution and sharing of power on all levels of government 
and have proven to be successful remedies t6 the problems 
facir1g 
·whether 
conflict-prone plural societies, regardless of 
divisions were on ethnic or 
Since these constitutional concepts 
ideological 
are not 
levels. 
mutually 
exclusive, the best solution for South Africa will probably 
be a consociation inside a federal 
Niekerk rightly proposes (1988: 20). 
FEDERALISM 
structure as Van 
The "feder·al idea" in South Africa has a long history. As 
early as in 1909, Olive Schreiner make the following 
argument in favour of federalism: "A huge territory like 
South Africa divided into a number of strongly organised 
and individualised, though confederate Sates, will present 
a far greater obstacle to the undue dominance of any 
interest, class or individual than the same territory under 
a unified and centralized government. The special danger 
of centralized democratic: states is always the tendency to 
fall a prey to the tyranny of sections, or large interests, 
or of strong individLtc:\ls" (Forsyth, 1984 : 4). 
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Federalism in South africa before 1910 was mainly seen as 
an instrument for consolidating the British Empire by 
linking 
in Lord 
up the Afrikaner and British settlements to create, 
Carnavon's vision, a confederation similar to 
Canada. The idea of using federalism as a binding force, 
failed because it was too crudely and insensitively thrust 
upon the South African communities by the British, 
according to Forsyth (1984: 2). 
Although it was generally assumed that the unification of 
the four colonies would be federal in nature, a unitary 
system was finally implemented in 1910. The argument in 
favour of federalism came from the British imperialists 
(who saw it.as• means to consolidate the British Empire) 
and from the Natal delegation. In contrast, most local 
South African forces propagated a union because it would 
have resulted in greater autonomy and independence from 
Britain. Several factors resulted in the idea of 
federalism being neglected during the National Convention 
in 1909. Some leading proponents of federalism were absent 
and the Natal delegation, who favoured federalism, came 
relatively unprepared to the Convention. They were 
influenced along with the rest of the delegates by writings 
and speeches against the "defects of federalism" which 
were circulating at the time. 
Smuts and Merriman were the two leading figures propagating 
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a unitary system, claiming at the time that South Africa's 
problems required "uniform treatment a.nd firm handling". 
Arguments given against federalism included the alleged 
fragmentation CJf power, seer1 at t.he time as 
disadvantageous. Federalism supposedly enabled corruption 
to flourish and it made arbitrary bodies such as courts too 
powerful. 
fol lows 
federation 
Smuts' argument against 
" ••• to my mind the great 
is this, that it assumes 
federalism wa.s. as 
difficulty with 
that a number of 
independent parties come together and enter into a compact, 
into an agreement, which is binding for the future. The 
federal system is one of checks and balances ..•• The 
natural result of that system is that it becomes a 
hide-bound system, a contract between a number of parties 
which the future cannot attempt to change, and the result 
is a rigid, inflexible Constitution which cannot develop as 
things go forward. Is that the sort of Constitution .we 
want for South Africa, for a country in its infancy? Do we 
want a Constitution which will lead to civil wars as the 
American constitution led to? No, we prefer to follow a 
different type - that of the British Constit~tion'' (Forsyth 
1984 : 3) • 
Forsyth disagrees with Smuts' assertion that the 
constitution of a federal state necessarily takes the form 
of a contract - "A federal state only comes into e:-:istence 
when its constitution is not regarded as a contract, but as 
something made by the whole as a single indivisible entity, 
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which does 
Cons ti tut.io1, 
the American 
not preclude intensive bargaining before the 
is made." In addition, the assumption that 
federal Constitution. led to the Civil war, is 
It is highly probable that the Southern ques tior1ab 1 ~. 
s.tates in the U.S. would have seceded anyway, whether it 
was a federal constitution or a unitary one, because of the 
deeply divisive issue of slavery and the bitterness it 
evoked. 
Merriman's argument was that a federal constitution was not 
necessary as there were so few differences between the 
Afrikaner and the English. For him the two groups were 
forming a homogeneous population, and descended from the 
same "stock and sharing a common Protestant religion, 
unlike the French and British Canadian". Merriman's 
interpretation of the homogeneity could be regarded as 
premature. The Afrikaner and English may both have had 
their origin in the Protestant 
time their language, culture 
part of Europe, but at the 
and outlook on life were 
vastly divergent, not unlike the ethnic differences in 
Canada between French and English-speaking Canadians or 
between the Flemings and Walloons in Belgium. 
Both Smuts and Merriman have made a mistake in assuming 
that an unitary government would bridge all cutural/ethnic 
differences between South Africa's two major White groups. 
From 1936 to the 1960's ethnic antagonism between these two 
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groups intensified almost "to the level of civil war", 
according to Forsyth (1988 4), although the antagonism 
could even be taken back further to the Rebellion in 1915 
and the flag crisis in 1927-28. Only a common fear of 
overwhelming Black numbers has helped to reduce the level 
of antagonism during the past three decades. 
There is in my mind no doubt that the implementation of a 
federal system in 1910 would have been much more 
advantageous to all in South Africa. Firstly, the minority, 
English group would have been able to prevent domination by 
the Afrikaners much more effectively than they could in a 
unitary system, especially if they demanded a more logical 
division of provinces than the present four, which could 
have strengthened their geographical base in Natal, the 
Eastern Cape and parts of the Western cape and the Rand. 
Not only on the level of local politics (like in the Natal 
Provincial Council) but also in national politics, a couple 
of strong English-dominated federal states would have 
countered the Nationalists much more effectively. Coupled 
with a system of proportional representation, it would have 
given the English a fairer share of political 
repr•sentation in South Africa ( about 40% if they voted as 
a group) • 
Secondly, the Cape's non-racial system may have remained 
intact in a federal state located in the Western Cape 
without the conservative Cape hinterland and the pressure 
from a strongly centralised unitary government). 
From 1960 onwards, federalism surfaced again and became an 
increasingly important concept in South African political 
debate. According to Forsyth (1984 5) two forces were 
behind the resurgence. Firstly, there was a desire to 
impose a restriction on the sweeping and unrestrained power 
of the National Party government which made full use of the 
concept of the winner-takes-all electoral system in a 
unitary constitution. Secondly there was a need to look 
for an alternative political system to Apartheid in order 
to give all races in South Africa a say in the central 
government. 
Federalism's popularity today can be seen in various 
institutions in South Africa's socio-economic system, for 
example, the system of industrial relations in the sphere 
of labour is typically federally organised, so are most 
sporting bodies e.g. the S.A. Rugby Board, the Synod of the 
Dutch reformed Church; also primary and secondary education 
and even the National Party organizational structure. (Du 
Pisanie and Kritzinger, 1985 : 454). 
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Since the idea behind a federal system in South Africa 
would be to fragment the power of a majority government and 
thereby to protect min6rity groups in autonomous states -
the important question is how to arrange the fragmentation 
or devolution of power i.e. how to subdivide the country 
into logical federal units. 
Owing to Black sensitivity over the issue of ethnicity, 
proponents of the federal idea in South Africa see a major 
problem in trying to devise a federal structure along 
present ethnic and racial lines. Alternatives would be 
regional or economic - based federalism. 
Maasdofp (1980: 142) gives examples of two forms of a 
g~ographic federation in the first he uses consolidated 
homelands ""c·· 
""·"' 
,a basis ·for federal states. This is an 
extension of the pure ethnic approach of the National Party 
and therefore stresses ethnic differences. Maasdorp's 
second -xample is the regional planning approach. The. 
rationale behind this idea is that the present provincial 
boundaries merely represent a historical legacy and are 
not suited to the needs of a modern economy. According to 
this perspective South Africa is divided into ten states 
based on regional and economic grounds. Maasdorp claims 
that most regions are dominated by just one or two ethnic 
group. Each of these regions has a large city or economic 
growthpoint and on the whole it should, according to 
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Maasdorp, fac:ilitc:.~te a "more equitable spatial distribution 
of the benefits of economic growth and development". 
Although this federal division is not based on ethnicity, 
there is a relatively high degree of ethnic homogeneity in 
most states. 
Lij phart ( 198(1 71) is in favour of what he calls 
"asymmetrical territorial federal.ism" which can be defined 
as the creation of relatively homogeneous 
certain defined geographical areas. 
ethnic states in 
For him, this 
arrangement c:omplies with the basic purpose of federalism, 
the accommodation of diversity in an overall framework of 
political unity. He bases his argument on the assumption 
that the various groups in South Africa are still 
geographically concentrated to a signific:ant degree. An 
interesting viewpoint of LiJphart's is that such a 
geographical federation would avoid the difficult question 
of determining of which groups or segments a democratic 
plural South Africa will consist. Where certain ethnic or 
other groups are too widely interspersed, Lijphart suggesti 
a corporate (non-territorial) federation. 
Du Pisanie and Kritzinger (1985 449-450) also envisage a 
federation based on a geographical basis i.e. along the 
line of the original settlement of the Black group in South 
Af~ica, for example the Xhosa in the· Eastern Cape, the 
Zulu in Natal and the Tswana in the Northern Cape and 
Western Transvaal. 
They claim that the original geographic distribution is 
.sti 11 more less intact, 
Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging 
apart 
region, 
from 
whic:h 
the 
is 
mul t.i-·ethnical. According to Du Pisanie and Kritzinger, 
even the Coloureds have a clear geographical base in the 
Cape Province and PWV region and the Indians in Natal and 
PWV. The Whites however, have spread to all parts of 
South Africa in proportion to the economic strength of each 
region. They suggest four steps by which federalism can 
be implemented in South Africa The entrenchment of 
individual rights; devolution of power to local 
authorities; establishment of regional governments and 
cultural authorities; the establishment of structures for 
general affairs of national interest. 
Louw and Kendall (1986 133) agree that political entities 
based on ethnicity are automatically linked to Apartheid, 
but the 
according 
federal {canton) system they propose 
to them, totally dismantle Apartheid 
will, 
and 
therefore the connection between ethnicity and race 
ideology as well. Their proposed canton system divides the 
country into at least 360 cantons, based on the present 
magisterial districts, which will be autonomous, but linked 
to the central government for matters of national concern. 
They agree that some federal units will have a "high 
correlation with ethnic and/or socio-economic population 
distribution". 
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A sum~ary of the views of the above-mentioned federal 
proponents indicate a strong sentiment towards a federal 
division based on existing patterns of ethnic and cultural 
settlement throughout South Africa. They mostly suggest 
asymmetrical models of mutually reinforcing fed•ral and 
segmental boundaries, which coincide with current ethnic 
divisions, even though ethnicity may be disguised under the 
cloak of territorial or economic dividing lines. 
Adam (1979 300) tries to ~void· thi~ ethnic-based 
perspective he mentions his conditions for a 
successful federal system in South Africa, of which the 
most important is the total avoidance of any reference 
to race or ethnicity as a constituent rationale. He does 
admit, however, that linguistic and ethnic settlement 
patterns as well as historical, geographical and economic 
conditions would have to be considered when devising the 
boundaries of the federal units. 
Difficulties in the implimention 
Federalism. 
of South African 
There are several factors which make the implementation of 
a federal system difficult in South Africa. Firstly, to 
implement a federal system in South Africa without using 
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ethnicity as a de~arting point is virtually impossible. By 
ignoring ethnicity and group consciousness, there would 
be no point in implementing federalis~, for the purpose of 
federalism is to protect group interests by allocating to 
minorities a degree of power which may otherwise.have been 
used by the majority to the detriment of the minority. 
Secondly, there is the incompatibility of the maximum 
requirements that a White minority and a Black majority may 
want from such a federal system. For example, Swilling 
(1987: 7) mentions the reasons why Whites may want to see 
federalism implemented Firstly to prevent the Black 
majority from 
which could 
implementing a socialist economic 
entail confiscatory taxation, 
system 
fiscal 
indiscipline and nationalization; Secondly to prevent a to 
rapid advancement of inexperienced Blacks up the hierarchy 
of the civil service and reverse discriminatory employment 
practices; and thirdly to avoid ethnic conflict that may 
erupt under a Black government and could lead to economic 
and political chaos. It is doubtful whether the Black 
majority would accept a system that is so obviously 
designed to curtail their newly gained (post-Apartheid) 
freedom to act in a way as they may believe a 
democratically elected majority should be allowed to act. 
Federalism directly opposes unbridled majority power. 
Since it it would be tot~lly unacceptable to use federalism 
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as a tool to ensure White privileges and domination, a more 
legitimate aim would be to limit any one majority group's 
access to political power which will result in such a 
ruling group being prevented from making drastic and 
sweeping changes affecting the legitimate rights of 
minorities. 
Another reason why federalism may not be a viable idea, can 
be found in the fact that federating units in South Africa 
will not be homogeneous, i.e. regional demarcations will 
not correspond with ethnic settlement. In chapter 3 it has 
been shown that in most cases where federalism has been 
implemented, the lines of demarcation closely followed 
ethnic: territorial settlement e.g. Canada, Belgium, 
(excluding Brussels), Switzerland and Nigeria. It was not 
possible in Northern Irel~nd, Lebanon or Cyprus, because 
of the widely interspersed nature of the ethnic groups. 
Cyprus tried a corporate federalism in which the ethnic 
groups did not live in one specific geographical area. 
South Africa's population is also highly intertwined, apart 
from a few million Blacks still living in traditional 
homeland areas. Slabbert and Welsh (1979 : 140) concur 
"Prima facie, South Africa does not seem promising as a 
federal situation, the major reason being that its 
diversity has no territorial nexus". 
A further reason why the implementation of federalism may 
encounter resistance, can be found in the Freedom Charter. 
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The Charter clearly states: "The national wealth of our 
country, the heritage of all South Africans, shall be 
restored to the people". There is no doubt that a major 
redistribution of wealth is expected by the Black majority, 
who have, for decades if not centuries, suffered gross 
economic injustices linked to 
perception among Blacks is 
implement a redistribution of 
strongly centralized unitary 
White 
that 
wealth 
state. 
exploitation. The 
the easiest way to 
would be through a 
The Afri~aner's own 
example 
himself 
transfer 
sector 
of correcting economic inequalities between 
and the English after 1948 through a massive 
of wealth from the English-dominated private 
to the Afrikaner-dominated public sector, proves 
how a unitary state can be of benefit to reduce such 
inequalities. A federal South Africa would regarded by most 
Blacks as a major obstacle to the process of the 
redistribution of wealth. 
CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY. 
The implementation of segmental autonomy in South Africa 
will refer to the delegation of decision-making to ethnic, 
ideological or territorial segments. It is impossible to 
predict which segments will evolve in a democratic South 
Africa, but the principle of voluntary association is of 
overriding importance segments should be able to define 
themselves. If the majority of Whites choose to belong to 
one segment, they will, through • system of corporate 
federalism (because of their interspersed nature), govern 
their own affairs, whether it is culture or economic 
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representation. As have been argued before, there is a 
strong case to be made out for the White group, especially 
to enjoy over-representation, because of their 
extraordinary strong social, political and economical 
position in South Africa, a position which should still be 
intact when the process of a negotiated settlement 
commences. In the case of federalism, over-representation 
should also apply to weaker federai unites, e.g. parity 
with stronger states in one of the Houses of Parliament. 
The final principle, the minority veto, is also the most 
controversial issue of minority protection in the South 
African constitutional debate. It inevitably conjures 
images of the National Party notion of a blanket White 
minority veto, holding the Black majority hostage by 
vetoing any fundamental change or progress that does not 
comply with White Nationalist ideology. 
A minority veto is supposed to give a guarantee to each 
minority segment of a plural society to ensure it won't be 
outvoted when its vital interests are at stake (Lijphart 
1980 =61). Every segment can get a veto right, but 
normally a certain percentage votes are required e.g. 10% 
of the total votes. In Belgium, both groups have a blanket 
veto when it comes to language, cultural or educational 
matters; in Switzerland and Canada it exists informally, 
while Cyprus and Nigeria also had formal vetoes in their 
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In the case of Cyprus, the 'abuse' of the Turkish veto 
caused the constitution to collapse. This brings us to a 
of minority difficult question - What constitutes an abuse 
power ? 
perceived 
interests. 
What is 
by another 
The vital 
seen by one party as an abuse, is 
as a safeguard of vital minority 
interest of a minority could be 
defined as interests which can be overridden by conflicting 
claims of a more powerful majority, to the detriment of 
the minorities's continued survival, whether it be culture, 
security or socio-economic interests (own definition). 
According to Slabbert and Welsh (1979 153) the main 
purpose of the veto ia to force negotiation and consensus 
between parties, not to paralyse government or to act as a 
permanent blocking device. Lijphart argues that a minority 
veto is not as absolute as it seems and that minorities 
will take notice of the dangers of overusing it to avoid 
frustrating the majority to breaking point. He adds that 
the added security which the thought of having a veto will 
provide, will actually make the use of it less probable. 
The example of Cyprus refutes Lijpharf's optimism and it 
come as no surprise when the PFP recently announced that it 
is reconsidering the viability of the concept of a 
minority veto in their constitutional proposals. 
One way to make a minority veto work in South Africa is to 
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increase the minimum percentage voter needed for a veto to 
be implemented, i.e. to a level just higher than any single 
segment's percentage membership of Parliament, executive or 
legislative. This means that no single one minority can 
succeed with a·veto on their own and will need the support 
of ant,1:her 
l. egis la t.i.cm. 
group tt, 
It will 
e11able them to bl.rJc:k "harmful II 
r•sult in a process of negotiation 
and trade-offs between groups, rather than a permanent 
bl.ocking_which inevitably wi 11 lead to a breakdown of the 
constitution. In South Africa, the Afrikaners, for 
e:,:ample, if they decide to form a group/party by 
themselves, will need the support of, for arguments sake, 
the Coloured, Indian., Zulu or perhaps an English group or 
even the support of members participating as individuals in 
order to veto certain legislation. The degree of support 
any group Will get, will depend on certain trade-offs like 
promises for support in return, economic or social aid. 
The most common objection against a constitutionally 
entrenched minority veto 
will be used to protect 
privileges, can be met 
in South Africa, namely that it 
White racial and economic 
through the introduction of this 
system. It is a system which can, of course, be e:,:tended 
to increase the minimum percentage needed even further, 
just in case two groups hold very similar views, e.g. 
Afrikaans and English speakers. It can be referred to, for 
e:<amph:, as the "double minority veto". It must be added 
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finally, that a minority veto can in any case, just be 
relevant only when the vital interest of a particular group 
is endangered never for n~tional or internationally 
related affairs, otherwise it could lead to a potentially 
dangerous situation where a foreign power bribes the 
leaders of a political or ethnic grouping to veto proposed 
legislation aimed at curbing disadvantageous intervention 
into local affairs by that foreign power. 
By· ,,ow it should be Clbvious that the 11 c:onsoc:iational 11 
nature of the South African Tricameral Parliament and the 
basic principles of c:onsoc:iational democracy are not 
compatible. The 1983 Cbnstitution contains elements 
firstly of corporate federalism/segmental autonomy by 
giving autonomy to three Houses in Parliament to deal with 
matters concerning the three race groups they represent 
(own affairs). Both the Coloured and Indian Houses and 
their Ministerial Councils have a degree of segmental 
autonomy over groups of people not territorially defined 
(the corporate element), which enable- them to make 
decisions concerning 11 own 11 affairs relatively independently 
from the White "majority" in the system. Yet, this "free 
hand" is restricted by dependence on budget allocations by 
the White House in Parliament. It is further being impeded 
by provisions of the Group Areas Act which determines where 
each group are allowed to reside, an Act which retention is 
a crucial underpinning of the Tricameral system. 
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Secondly, as mention~d previously, two Coloureds and one 
Indian have been made members of the Cabinet, but because 
they are not represented proportionally according to their 
group's actual numbers in Parliament, they have very little 
real clout inside this body. Furthermore, important 
decisions are taken by the State Security Council anyway, 
which further diminishes the role of the Cabinet. This 
arrangement contrasts sharply with the consociational idea 
that the political leaders of all parties/groups/segments 
should jointly rule the country i.e. real power-sharing. 
Thirdly, the numbers in the Coloured and Indian Houses of 
Parliament and in the Electoral College, are roughly in 
proportion to those of the Whites in relation to population 
sizes (4 2 1), but not with regard to the 
representation in the Cabinet or in the civil service. 
Fourthly, n~ither of the two minority groups have a 
minority veto over legislation affecting their vital 
interests, because if they do try to block legislation, the 
National Party-dominated President's Council will ensure 
that it passes. 
Further deviations mentioned by Lijphart (1980 68) 
includes the fact that the Blacks have no representation in 
the Tricameral system the presence of too strong an 
executive President; the fact that the Whites have an 
absolute majority in all sections which ensure them keeping 
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decisive power; the numbers of representatives of all 
groups are fixed, which means it cannot change along with 
changes in population proportions (other than with the 
approval of all three Houses), and finally, the fact that 
so little negotiations have taken place between the three 
groups when the constitution was devised. 
There is no doubt that the government has done a great 
disservice to the very promising concept of 
consociationalism through th- mutilation of its principles 
in the Tricameral system. As in the case of the 
government's abuse of the term minorities, it does not mean 
that it cannot be usefully applied in a system of 
democratic pluralism. 
Finally I will look at the obstacles to consociationalism 
being successfully implemented in South Africa, as foreseen 
by Adam (1979 287). Since the critique of 
consociationalism has already been discussed in a previous 
chapter and is applicable also to South Africa, I will in 
addition just briefly discuss Adam's point of view. The 
first obstacle he mentions, is that groups membership in 
South Africa is imposed, instead of based on voluntary 
association. Although this is the case in the present 
Tricameral system, and forms the basis of the NP's 
policy, it does not imply that negotiated settlement 
cannot change all that and it does not mean per se that 
South Africa's plural nature is uMsuitable for the 
implementation of some consociational principles. 
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Adam's second point deals with enforced restriction of 
segmental leadership, which refers to the fact th~t apart 
from the White and Zulu leadership elites, other Black 
leaders act mostly as individuals without the support of, 
and feedback to, their Black supporters. This would make 
the grand coalition of elites very difficult, because of 
the weakening of deferential attitudes of the non-elite 
public towards the leadership elite~ The automatic reply 
would be that since Adam wrote his article in 1979, 
conditions have chanced very much. The formation of the UDF 
and Cosatu, the higher profile of the ANC, the coming of 
age of religious/political leaders like Boesak, Tutu and 
Chikane and strenghtening of the position of Buthulezi and 
lnkatha, have done much to unite leadership and followers 
and to provide for a d•gree of accountability. 
The third obstacle Adam mentions is the fact that there 
exists an unequal distribution of power and resources among 
competing groups. This state of affairs is characterized by 
a situation where race and class coincide. In Adam's view, 
only a major redistribution of wealth would make a 
consociation workable. As been stated before, if 
consociational democracy are going to be used by the White 
~uling group to maintain the gross imbalances in the 
distribution of wealth between Black and White, it would 
fail utterly as a constitutional option. Idasa's Van Zyl 
Slabbert said on occasion that there are no such thing as 
Black and White Rights only opportunities that are 
manipulated by one group to the disadvantage of another. If 
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all parties have equal access to these opportunities, then 
no party can guarantee economic privileges forever. 
A summary of the previous pages on constitutional methods 
for plural societies, indicates that in spite of certain 
obstacles, a form of consociationalism in a federal 
structure may provide the White group with sufficiently 
firm guarantees to allow them to accept a Black controlled 
South African democracy. The constitutional proposals of 
the Natal-KwaZulu Indaba as discussed in the next chapter, 
embodies such a structure. 
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6.EVAL.UATING THE NATAL.-KWAZUt .. U lNDASA PROPOSALS AND THE 
PROPOSED CONSTITUTION OF THE NAMIBIAN MULTI-PARTY 
CONFERENCE WITH RESPECT TO MINORITY RIGHTS. 
TWC) of the most recent examples of cons~t.i. t:t.d.:ione":\ 1 
engineering ih Southern Africa, came from the regions of 
Natal and Namibia. Both regions are characterized by 
typical South African plurality, with ethnic, class and 
ideological divisions all coinciding. The Natal-KwaZulu 
Indaba opted for a system emphasizing both groups and 
individuals, while the Namibian proposals adhere to the 
classic Liberal model of individualism, tempered to some 
extent by a pluralistic model. The main difference between 
the two sets of proposals, is that the proposed Namibian 
c::c::ms ti t1..1 t.i.on represents a firm step away from ethnic 
group structures, while the Indaba proposals still adhere 
to ethnic group representation with effective vetoes in the 
one Chamber of Parliament. It would allow for a great 
constitutional experiment if the South African government 
would be progressive and far-seeing enough to permit these 
two regional efforts to be implemented. 
THE NATAL-KWAZULU INDABA PROPOSALS 
''We have searched in the Indaba for a formulation of group 
interests and minority protection which is compatible with 
the fundamental tenets of true democracy'' - Mangosuthu a. 
Buthelezi, Chief Minister KwaZulu, in a speech to the 
Afrikaanse sakekamerp Cape Town, 24 November, 1987. 
In 1986, Natalians of all races, if not all ideologiesp 
came together to negotiate for a non-racial, power-sharing 
constitution for South Africa's smallest province. The 
fact that such •n IMdab~ (as the process of negotiation 
became known) was possible, was in itself an achievement, 
after centuries of wasted opportunities, and racist and 
segregationist policies followed by the ruling white 
minority group - policies which, when first introduced by 
the British Colonial rulers, were continued by their White 
Provincial successors. In the Union of South Africa these 
policies were finally brought to a climax after 1948 by 
Apartheid-induced Central government policy directives. 
With reference to these periods, Alan Paton (1987: 32) 
claims that ''the history of Natal from 1870 to the present 
day is not anything for it• white citizens to be proud of.'' 
Yet, in 1986, Zulus, Whites, Coloured and Indians 
for eight months to f6rmulate the Indaba 
proposals. The r~sult is an example of how 
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opposing forces of South African society can come together 
and through a process of negotiation and compromise, reach 
an agreement acceptable to the majority of the participants 
- an achievement which is unparalleled in Beuth Africa's 
history of race conflict. 
The underlying idea behind the Indaba was to formulate 
proposals for a single legislature for the two territories 
of Natal and KwaZulu. The basic points of departure of the 
Indabap as summarized by its Chairman, Prof. D. Clarence, 
were the following: 
To remain part of the greater So~th Africa, taking into 
consideration the economic, cultural and historical 
ties between the two areas. 
To provide political participation and effective 
representation for all people of the area. 
To avoid legislation based on racial discrimination 
to move away from apartheid following the lead of the 
State President. 
To ensure a free economic system with equal 
opportunities for all and the protection of the rights 
of individuals and groups. 
To ensure that legislative and administrative power be 
devolved as much as possible. 
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Participants came from many sections of N~tal's political 
and socio-economic communitiem. The initial list of all 
the major organizations which took part~ reads as follows: 
Full Members 
Afrikaanse Hancielsinstituut 
Black Allied Workers' Dnion 
Durbanse A~rikaanse Sakekamer 
Durban City Council 
Durban Metropolit•n Chiti\mber of Commerce 
Federasie van Afrikaanae Kultuurverenigings 
lnka'l:hiti\ 
Islamic Council of South Africa 
Junior Rapportryers 
KwaZulu Government 
l...~abour Pi!Arty 
Natal Agricultural Union 
Natal Associ•tion cf Local Affairs Committees 
Natal Chamber cf Industries 
Natal Provincial Council 
National Peoples' Party of South Africa 
New Republic Party 
Peoples' Congress Party 
Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce 
Pietermaritzburg City Council 
Progressive Federal Party 
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Reform Party 
Regional Development Advi~ory Committee 
Solidarity 
South African Sugar Association 
TU SCA 
Observer Members 
Natal Law Society 
Natal Municipal Association 
National Party~ Natal 
Invitation Declined 
African National Congress 
A~anian People's Organisation 
Congress of South African Trade Unions 
Conservative Party 
Council of Unions of South Africa 
Herstigte Nasionale Party 
Natal Indian Congress 
Pan Africanist Congress 
United Democratic Front 
(Van Wyk, 1987 48). 
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According to Van Wyk (1987 45), there were very few 
procedural constraints, and decision-making .was based on 
In the 
formal voting was a rare occurrence, because 
negotiations continued until full agreement was reached on 
most mattersp except of coursep on the final vote. 
Committees were appointed,, the most important being the 
constitutional committee, although the Indaba was not bound 
by proposals of this committee. After eight months of 
negotiations, the 
accepted (only the 
it). 
Indaba proposals were overwhelmingly 
four Afrikaans-speaking bodies rejected 
The proposals emerging from the Indaba can be summarized as 
fol lf.:>Wl!ll U they recognize the right of all people to 
participate in government, they recognize the rights of 
minorities i:lnd individwals alike and irwolve 11 i1,telliger,t, 
balanced power-sharing'', according to Mansfield (1987 
37). With respect to the Chairman of th• Indaba, 
Professor Desmond Clarence's summary of the underlying 
principles of the Indaba 
following qualification 
Indaba has it as aim 
proposals, one has to make the 
According to Prof Clarence, the 
"to move~ aw,,y from Ap.;irtheid 
fr.:>l lcJwing tt'1e! lead of the St .. ~te Pl"'esic:lemt" surely this 
statement represents a misconception of the spirit of the 
Indaba? In my view it was never the aim of the Indaba to 
get rid of Apartheid and White domination by folowing the 
248 
lead of National Party. P.W.Botha actions, although more 
reformist than those of his predecesors, are those of an 
autocratic leader who is not prepared to sacrifice White 
domination for the mike of a peaceful feature. For the 
sake of the future credibility of the Indaba, tine trusts 
that its chairman was merely trying to make the proposals 
more acceptable to the government. 
Before going into mo~e detail into the constitutional 
proposals, I will briefly provide some general background 
on Natal and its people: 
While most people in Natal making a largely agrarian 
existence in the 18th century, the 19th century brought• 
•eries of radical transformations which resulted in the 
establishment 6f .a highly authorita~ian Zulu kingdom north 
of the Tu;ela under Shaka, and of British colonial rule to 
the south (Maylam and Wright, 1987 : 16). Between 1838 
and 1849, the remaining Zulu territories south of the 
Tugela which the British had not yet occupied, were invaded 
by the Voc:1rtrekk£+lrs ( "Boe~r p.;,\stcJrcii\list invaders") from the~ 
Cape. They did not s~.it-::ceed .in fi-~stablishing their rul.~1 over· 
the Zulu because the British soon seized the whble of Natal 
their owr, brr:ilnd o'f "discr.i.mir,atory 
territorial separation'' between White and Black, according 
to Maylam and Wright (1987 e 16). 
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Shepstonep the head of the Native Affairs Department, can 
be regarded as the f•ther of racial ~egregation in Natalp 
und~H· his administrationp racial and ethnic 
separation were first officially implemented. In 1887 
Zululand was annexed as a British colony and in 1893 
responsible government was granted to Whites in Natal. In 
1897 Zululand was again annexed~ this time by Natal and 
was followed by the expropriation of large areas of Zulu 
territory for purposes of White settlement. By 1910 at the 
formation of the Union of South Africap White domination 
of the Zulus w~s firmly established. During the next 
couple of years efforts were made by the Whites to revive 
the Zulu royal House in order to strengthen the position of 
traditional and moderate leaders. According to Maylam and 
Wright (1987 18), this was done to count~r thm militant 
popularly-b•sed political movements like the ANC and the 
Industrial and Commercial Workers Union an alliance 
between the more conservative Black groupsp the state~ 
Natal. Prc~w.inr.:if?Al. ~.~c.iver1,mr,ant i:'Ancj Nm'tt'.l.\l 11 Bi~1 · B1.As.i1,e111;1s 11 P 
which became an ongoing process whith eventually resulted 
in the Indaba of 1986. 
Natal-KwaZulu today has 
million which consist of 
a population of almost eight 
six million Blacks~ one million 
Indians~ 0.8 million Whites and 0.2 million Coloureds. The 
majority of the population is concentrated around the 
industrial complex of Durban-Pinetown-Pietermarit2burg, 
which is also the second-largest industrial base in the 
country 
region. 
after 
Natal 
the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging 
occupies only 7% of South Africa's 
territory, but produces 14% of its GNP and is home to 22% 
of its population. Apart from industry, Natal also has a 
strong agricultural base and is the major tourism province. 
With regard to politics, the Whites in Natal were always 
regarded as more English and slightly more liberal than the 
rest of the country even though it did not seem this way at 
the National Convention in 1910. The fact remains that the 
Natal Provincial Council was the only one that remained 
under Opposition control from 1948 right up until the 
abolishment of the Council in 1986. Unfortunately this 
liberal perception 
general election 
received another blow in the 1987 
when the English-speaking Natalians 
deserted the liberal Opposition in droves to vote for the 
National Party, resulting in the latter becoming the 
dominant party in the Province. 
The Zulus . seem to have been mobilized under Chief 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi and his Inkatha movement which claims 
membership of over one million. Inkatha has followed a 
policy of mobilizing its followers under a mostly ethnic 
banner and to crush opposition groups, accordiMg to Maylam 
and Wright (1987 15). Some observers, such as Southall 
(1981) seriously doubts the validity of Buthelezi's claim 
of wide-spread support among the Zulus, especially in the 
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urban areas. South•ll's account is questioned by Brewer 
(1981) who claims that Inkatha do enjoy strong support in 
townships such as KwaMashu. The question of how much 
support Inkatha actually enjoys and the organisation's 
policy towards black apposition in Natal, came to the fore 
during the violent Inkatha-UDF/ANC clashes which reached a 
peak the end of 1987 in and around 
Pietermaritzbur;. It is estimated that 268 people died as 
a result of this violence during 1987 (Financial Mail, 
January 8, 1988). 
Conflicting claims have been made with respect to the 
causes of the violence - while Buthele2i has made vague 
claims (and many threats) that the UDF/ANC had launched a 
campaign to make the area ungoverMable in August last yearp 
the UDF claims that there are 11 overwhelming documentary 
evidence'' that the violence has been initiated by Inkatha 
supporters (Business Day, 22 January, 1988). The evidence 
which the UDF refers to, originates in an investigation 
launched by a team of lawyers in Pietermaritzbur; which 
apparently collected hundredm of mtatements indicating that 
Inkatha used violence against people who refused to Join 
the organization or held different political views. 
Regardless of whom instigated the violence, the fact 
remains that Inkatha is experiencing large scale violent 
opposition in its traditional base in Natalp which may be 
indcative of Inkatha loosing its absolute grip on power 
among the Zulus in Natal/KwaZulu. 
The Indians were originally imported to work on sugar farms 
and today they play an important part in the Natal economy, 
in relation to their small numbers. They 
experienced bitter conflict with the Zulus in 1949, and 
today they enjoy th~~ advantages flclwing out of their 
coalition with the Government in the Tri-Cameral system 
(although ?nly about 20% of all Indians participated in the 
TriCameral elections). For example, education expenditure 
per pupil on secondary education varies from R2 060 per 
Asian student, to R263 per Black student. The Coloureds in 
Natal, although a much smaller group, enjoy similar 
benefits flowing out of their cooption into the Apartheid 
system (Ardingtonp 1987: ~~). 
The Indaba Constitution 
The ·constitution makes provision bi...;.c:ame?r·al 
legislature, standing committees, cultural councils, an 
executivep a Bill of Rights and a Supreme Court. The 
electoral system will, instead of a simple 
winner-takes-all system, take the form of 
major .i ty or 
proporticmal 
representation where every voter will have two votes, one 
for the First Chamber and one for the Second Chamber, 
regardles~ of race or ethnic group. 
The First Chamber will consist of 100 members, 66 of whom 
will be chosen in 15 constituencies while the remaining 34 
will be allocated to the various parties 
proportionately to the votes they receive. Therefore, if a 
party received 10 votes, it will get 10% of the seats. 
Under the present South African electoral system a party 
like the Conservative Party received half the number of the 
votes that the NP received in the last election, but 
received only 13% of the seats in Parliament (under a 
proportional system they would have received almost double 
that percentage). 
The Second Chamber will consist of 50 members - 10 each 
elected by the five different background/ethnic groups. 
There are four ethnic groups, namely the Zulu, Indian, 
English and Afrikaans groups as well as a South African 
group for voters who do not wish to be classified in an 
ethnic way. Each party or interest group can nominate a 
list of candidates to represent any group and these 
candidates can be members of any group provided that those 
who vote for such candidates are members of the particular 
group in question (Davis, 1987 266). This system makes 
it possible for a party to win seats among more than one 
of the background/ethnic groups and to appeal for support 
accross the ethnic spectrum. 
The executive will consist of a prime minister and ten or 
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more ministers. The prime minister will be leader of the 
majority party in the First House and will choose five 
ministers from his own party and another five will be 
elected from an electoral college drawn from the opposition 
parties. An additional clause stipulate that at least one 
member of each background group is represented in the 
executive. 
The Standing Committees are made up of members of all 
groups in both Chambers. There will be 
members each. They will play a dominant role in the 
legislative program. Each party with more than 10% of 
electoral support in the First House will be represented on 
the committees, but no party can enjoy more than 60% 
representation on the committees. Representation on each 
committee is done on a proportional basis to ensure that 
all parties may participate. 
Legislation most laws will originate from the executive, 
channeled to the Standing committee, where a law must be 
agreed upon by a two~thirds majority of that committee. 
Once approved, it goes to the First Chamber where a simple 
majority will ratify it, and then to the Second Chamber 
where the same rule applies. A Bill affecting a particular 
group must also be supported by a majority of members of 
that group in the Second Chamber. 
Cultural Councils will protect, promote &nd maint&in 
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language and cultural rightm of the respective 
groupm. These will be established for any cultural group 
which is successful in its application to be established as 
such a group. The Cultural Councils will have the right to 
be consulted by the Standing Committees and will have an 
absolute veto over laws concerning language, culture and 
religion. They also have the right to make representations 
to all levels of government as well as to the Supreme Court 
which will make a final decision when a dispute arises. 
The Councils constituti~nally and 
entrenched. 
It interesting to note the comparisons between the 
Cultural Councils of the Indaba and those of the Belgium 
constitution. In Belgium, two separate Cultural Councils 
were set up for the Flemish-speaking and French-speaking 
communities, consisting of 50 members each and nominated 
The task of the Belgium Cultural Councils is to supervise 
and to promote the spread of their culture in their own 
regions and in the bilingual Brussels area. They may 
express opinions on any cultural problem and may be 
required to present a motivated opinion to the Executive on 
cultural matters. The spheres of influence include the use 
of language, education, fine arts, communication, foreign 
cultural relations and so forth (Senelle, 1978: 103-106). 
Basically it seems that the Natal-KwaZulu Cultural Councils 
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are very similar in nature and in task but differ in that 
the Indaba Councils may have more power ,e.g. the locul!II 
standi to go to the Supreme Court to test the validity of 
a1,y Bill. in·fringir,g on tl,e rigl,ts t':lf a <:::ultura.l ~.woup. 
l'he Indab ... , Bi 11 of Rights ~Jives the Sk1preme Court 
additional full testing powers (Dennis Davis, 1987 
because the Court will be empowered to declare invalid any 
laws infringing on human rights and freedoms. The Bill of 
F~i<;:Jhtl!llp 11 ••• g~Aarci\H"lteEwfiS tc:1 everyorrn thr:::i f1i>qual prc:>tec:::tic:m 011 
the law, without regard to race, colour, 
political opinion or economic l!lltatus, and in particular, 
enshrines the right to life and liberty, the right to own 
and occupy property anywhere; the principle of 
administrative Justice; the right to public education; 
ethnic, linguistic and cultural rights (Davis, 1987) 
Accordi~g to Davisp the Bill of Rights bears a striking 
resemlance to the European cod• of human rights, but has 
certain features of its own, eg. the right to property, 
the right to belong to any ethnic group, and the fact that 
members of all groups will have the same right to public 
fii) ch.AC e:d:. i on • 
The protection cf minority rights is an integral part of 
the Indaba constitution. Because of the particular 
ccmpo~iticn of the Natal pcpulationp Blackm will 
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inevitably dominate a proportionally-based parliament, and 
will probably obtain at least 75% of the seats in the First 
Chamber. They should also occupy about 60% of the 
positions on the Standing Committees, and at least six 
members of the Executive and the Prime Minister will be 
Black. (I have reached this figure as follows n the Prime 
Minister who will logically be a Zulu, will 
five Zulu cabinet ministers, plus one 
background group~ six). 
probably elect 
from the Zulu 
Keeping in mind the traditional Whit• fears of becoming an 
oppressed minority under a Black majority government, the 
following question can be raised Does the Indaba 
constitution provide enough protection for groups, ie. is 
there a sufficient degree of communalism to make this a 
successful plural society as set out by Van Dyke earlier 
on? 
The answer is uneqivocally in the affirmative if one has to 
judge by the numerous m~nority protection mechanisms. 
Davis (1987 266) agrees, and mention several such 
minority checks 
Legislation needs to pass through both Chambers - in the 
Second Chamber the Whites have an representation of 40% ~nd 
in fact, minority groups control 80% of this Chamber, 
through which all legislation have to pass. Furthermore, 
Cultural Councils also have veto powers; several members 
on the Executive must come from minority parties; the 
presence of a Bill of 
individual and group rights, 
independent Judiciary. 
which protects both 
and is supported by an 
The constitution strongly resembles consociational 
democracy. Firstly there is the requirement that several 
members of opposition parties should join the Executive 
(the grand coalition). Secondly, proportionality is 
present both in th~ Indaba constitution and in 
consocia~ionalism. Thitdly, both adhere to a mutual veto. 
Even LiJphart's concept cif segm•ntal autonomy can be found 
in the Indaba in the wo~kings of the Cultural Councils and 
in the local and traditional authorities. 
Criticism of the Indaba Constitution 
The leader of the Natal National Party, Stoffel Botha, 
rejected the proposals out of hand, because of the : ''lack 
of group protection and the unequal power-sharing inherent 
in the proposals''• This accusation is a complete 
misrepresentation of the nature of the Indaba, and one has 
to seriously question the reasoning ability and the 
integrity of those in the National Party who claim to be 
interested in power-sharing. The proposals are replete 
with minority protection and the only reason why it has 
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proved to be radical for the government, is because the 
l•tter is not really interested in democracy or the sharing 
cf power on an equitable basis. What the government 
actually want is for the Whites to keep overall control in 
the legislature and the executive or at least to have a 
blanket veto in any constitutional 
Blacks in the central government. 
plans which may include 
This of course is not 
true power-sharing. What the National Party is saying in 
e·ffect is "let.'s sharce power as long as we keep 1:::or1trc.;l", 
wh:i.c::h is exactely what the Indaba avoids in its 
constitution (Clarence : 1987). 
Another view from the right came from the Afrikaanse 
Handelsinstituut, which rejected the Indaba proposals. In 
the words of Hatting (1987 n 72), the meaning of the final 
proposals is that effective participation by minorities in 
power-sharing can only occur if they form alliances with 
majority parties, and he says that this does nothing to 
solve the problem of group realities. Secondly, Hattingh 
claims that the Natal economy cannot afford to fulfil the 
demands (of the Indaba) to equalize First and Third World 
economies (namely White and Black respectively), without 
th€-~ destruction r.:if "vested stc:mdarc:ls". Once again, this 
criticism can be rejected as being that of a member of the 
White minority group who will try to share political power 
superficially, without ever being prepared to give up 
control over White domination and privileges. 
260 
Criticism from the left came from the UDF, which claims 
that the Indaba was ill-timed and caused division in the 
"gr·mrid. pllii\n ·f1or totaAl l :l.b,0r·c.~t.:i.c:m 11 • Thf:i) LJDF itu1 !iilUpported 
by Sewpershad (1987 42) of the Natal Indian Congress who 
voices some more substantial, but debatable arguments, for 
example, that because the bulk of the funds of the 
Province is provided by the Central government, the Indaba 
government will have to function in accordance with the 
racial policies of the Nationalists. 
claims that the Indaba emphasizes multi~racialism, instead 
of non-racialism and he also critici~es the ultimate power 
of the Supreme Court, which goes against the principle of 
democracy (which vests such power in the representatives of 
the peoph~). 
Further critici!iilms included doubt!iil cast over the Indaba's 
claims to be democratic - firstly because so many of the 
true leaders did not participate, for example the ANC, LJDF, 
AZAPO, COSATU and PAC, and secondly because even of those 
who did participate, only a few had a real mandate, for 
example, the PFP, NRP-Provincial Council and Inkatha. But 
even the NRP lost their mandate after the government 
disbanded Provincial Councils, and the recent election 
proved just to what extent the Natal electorate had swung 
away from the NRP towards the right. Inkatha itself im 
also !iilubjected to doubts with regard to its claims for 
massive support from the Zulus - De Villiers (1987 : 15) • 
26.1. 
Other criticism is aimed at the ethnic nature of the 
Proposals, e.g. the People's Congress Party stormed out of 
the Indaba because it believed that the Bill 
would adequately protect minority rights and 
ethnic composition in the Second Chamber 
o·f ~·u~3htm 
thc\l\t. the 
would be 
Another interesting point of critique comes from David 
Welsh (private interview, 1987), who doubts whether the 
Indc:\ba r&21pres:Jented a "real tern:-1t. C:)'f negotiaticm",. sinc:e t~·1e 
principle actors on the South African political arena, the 
NP and the UDF/ANC 
further 1::la.im1s 
were! no·t. party 
that both 
to the proceedings. He 
Inkatha and the PFP/NRP 
"<:::c:,aJ.it:i.ori" hacj c:\ common intere~;;t in building an anti-NP, 
anti-ANC coalition. Welsh may be correct in so far as one 
looks at the wider South African perspective, where the 
ma.in actors are the NP and the UDF/ANC. It is true that 
neither the two main organisations participated in the 
Indaba, but on the other hand, in Natal, neither the NP nor 
the ANC/UDF are represented particulary strongly. At the 
time of the Indaba negotiations, the PFP/NRP allianc~ heJ.d 
half the parlimentary seats and the majority of Provincial 
Council seats in Natal, 
considerable proportion of Whites in Natal. Inkatha too~ 
is generally still seen as the dominant Black organisation 
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in the province. Although the negotiations did not include 
th• '•xtr•mist' vi•ws of the NP and the ANC/UDF, it managed 
majority of Natalians at the time. 
In spite of criticism of the contents of the Inda.ba 
proposals~ and criticism aimed at its supposed lack of 
l.egtimac:y and cn,~dibility, the Indabadidproduce 
prcJposa. l. s ·for a r1ew cons ti tu tior,, which (Jran t~:s equ«w.l ri~Jhtm 
tel al. l, imnd Iii\ t. tht:a simme t.:l.me), elns~1...1res minor.i.ty 
prob?t::tion. FcJr the first time, Black .and Wl·ii tG! were.~ 1w.bh? 
t.c:> n E~g C:> t. iii:\ tfi~ meE11"1ing·ful ly about th€i~ir pol i t:.lc::ii:\ l f~.1ture, 
compromi!se, achieved consensus about a 
constitution whic::h c:: e\\r'l 
Africa's problems. 
.. e:. 
<;i\ml ii:\ model for much of South 
Finally I will refe~ briefly to the Joint E:-.ec:uti vt=: 
Authority (J.E.A.) which has been launched in Natal in 
1997. According to Val Vcilker (1997: 59) the J.E.A. is a 
"unique c:01,sti tl..1 tiona l. concept" in which two ~;;ec:cmd-tier 
goverments can co-operate on matters of joint concern at 
executive and administrative level, without having any 
legislative powers. The lack of legislative powers is 
where the J.E.A. differs from the Indaba proposals, whic: h 
have as imim a single legislative for Natiml and Kwazulu. · The 
J.E.A. has a loose confederal struc:turep which allows 
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for co-operation between the Natal and KwaZulu, with both 
sides having the right to veto any plans. The body consist 
out of 10 members, five each from KwaZulu cabinet and from 
the multi-racial Natal Provincial Executive ( whose members 
are appointed by the Goverment). The Administrator of 
Natal and the Chief Minister of KwaZulu are not legible for 
membership and only they will act as referees to overcome 
deadlocks that may be caused by the mutual vetoes of the 
two sides in the J.E.A. The two referees will decide by 
"a1;;ir1\'iHc1mf.ent 11 btwtW€wfwn them how t.o solve overccJme d~tadlocks. 
Since the final arbitration lies· with them, 
arise ·if they can't come to a agreement. 
problc(ems may 
According to Volker (1987 
J.E.A .. :i.ncludel 
59) the basic powers of the 
The administration of any law of KwaZulu or Natal 
assigned to it 
The administration of any function assigned to it 
by the State President. 
Making nwc:ommenda tions to amend any legal 
provisions in KwaZulu or Natal. 
Acting as the co-ordinating agency between the two 
bodies. 
The J .. E.A. will be able to take decisions on such 
matters c\'J.S planning an construction, 
conservation, supplies and libraries. 
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It is obvious that the matters over which the J.E.A. l.. c:· 
-~ 
falls way short of the minimum 
and a single legislature for Natal and KwaZulu. Execui:ive 
and administrative co-operation on matters like libraries, 
roads and conservation can never be a substitute for the 
sharing of political power in Natal. The New York Times 
(DEC.1, 1986), summed up the government's stance towards 
t.h&~ Indct\biiil as fol l.ows: 11 ••• thG~ Botha n~gime is a poor· risk, 
incapable of moving away from a bankrupt political system -
a leadership frightened by even a limited experiment in 
mult.i-r1::ilc::ial l'"tlle ..... 11 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS OF THE MULTI-PARTY CONFERENCE 
OF NAMIBIA 
11 In the f:i.r-1al instance, wc:iuld a solut.icm not be for the 
White to move himself out of a minority position to become 
pmr·t. c:.1f thGi.' major:i.ty 7 11 Mt.ldgt:~ (1987 ~ :;~::?). 
One 61 the more remarkable political turnabouts in White 
Southern African politics has been the case of Dirk Mudge, 
who has been transformed from a conservative, ethnicity-
obsessed Southwest-African politician before 1974 to one of 
the foremost Namibian proponents of individualism in 1987. 
The transformation of Mudge will be discussed in greater 
detail to give an indication of what he has learned from 10 
years of semi-post-Apartheid politics in Namibia and to 
indicate how the political ideology in Namibia has turned 
away from the notion of ethnicity and minority rights. 
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Mudge explains the evolution of his political views as 
follows n Initially he figured that ethnic groups should be 
recognized and put together in a race federation, instead 
of a geographical federation. At that stagep most 
politicians still thought in terms of geographically based 
homelands such as Ovambo, Caprivi, Namaland and Kavango, 
linked in central government. Unfortunately, a group like 
the Whites, which constitutes about 10% of Namibia's 
population of about one million, was not concentrated in 
any specific area. To solve this problam, 
devised that was still based on groups, but without 
necessarily a geographical base. In political science 
ter~s, Mudge was thinkin~ of a Corporate Federation, of 
which the former constitution of Cyprus was an example. 
This corporate system also encountered a few problems, 
according to Mudge, of which the most important was the 
distribution of wealth - the Whites, being the most 
economically advanced group, controlled their own economic 
system, i.e. paying taxes and then 
portion of the budget on themselves, 
spending the largest 
effectively preventing 
a redistribution of wealth. This caused many grievances 
among other groups and once again, another solution had to 
be found. Finally~ Mudge and the MPC hit upon the idea of 
individual rights and majoritarianism, i.e. to prevent the 
White group from being a minority by becoming part of the 
majority of Namibiaris. According to this perception 
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the White fear of majority dominaton will disappear, once 
common ground has been reached. When this has happened, 
race, language and culture should not be used any more to 
distinguish among groups. Common ground, according to 
Mudge, can be found in common patriotism, anti-racism, 
capitalism and democracy. 
Mudge came to the conclusion that the protection of 
individual rights must enjoy foremost attention.. The 
reason why group rights need not be protected, is because 
the individuals making up groups already enjoy protection. 
He uses Lijphart's concept of con~ociational democracy and 
its first principle of a Grand Coalition to Justify his 
argument that political parties, rather than groups should 
be the basic unit (lij~hart .talks of segments or elitist 
leadership forming a government). Having rejected groups as 
a viable political entity in Namibia, Mudge logically 
rejects any form of separate areas or separate schools for 
different groups. 
Mudg• is the Chairman 
(DTA) which consi9ts 
of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance 
out of 11 ethnic groups. (The 
territory had second-tier government since 1980, based on 
self-goverment for the eleven ethnic groups.) The DTA 
withdrew from the governing National Assembly in 1983 
because of differences with the South African government, 
and together with Swanu, Bwapo Democrats, National Party 
an a Rehoboth Party, formed a Multi-Party Conference(MPC). 
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The goal of MPC was to work out a constitutional system for 
Namibia~ and in 1985 it received legislative and executive 
power from South became known as the 
Transitional Government (Barratt 1985 : 429). 
The MPC, in accordance with Mudge's view, formulated an 
individualistic constitution which largely ignored group 
rights, something which, of course, goes directly against 
the South African government's policy in this regard. It 
came as no surprise that pressure was exerted on the MPC in 
1987 to revert back to ethnic based politics by holding 
local elections based on groups. According to the Botha 
governmtent, there are insufficient safeguards for 
minorities in the constitution. According to Mr. Louis 
Pienaar (Die Burger 22 August 1987) Administr•tor-general 
of Namibia, South Africa, because of its supervisory 
capacity, has got a final say in the constitution. A 
deadlock seems imminent, because the MPC refuses to 
embrace the South African export of Apartheid based on 
forced ethnic groups. Mr. Mudge believes the reverse is 
possible~ namely that the MPC of Namibia can export their 
individualist constitution to South Africa, as the concept 
Clf "demclc::rEAtic:: mE.~.io1"'itar:iE:H'l:i.sm" will be much mclre suited to 
South Africa's problems than a policy based on groups. 
Clearly Mudge believes attack is the best form of defence 
t,nd one~ c:an guess how this piece of advice will be 
received in Pretoria. 
The Proposed Constitution as formulated by the 
Constitutional Council of the MPC includes the following 
provisions : 
-The constitution moves away drastically from 
ethnic structures, and no provision is made for 
own and common affairs. Provisions are made for: 
-Equal 
for all 
origin. 
political, 
Namibians, 
economical and social 
irrespective of 
rights 
ethnic 
-A Democratic electoral system with proportional 
representation. 
-A Bill of Rights protecting basic human rights. 
-A ~uarantee for the protection of the rights of 
ethnicp linguistic and religious groups. 
-Freedom to use any language in education. 
-An independent j~diciary. 
Chapter two of the Constitution deals with the Bill of 
Fundament~l Rights, Duties and guarantees. Section 11(2) 
stipulates that nobody will be disadvantaged becuase of his 
ethnic 
colour, 
or social background, 
religion or political 
his sex, language, 
beliefs. Section 15.2 of 
the constitution deals with the right to be associated with 
any group without being forced or prevented by anybody else 
from doing this. 
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Section 17 deals with the right of all ethnic, language and 
religious groups and of people belonging to such groups to 
maintain and propegate their own culture, 
traditions and religion, as long as they don't 
interfere with the rights of other groups or endanger 
National interests. 
No explicit recognition of minority rights is mentioned, 
and the South African government and the Southwest African 
Nationalists are on this ground strongly opposed to the 
proposals. The Nationalist perception of minority rights 
in Namibia implies that the 11 ethnic groups, 
Population Registration, would each have their parliament 
with seperate legislative and administrative powers, i.e. 
in line with the South African homelands structure. 
According to Judge Hiemstra, (1988: 11) the chairman of 
the Constitutional Committee, the va~t majority of 
Namibians reject such a interpretation of minority rights 
on he following grounds: 
-The continuation of White domination under the 
cloak of equal minority protection. 
-The absurdity of • Central government without 
the right to collect taxes. 
-A top-heavy administration, prone to corruption. 
---------------------------~----------------------
-A restriction on the freedom of politic•l partiem 
to cross ethnic bound~riem. 
The question ~rises whether the Whites as such, can 
maintain themselves as a minority on individualistic b~sis 
in a country where they make out only 10 % - of the 
populationp in rel~tion to th~ eo% of the largest groupp 
the Ovambo. According to Hiemstra (1988: 13) the Whites, 
if adopting the right strategynow, and by using their 
technological and economical mkillmp would be in no d~n;~r 
of becoming a powerlessp oppressed minority. Furthermore, 
the Bill of rights, an independent Judiciary and other 
constitutional guarentees would further safeguard their 
rights. The analogous situation in Zimbabwe, where the 
Wh:.l.t&ii)lili competing/~ooperating successfully on an 
individual basis with the Black m~Jority, could provide 
them with further peace of mind. 
I1, c:onclus.i.on it would appear that membe~s of the 
Constitutional Committee of the Transitional government of 
Namibi,-a had taken a hard look at the question cJf "whether 
formal abridgements of majoritarian power will not do more 
to alienate the majority, rather than provide for the 
security of t:.h~il mif'1or.i.ty 11 (Slabbert c:mcj Welt-!ih 1979 c 73). 
They came to the conclusion that a constitution which 
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emphasizes individualism and a common society is the best 
solution. 
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7.CONCLUSION 
Whmn I look towards the future I am fearful of the long 
darkness that may await us all. I am saddened by the human 
potential we have squandered. But we here in South Africa 
have problems to solve for whic:h the rest of the world has 
found no solutions. That in itself is a great c:hallenge. 11 
(Dr. Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert, 1985). 
The "pr~,b l ems" which Dr. S labbert is re·ferr ir1g to, it~ of 
course, a reference to the question facing every plural 
society in the world, namely how to accommodate the demands 
of its competing segments. John Stuard Mill believed that 
such efforts would be virtually impossible in plural 
societies striving to uphold democracy. Vernon van Dyke 
is slightly more optimistic in arguing that it is possible 
for governments of plural societies to achieve legitimacy 
and to maintain democracy if they accept communal.ism i.e. 
if they supplement individualism with group rights which 
will protect minorities in such societies against majority 
domination. (Van Dyke 1983). 
What I have been trying to prove in this dissertation is 
that plural societies can, to a degree, solve much of the 
conflict which plurality causes, by accepting certain 
communal measures. Of the plural societies discussed in 
.; C::' 
... ~> the most outstanding 
example of successful! management of inter-group conflict 
through constitutional eMgineering, based on the notion of 
c.~roup r i<i]hts. Canada and Belgium are also examples of 
nations which have accepted the plural nature of their 
•ocieties and have taken to pluralistic measures such as 
federation and consociationalism. This does not mean that 
communalism is infallible - the example of Northern Ireland 
has shown us that some societies are so deeply divided 
that not even communalism can offer a solutionp while the 
unwise application of some of the underlying principles of 
the concept proved to be the downfall of a united Cyprus. 
In the Soviet Union ethnic and nationalist sentiments have 
resulted in the implementation of quasi-federalism and some 
form of regional autonomy. In Zimbabwe, the reservation of 
a number of seats in Parliament for Whites 
appointment of Whites in the executive have helped to 
facilitate the transition of power from White to Black, 
even though Shona/Ndebele relations remain a source of 
conflict. 
I have furthermore tried to place the concepts of ethnicity 
and group in contrast to other. largely opposing concepts 
such a• cl••• and individualism. While group rights 
(which I have equated with minority rights for the purpose 
of this •tudy), are not intended to be a substitute for 
individual rights, it fill• the gap that is left by 
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liberalism between the individual and the state. Events in 
the 20th century have proven that group rights can 
co-eHist and supplement individual rightw in th@ wid~r 
spectrum of human rights. Even the all-important 20th 
century concept of class has lost ground against a 
resurgence of ethnicity and group consciousness during the 
second-half of the century. 
In South /~fric.~, 
al l-:l.mpclrtant 
race 
i!!!Hilll.A~» p 
ethnicity has always been the 
i:he., c::c:H.m try also haw been 
unfortunate enough to slide into a situation where race and 
class coincide. 
ethnic differences by 
differences in the status, income, occupation and wealth of 
these groups. It is this double disparity that makes even 
normally optimistic people like Dr. Van Zyl Slabbert 
fe.,\rfu J. o·f, 
us all". 
in his won:l!i:1, 11 the long darkness that o:\Wai ts 
Others like Heribert Adam, are more optimistic and believe 
that South Africa_is basically a common society in which 
ethnic sentiments and social distance between the Black and 
White groups will decrease when economic inequalities are 
non-·rc':i\c: .ia l, consumer-orientated 
industriali2ed democracy come into being. This view is 
shan,~d, although ·f'rom a socialist perspec:tive, by t.he 
"official Black opposition", the ANC, who hcllds the view 
that the White minority is more concerned 
about its materialistic well-being and economic privileges 
than ethnic concerns. In a similar vein, St«!phen. Glover 
of l987) P 
11 What ·finally hi political pow~·ff i·f you can hang 
on to your swimming pool and your Mercedes? - White South 
Africans are not attracted to power for reasons of 
benevolent paternalism. They want to defend their standard 
of life" On a less materialistic note, Gil iomf'ie argues 
that the conflict betw~en Black and White is not merely 
over materialistic concerns, but also involves strong 
feelings of ethnb-nationalism of the Afrikaner and White 
group. Giliomee's view of Afrikaner ethnicity is not 
incompatible with Gla2er's theory of the universal force of 
ethnicity and with my own view as set out in this paper. 
The crux of my argument howeverp was that ethnicity, Just 
·for th<i! smk<:! of ethn :Le .i. ty ( i. (!!. cul tur&l.) , is becommirig 
irrelevant and that the concept is used instead in to an 
increasing degree in an economic &rid political contect. 
With regard to the more practical side of South Africa's 
minority question, I have come to the conclusion that it is 
virtually impossible to prescribe or predict the nature and 
co~position of groups that will emerge in a post-Apartheid 
society under a system of voluntary association. A notable 
exception is the Afrikaner or possibly the larger White 
group, without whom no solutions is possible. 
With re;&rd to the definition of the kind of rights which 
need protection, it is clear that most ideoloc;;Jies 
throughout the politic&l spectrum make provision for the 
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protection of cultural, linguistic and religious rights, as 
long as these are not used to entrench the economic and 
political privileges of the White group - which logic tells 
us, won't be sufficient to entice the present White rulers 
into accepting minority status. The only way a solution 
in South Africa can be achievedp is to provide 
constitutional safeguards to the White holders of political 
and economical power, so that they will not loose out badly 
after power has been handed over to the Black majority, 
i.e. to give sufficient power so that they have strategic 
influence over matters concerning them as a group and over 
national issues. 
The basic issue is over compromise and trade-offs. The 
Whites have t.o compromise ther.ir EwNC lu!ii1.i.ve t,old 01, pow~,r, 
while the Blacks have to agree to some compromise to their 
aim of majority government under a one-man one-vote system 
in a unitary state. Without this compromise on both sides, 
no solution is possible, but once this has been achieved, 
~e should look at some of the constitutional systems which 
can give substance ~o such a compromise. Consociational 
democracy in a federal structure may provide the best 
solution, but the exact nature of such a systemt will have 
to be determined through a process of further negotiations 
between all relevant groups and institutions. 
Finally looking back at this essay as a whole, one issue 
The eNistance of minority groups and the 
legitimate rights of such groups i• not a newly invented 
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c:cmc:ept. Ne.i.the.~r is it otitdated c:,r· ct~ 11 rE:\c:ist 11 re)l.i.c:: of the 
past, nor is the propagation thereof a !!iiac:r if ice o·f 
liberal and progressive principles. Groupsp whether they 
are of political, ethnic or religious origin, are an 
empirical reality in today's world and very few societies 
are not plural to some degree South Africa is no 
i 
Proponents of the idea of minority rights receive criticism 
from all sides. The conservative Right, for example, 
could claim that the adherence to minority rights also 
means the acceptance o·f Black majority government, 
something which is totally unaccept-ble to them. To those 
on the left, minority rights is Just another Nationalist 
ploy to maintain White privileges and dominance. Both 
these viewpoints are incorrect, as I have tried to prove in 
this paper. Democracy. in South Africa will best be served 
not through the present minority government, neither by 
straightforward majority government, but through a system 
of power-sharing in a consociation in which even the 
smaller groups will have security for themselves and a say 
in the government of South Africa. 
I conclude with the following statement by Theodor Hanf 
Although it is quoted from a 1981-publication by Hanf, the 
remarkable aspect is that it is still applicable in 1988, 
in spite of all political developments in between = . 
"There is evidence that clear majorities of Black and 
White South Africans are prepared to abandon their 
respective maximal options and accept a compromise as the 
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second-best solution, namely power-sharing Given this 
level of awareness some form of consociational democracy 
as preemtive conflict regulation in South Africa is not at 
all inconceivable. 
------------------------------------------
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